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One of the most crucial questions facing twentieth 
century philosophy concerns the status of man in the world. 
While this has been somewhat of a perennial problem, yet it 
has taken on new and serious proportions in the last century. 
The industrialization of society, the widespread acceptance 
of a materialistic philosophy, and the abstractive methods of 
science and technology are but a few of the factors con­
tributing to its increasing complexity. In the wake of these 
and other dehumanizing forces man has become a real question 
to himself, asking such questions as. Who am I? Wiiat is my 
role in the world? Among contemporary philosophers Marcel 
has been outstanding in his long and deep interest in man’s 
problem of identity. For well over a half a century he has 
directed an inquiry into the questions surrounding man and 
his nature. In recent years this Interest has accelerated. 
Marcel's probing insight into the being of man, his reflec­
tions on its inner meaning, and his extensive exploration of 
the causative forces underlying the dehumanization of man 
afford a valuable field of study.
Tills task is not without its problems for Marcel, 
himself, presents a singular challenge. His findings through
ill
the years have been recorded as spontaneous utterances in 
diaries, plays, letters, and essays. Collecting and col­
lating his thoughts on the subject of dehumanization, and 
arranging them in meaningful pattern is no small feat in it­
self. Added to this problem is the somewhat private use he 
makes of language. Key concepts often are clothed in words 
which obstinately yield their rich meaning; nonetheless, the 
rewards of careful study far outweigh the difficulties en­
countered.
The scope of this investigation includes, first of 
all, a setting forth of Marcel’s enriched concept of being, 
followed by an analysis of the development and effects of 
modern forces of dehumanization on man. This work finds 
purpose in seeking to clearly enunciate the warning voiced by 
Marcel to all mankind of the devastating and tragic effects 
involved in man’s dehumanization.
Acknowledgment is extended to the members of the Dis­
sertation Committee for the valuable guidance given in the 
preparation of this study: William Horosz, Ph.D., Chairman,
Kenneth Rogers Merrill, Ph.D.. John Clayton Feaver, Ph.D., 
Carlton Warren Berenda, Ph.D., and Lloyd Pyron Williams, Jr., 
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THE CONCEPT OF THE DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF GABRIEL MARCEL
CHAPTER I 
MARCEL AND THE PHILOSOPHIC QUEST
Of the many voices heard in the twentieth century, 
none has been as prophetic with warning as Gabriel Marcel's,, 
"The voice of one crying in the wilderness" of philosophic 
confusion, rightly depicts the role of this unique Frenchman, 
The burden of his call, which has become increasingly rele­
vant, is centered on the conservation of man in the fullness 
of his being. Man, as a fully developed person, has been in­
creasingly endangered by the dehumanizing processes inherent 
in a modern society. Sweeping industrialization, computer­
ization and automation have all but robbed man of his person- 
hood, his dignity, his being. For the last half century this 
philosopher has sounded a clear call to all those who would 
work against this technological erosion of man. His words, 
at first somewhat prophetic, are increasingly pertinent in 
this thing-minded generation. Following the customary 
scientific bent, man has objectified man, reducing him to
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nothing more than a set of component elements, to little more 
than a statistic.
Marcel, the philosophical explorer and pioneer, has 
patiently and persistently sought out the meaning of being, 
the inner meaning of man's life. This pursuit, with its many 
ramifications, has occupied the center of Marcel's research.,
Personal Factors Affecting 
Marcel's Philosophy
In order to understand an individual, the texture of 
his temperament and the tendencies of his disposition, one 
should carefully inspect the environmental setting of his 
formative years. This is especially so in the case of Marcel. 
The tremendous sweep of his imagination, the metaphysical tone 
of his thinking as well as his intense interest in the con­
crete experiences of life, are but a few of the mature char­
acteristics of the man that can be noted in embryo during 
childhood and youngmanhood. The boy is potentially the man, 
and the man is the boy actualized. Marcel recognizes these 
early experiences as determining factors in the later de­
velopment of his philosophy; consequently, it is with diffi­
culty that one seeks to understand Marcel's trend of thought 
apart from some knowledge of his youth.
There were several significant occurrences in Marcel's 
life that influenced the development of his thought. Ac­
cording to his own testimony, the sudden death of his mother 
while he was but four years of age ranks first in importance.
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He describes it as a "death which was completely sudden and 
which shook the existence of all of us." He has reason to 
believe that it not only overshadowed his childhood but his 
whole life as well. He enshrines her memory in the very 
depth of his being. "I have few visual memories of her; but 
she has remained present and mysteriously with me throughout 
my life."2 While her sister was later to become his step­
mother, she was quite different in temperament. With little 
natural inclination toward his new mother, a strange duality 
developed between a being who had vanished yet whose presence 
was actually felt, and another dominating, self-assertive 
soul whose actual presence was never really near.
I believe now this disparity, this hidden polarity be­
tween the seen and the unseen, has played a far greater 
part in my life and thought than any other influence 
which may be apparent in my writings.3
No doubt the most telling feature of his mother's sudden 
passing which was combined with a remaining and strongly felt 
presence is that it provided a prototype of the polarity be­
tween the visible and the invisible. Perhaps this was the 
initial wedge which began to divide Marcel's world into a 
multiplicity of polarities so often noted throughout his 
writings.
1 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, 
trans. by Manya Harari. Citadel, 6th paperbound ed.; (New 
York: Citadel Press, 1956), p. 112. (Hereinafter referred
to as Existentialism.)
2%bid.. p. 112.
3Ibid., p. 1 1 3.
î+
With the marriage of his father to his maternal aunt, 
Marcel testifies of entering a "desert universe" which en­
compassed his entire childhood. He paints a graphic picture 
of the sterile and boring days experienced in this newly 
formed home. In all probability, his youthful world was 
superficial and arid in part, because of the protective shield 
thrown about him as an only child. While he longed for the 
concrete experiences which other children enjoyed, yet he 
was confined largely to an adult world and its corresponding 
thought forms. Both parents watched over him with such 
meticulous care that he felt as if he were an occupant of an 
unreal world. These well-meaning but misguided caretakers 
actually constructed a buffer between the young lad and 
reality. To such a sensitive child it could do none other 
than overwork an already fertile imagination., Early symptoms 
of a developing paranoia seem to be present in Marcel's 
descriptions of himself.
I was racked by a kind of tension which at times reached 
an almost intolerable degree. Consciously, I suffered 
from the exaggerated attention devoted to me as an only 
child. My illnesses, my successes and failures at 
school were given an absurd Importance. I felt watched, 
spied upon; I guessed that after I had gone to bed, the 
conversation in the drawingroom turned on my,inade­
quacies and on what could be expected of me.'
To complicate this growing problem, Marcel speaks of 
being so confined by an atmosphere of moral scruples and 
hygienic precautions that he described his world as being
^Ibid., p. 111.
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"antiseptic." He indicates a connection between this early
atmosphere and the particular form which his later thoughts
would take when he stated,
I can see the reason why abstraction was the keynote of 
my early philosophical thoughts and why I was almost 
contemptuously hostile towards empiricism. This atti­
tude seems to me the direct reflection of that horror 
of dirt and germs which had been bred in me from my 
earliest youth upwards. Experience, as it is mostly 
conceived by philosophers, was to me impure and 
profoundly suspect.1
He further accounts for his tendency toward idealism by ob­
serving his need to hit back at the "practical world which 
at every step proved to me my ineptitude and my awkward- 
ness." It was only on the plane of ideas that he could 
find shelter from such wounds received by contact with daily 
life; therefore, it was natural for him to think of philos­
ophizing as a way of transcending. His conception of a 
super-sensual world apparently influenced his entire 
spiritual development." Marcel lays the major portion of 
blame on his early environment and training for his leaning 
toward idealism. He reasons, in retrospect, that idealism 
never did look permanently inviting but only as a half-way 
house from which to launch further probes into reality.
This accounts for his particular interest in post-Kantian 
philosophy, especially that of Schelling. He discovered in 
Schelling's later thoughts a light "which perhaps one day




might help me to discover my own p a t h . H e  recalls his 
personal sense of need for the individual and the concrete, 
and his ever-recurring attempts to explore the world of 
reality.
My greatest joy in my childhood was to discover, to 
explore, to imagine more than I could see, to plan other 
journeys, complementary and more distant . . .  My predi­
lection for the inaccessible and the unknown went with 
a disdain, which shocks me today, for whatever is within 
the reach of all.^
Marcel always had an interest in penetrating to the heart of 
things. Truly he can be rightly called the explorer, the 
traveller, the pilgrim. His interest in, yes, his fascina­
tion with what lies below the appearance of things has been 
ever present.
All the same, I think that I am right in seeing in this 
predilection something of the metaphysical concern to 
discover the intimate at the heart of the remote, a con­
cern, that is to say, not to overcome distance by speed, 
but to wrest from it the spiritual secret which destroys 
its power as a barrier.3
For all his interest in the world of ideas, his feeling 
toward the super-sensual world seemed to become less and less 
optical— in the sense of projecting forms into space— and 
more auditory. His passion for music explains the convic­
tion of profound truth which came to him with the discovery 
of Schopenhauer's theory of music. For Schopenhauer,
^Ibid., p. 105. 
^Ibid.. pp. 114-1 
3Ibid., p. 115.
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Music is not concerned with the representation of 
phenomena or the fundamental forms that underlie 
phenomena, but has as its subject the will itself, the 
nature of which it expresses directly and immediately. 
Thus, of all the arts, music stands closest to the 
ultimate reality of things which we all bear within 
ourselves and speaks 'the universal imageless language 
of the heart.' 1
As Marcel sensed a growing need for the concrete and 
the particular, the theatre became an attractave outlet as a 
privileged form of expression. In this endeavor he was able 
to identify himself with the various characters sufficiently 
to become their mouthpiece. Rationalizing this bent for 
theatrical expression, he mentions his father's avid interest 
in the field and the fact of his superior ability in reading 
plays aloud to him all through childhood. Throughout this 
process the characters in the plays became actual and real 
for young Marcel. Hours would be spent in make-belief con­
versation. His only method of accounting for such behavior 
was the cruel lack of brothers and sisters of his own.
As he grew older, his dramatic faculties were en­
hanced by the differences he noted in temperament within his 
own family circle. This in itself created a separateness 
between members of the family which seemed all but im­
passable. Words became useless. Communication ceased. Yet 
through it all he found that harmony could be achieved in a 
higher realm through the transcending effect of music or 
drama.
-1 Patrick Gardiner, "Schopenhauer," Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 1st ed., VII, 325-32.
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At the same time, music offered me an irrefutable 
example of the kind of supra-rational unity which I 
believed to be the essential function of drama to 
establish and to promote. This explains the bearing of 
the most important of my early works, the Quartet in A 
sharp, on the connection between family tragedy, music 
and pure thought.1
Herein Marcel discovers, through his dramatic works, a way
out of the labyrinth into which abstract thinking had led him.
In fact, through these earlier years of his dramatic writings
he was constantly struggling to understand himself and to get
a firmer grip on a reality which seemed continually to elude
him.
It was the problem of the nature of reality which ob­
sessed me throughout those years of blind groping. What 
I wanted to know was not so much what reality is, as 
what we mean when we assert its existence, and when we 
say that it cannot be reduced to its outward appearances, 
or that these appearances probably conceal more than 
they disclose.2
As Marcel’s thought matured, it was apparent that an
ambivalence of feeling had gradually developed toward
idealism. This fact is to be noted throughout his future
writing as one of its most salient characteristics.
I am persuaded that, in all this attempted critique of a 
philosophy which both attracted me and filled me with 
suspicion, I was impelled by that same sense of the con­
crete and that awareness of irreconcilable differences 
which lay at the origin of my need to create. This and 
no other was the nodal point of the two forms of develop­
ment which I was to follow in my w ork.3
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 107. 
^Marcel, Existentialism. p. 108. 
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 109.
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Idealism apparently attracted Marcel because it offered him 
an abstract way of transcending many of the irreconcilable 
differences in life. On the other hand he held it suspect
inasmuch as it seemed out of touch with concrete reality and
the way life unravelled. A bifurcation of approach followed: 
one emerging from his interest in the concrete difficulties 
of life, the other from his need of a transcendent unity and
apparent complication in his approach to
^eed to create. His dramatic works
e irreconcilables of life while his 
nscendingly point to unity on a
idea
rrcel's approach to life one must not
igno'i^l^^^^^^^^^^^^Kuence of the idealistic decade in
which hê^IWi^Reyears of youngmanhood. Particularly
blessed with peace and utilitarian concerns was the first
decade of the present century. For Marcel, these days could
only be recalled with nostalgia.
I think that not one of us could suspect the fragility, 
the precariousness, of the civilisation which enveloped 
us like a tegument; a civilisation on which the wealth of 
centuries seemed to have conferred a solidity we would 
have thought it madness to question.1
Looking ahead it was difficult to imagine a world that would
be other than blessed with peace, tranquility and the pursuit
of human values. This sustained pattern of normalcy which
projected the inevitability of the progress of man, had
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 120»
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Idealism apparently attracted Marcel because it offered him 
an abstract way of transcending many of the irreconcilable 
differences in life. On the other hand he held it suspect' 
inasmuch as it seemed out of touch with concrete reality and 
the way life unravelled. A bifurcation of approach followed: 
one emerging from his interest in the concrete difficulties 
of life, the other from his need of a transcendent unity and 
reality. From this apparent complication in his approach to 
idealism arose Marcel's need to create. His dramatic works 
revolve around the concrete irreconcilables of life while his 
philosophical writings transcendingly point to unity on a 
higher level.
In considering Marcel's approach to life one must not
ignore the telling influence of the idealistic decade in
which he spent the years of youngmanhood. Particularly
blessed with peace and utilitarian concerns was the first
decade of the present century. For Marcel, these days could
only be recalled with nostalgia.
I think that not one of us could suspect the fragility, 
the precariousness, of the civilisation which enveloped 
us like a tegument; a civilisation on which the wealth of 
centuries seemed to have conferred a solidity we would 
have thought it madness to question.1
Looking ahead it was difficult to imagine a world that would
be other than blessed with peace, tranquility and the pursuit
of human values. This sustained pattern of normalcy which
projected the inevitability of the progress of man, had
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 120.
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contributed towards Marcel's idealistic view of man. This 
lingering concept runs through all his later work. Man is 
valuable, the spirit of man is the ultimately real. It is 
not difficult to gain some appreciation of the shock ad­
ministered to him, as well as to the rest of his world, by 
the sudden onset of World War I. That man would take up arms 
against his neighbor was unthinkable in that euphoric decade. 
Such savagery was inconceivable in a civilized world! Ra­
tional men would settle their disputes around conference 
tables, not on the field of mass destruction. "The shock 
administered by the war explains the change of tone and of 
key which is noticeable in the second part of my Journal."1 
In fact it was during the early days of this great encounter 
that Marcel was asked to head the Information Service 
organized by the Red Cross. His office handled thousands of 
inquiries concerning missing persons. Every day he received 
personal visits from the unfortunate relatives who implored 
him for help,
. . .  so that in the end every index card was to me a 
heartrending personal appeal. Nothing, I think, could 
have immunised me better against the power of efface­
ment possessed by the abstract terms which fill the 
reports of journalists and historians of the war.2
This continuing involvement with the lives of so many indi­
viduals had a profound effect upon Marcel. As he worked in 
this area of personal relationships he found himself
 ̂Marcel, Existentialism, p. 121. 
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 121.
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increasingly inadequate to deal with the tragic character of 
human existence. In a short while he began so to identify 
with those to whom he ministered that he saw his own personal 
problems multiplied by those of the race. He became 
solicitous for the genuine personhood of all che otherwise 
"anonymous" individuals listed in his files. It is quite 
significant that at a later date he makes the observation 
that
The dynamic element in my philosophy, taken as a 
whole, can be seen as an obstinate and untiring battle 
against the spirit of abstraction. Since the years 
1911 and 1912, the time of my first researches and my 
still unpublished earliest philosophical writings, I 
have played the part of a prosecuting counsel against 
every philosophy that seemed to me to remain the 
prisoner of abstractions.1
In an effort to arrive at an understanding of the 
true nature of man, Marcel initiated metapsychical experiments 
in the Winter of 1916-1917* Somewhat unique in the history 
of the Western philosophic thought is the influence which 
these experiments had on his thinking. He became convinced 
of the reality of a realm where communication takes place 
other than by the normal psycho-sensory modes. "The result 
of these experiments made it impossible for me to doubt the
preality of metapsychical phenomena." The Second Part of the 
Metaphysical Journal is full of discussions on clairvoyance.
Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. by 
G. S. Fraser. Gateway Edition, 1st paperbound ed.; (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1962), pp. 1-2.
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 122.
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telepathy, necromancy, automatic writing, prophecy,
psychometry and other metapsychical phenomenao
These experiences had a lasting effect on Marcel, and, 
despite opposition from academic philosophers and from 
churchmen, he held consistently that an honest 
philosopher must take this realm into account in his 
thought at least as a metaphysical possibility, and 
not dogmatically reject it. No prejudice or pressure 
ever forced him to withdraw from this position, which 
he held to be vital in his struggle against idealism.1
This intense interest in the world "beyond" and the 
bearing it had on the thinking of Marcel can be noted oc­
casionally throughout his later work. Perhaps his preoc­
cupation with death during the war days pressed him for
answers about the real nature and destiny of man until he
2became more than passingly involved in such speculation. 
One, however, should not miss the import of these overt be­
ginnings of an theretofore covert interest in the spirit 
world. While an enriched imagination is beneficial in the 
field of speculative philosophy, it should be cautiously 
balanced with due emphasis on the actual existants in the 
real world.
Marcel's Approach to Philosophy 
For over a half century Marcel has courageously 
followed a lonely path through the labyrinth of modern 
philosophy. Even to speak of "my philosophy" smacks enough
 ̂Seymour Cain, Gabriel Marcel (London: Bowes &
Bowes, 1963)5 p. 23.
2Note Marcel's parapsychological experiments con­
ducted in 19175 Metaphysical Journal, pp. 13^-35»
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of a structured system that he has carefully avoided the use
of the term. "Many a time I happened to focus my attention
on these two phrases: 'my system,' or 'my philosophy,' only
•1to be appalled by their ludicrous character." This con­
sistently unsystematic thinker seeks to portray the true 
nature of philosophizing by avoiding all cumulatively 
erected structures of thought. He would rather view the 
thinker as one who lives In a state of continual creativity, 
one who allows the whole of his thought to be called Into 
question from one moment to the next.^ He would shrink from 
the Idea of calling any of his thoughts final. His thinking 
Is characterized by a vigor and freshness, as though fed by 
an artesian well of rich concrete experiences. His thought 
patterns are highly elusive, yet they constitute an essen­
tial feature of his approach. Marcel's philosophy flows from 
life, not from textbooks or empty theory. While direction Is 
given to his thought from a number of crucial personal ex­
periences, yet there Is an appeal In his writings to all 
men, for his concerns offer a perennial challenge to those 
seeking an answer to the Inner meaning of life. He does not 
hesitate to grapple with the problems plaguing man. Marcel
1 Gabriel Marcel, Presence and Immortality, trans. by 
Michael A. Machado (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1967), p. 15.
“See Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. by 
Katherine Farrer. Harper Torchbooks, 1st paperbound ed.; 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), P* 166.
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can be counted among the pioneers of this century who have 
sought to rescue and rehabilitate the broken human spirito 
Though Marcel's philosophy abounds with what could 
be called existential concerns, yet he insists on describing 
his philosophy as "neo-Socratic." He has developed a strong 
aversion for the term existentialist due to the immediate 
association of it with the French atheistic philosopher 
Sartre. He would even reject the term "Christian exis­
tentialist."^ Strange as it might seem, Marcel did not 
personally choose the appellation "neo-Socratic." One of his 
students characterized his philosophic approach as being neo- 
Socratic; thereafter, he laid hold of it as the least in­
exact description possible concerning himself.
What the term neo-Socratism implies is above all 
the--in no way sceptical--attitude of interrogation that 
is a constant with me, and appears perhaps even more 
clearly in my stage plays. It also and co-relatively 
implies an emphasis on communication as realised by 
dialogue, by addressing oneself to a Thou and counting 
on him and thus giving him credit. It implies, finally, 
the adoption of a negative attitude to the results we 
can hope to reach through any kind of physics because 
physics can never escape from the objective categories. 
Viewed in this perspective my thought should appear as 
the prolongation of a fundamentally anti-dogmatic tra­
dition.2
In order to rediscover the real purpose of philosophy 
one must remember that the model philosopher, Socrates, did 
not write, did not teach formally, but went about addressing
1 Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, trans. by 
Bernard Wall. Gateway Edition; (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1952), p. xiii.
^Ibid.. p. xiii.
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himself to those he met in the streets; consequently, he had
difficulty with public opinion and with the rulers of the
day. Apparently, Socrates could learn little from the
fields and the trees, but much from the people in the city.
He endeavored to help people come to a better understanding
of themselves and the events transpiring about them.
Marcel's approach is similar.
Just as Socrates in Athens would start a conversation 
in order to help a person discover some truth already 
present in his own consciousness, Marcel, likewise, 
tries by his work to come into discussion with us and to 
throw a new clarifying light on our existential ex­
periences. He is present in his philosophy as a person 
in whom we can recognize and understand ourselves and 
the events that take place around us.1
Socrates sought out man, though enclosed in his own limited
personality, in order to teach him how to live in the world,
to understand his fellowman and to reach through to reality.
All this too, seems to be involved in Marcel's aim. Yet it
is particularly refreshing to note that there is no school
of Marcellian philosophers for he, too, like Socrates does
not seek disciples. "He first asks his readers to explore
the 'grain' of their own 'wood.' and then he invites them to
a dialogue."2 He is interested in helping them to purify
their own ambiguities.
Thomas J. M. van Ewijk, Gabriel Marcel, trans. by 
Matthew J. van Velzen. Deus Books] (Glen Rock, N.J.: 
Paulist Press, 1965)? P* 26.
2Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel (Richmond, Virginia:
John Knox Press, 196?)? p. 5̂
1.6
There is one further comparison between the two which 
has invited controversy. Socrates consistently insisted on 
precise definition and meaningful language. There are those 
who attribute the same to Marcel.
This method of Marcel's has certainly a Socratic 
element in more than one respect. It is not only a 
continuing enquiry, not solicitous of winding up con­
clusions in neat parcels; but it has also the Socratic 
care for the meaning of terms, a desire to 're-value 
words' rather than create new ones, a dialectical 
interest and faith in unveiling the presuppositions of 
everyman's experience.^
Those who would make such comparisons feel that Marcel's 
works are enriched not only by his fine distinctions but also 
by the new use to which he puts common-place words. Problem 
and mystery are two words in point. Fraught with uncommon 
meaningfulness are such common words as participation, 
presence, communion.
On the other hand, Marcel comes in for what appears 
to be justifiable criticism for his lack of clarity and pre- ■ 
cision. Throughout his works he imputes private meaning to 
certain words. Furthermore, he is not consistent in the use 
of these new meanings. On numerous occasions he invests the 
word being or existence with differing shades of meaning.
The reader tends toward confusion, wondering just what 
Marcel does mean. On other occasions he makes use of words 
which carry emotional overtones, very meaningful no doubt to
William Ernest Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground 
Issues of Metaphysics." Philosouhv and Phenomenological 
Research. XIV (June, 195^), *̂+0.
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him. In such eases the reader is left bewildered, wondering 
what Marcel precisely means.
Marcel has an unconventional mode of presentation 
which might prove to be an initial annoyance for the super­
ficial reader; however, he inevitably leads the reader into 
something far richer, deeper and humanly truer than 
ordinary didactic treatises in philosophy. His approach is 
often intuitive. Sometimes he loses precision but gains 
meaningfulness in the process.
He calls, he listens, and invites us to listen with 
him, as he starts off from a theme and follows it pa­
tiently and openly, with a delicate and intricate form 
of concrete analysis, which concludes not with a Q.E.D. 
through a necessary sequence of propositions, but with 
a fulness of discerned meaning through immersion in a 
reality which must be felt and heard, rather than con­
ceived and seen.1
Though some have criticised Marcel for being vague and
opaque, yet it may be that by his method of contemplation he
sees more deeply to the core of reality than do others. One
might say that he feels into the heart of a situation.
It is only through Marcel's or a like penetration into 
the mysteries of life that human beings can realize the 
unity and truth of their existence. Epistemology which 
has failed to penetrate these mysteries has been neces­
sarily inadequate.2
The very heart of Marcel's philosophy centers on the 
nature of being. He seeks to penetrate the meaning of one's 
own personal existence; therefore, the drama of being takes
^Cain, Gabriel Marcel, p. 19»
2F. Temple Kingston, French Existentialism 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. xiv.
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place at the level of experience. He makes a strenuous 
effort to replace man at the center of metaphysics. In 
effect he endeavors to get man hack inside reality as a par­
ticipant instead of facing it as an observer.
To be uneasy, I said, is to seek one's center. But 
these words sufficiently indicate that philosophy, as I 
see it, is a development which is not pursued only 
within the subject considered as a spiritual organism, 
but also within the reality for which this subject is in 
some way the end— 1 would even be tempted to say the 
'stake,' for this development seems to me very similar 
to a game or a drama.1
Any objective approach to being is out of the question. The
secret of being will not be found through logical analysis.
Accurate description from without will also fail to reveal
its true nature. One must be an active participant in being
to understand being.
I cannot talk about being from the outside, he says; 
it is something I cannot be outside of without absurdity; 
the investigation can only be prosecuted within reality; 
the philosopher can never, must never, stand before it 
as a spectator regarding a scene. Hence the questions 
are conclusive; What is being? how do I know it? what 
happens when 1 know it? what obligations settle on me 
through it?2
Marcel draws some rather severe criticism because of 
his alleged mixing of morality and metaphysics. A few critics 
think of him as a moralizer, not a metaphysician. "Marcel 
seems rather to ontologize about ethical themes; his 
philosophy seems to be metaphysical in language and moral in
1 Gabriel Marcel, Presence and Immortality, pp. 25-26.
^Robert Ostermann, "Gabriel Marcel: The Discovery
of Being," Modern Schoolman. XXXI (January, 195^)? IO3.
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•1content." Granted that the question of being is foremost 
in his mind; however, he comes at this as a moralist. For 
example, he compares the metaphysician to a bed-ridden person 
who searches for a comfortable position. In effect, he is
saying that the real source of metaphysics is a certain dis-
/
quiet, a need, an ontological demand. Hence being would be 
the fulfillment of an expectation. The need for redemption 
seems to initiate his philosophizing.
Even one of Marcel's close friends, a Catholic
brother, looks askance upon his philosophizing and goes a
step further by classifying it as theologizing.
Jacques Maritain, distinguishing between cause-seeking 
and salvation-seeking philosophies, classifies Marcel 
among the latter, which for Maritain do not really de­
serve the title of philosophers: The salvation-seeking
attitude is an 'attitude of dramatic singularity . . . 
and on,e does not philosophize in that posture.
While Marcel prefers to dissociate himself from the 
existentialist movement, yet he has been classified most 
often with those thinkers by historians of philosophy. His 
writings are replete with existential themes which set them 
off from the more traditional forms of philosophy. Turning 
to a number of typical concerns as found in his works, one 
notes that Marcel recognizes man to be the gateway through 
which the world can be understood. Man and his situation 
are central in his philosophy.
Ipedro Adams, "Marcel: Metaphysician or Moralist,"
Philosophy Todav. X (Fall, 1966), l82.
^Ibid., p. 1 8 3.
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The first question philosophy must deal with is ’What 
is man?' In order to find the answer to this question,
man must think as a whole person, not as a disincarnate,
scientific, objective observer. This implies that the 
emotions and the will enter into the philosophical quest 
no less than reason.1
If man is to think as a whole person, he must think as a par­
ticipant and not merely as an observer. The intellect,
emotions, and will enter into the experience. Existential 
philosophy underlines the necessity of decision, freedom and 
involvement as elements of authentic living.
At this point we could scarcely wish to disagree 
with Gabriel Marcel that a philosophy stopping at what 
he calls objectivity (our philosophies of essence) is 
in the proper sense of the word no philosophy at all; 
it betrays man by excluding him from its rigid rational 
calculations. f̂en— more specifically human personality—  
is the key to an authentic ontological understanding of 
the world; he alone can correct the ravages worked by a 
distorting knowledge.2
Marcel seeks to explore the mystery of existence within man 
himself. Self-discovery becomes an endless lure. Existence 
(or being) is reality. Life's ultimate aim is to unfold the 
meaning of one's own personal existence. "To the Christian 
and the non-Christian alike the philosophy of Marcel has pro­
vided an introduction into a depth of experience out of 
which vivid life arises.
In approaching life and man's uncertain role in it, 
Marcel's thought presents the image of a winding path= Here
^Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel, pp. $-6.
2Robert Ostermann, "Gabriel Marcel: Tiie Recovery of
Being," Modern Schoolman. XXXI (May, 195^), p. 289.
^Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 2.
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it seems that the understanding, in the dimension of meta­
phor, precedes rational knowledge. This metaphor communi­
cates the inner meaning of his thought.
To think--to think philosophically— is to walk a 
winding path. Or to put it more exactly: to think is
to engage:'in an interior movement which imposes itself 
on the mind of the observer under this dominant and 
non-contingent metaphor.1
Perhaps there is good reason why Marcel's method follows 
such a sinuous path. When one realizes that man himself is 
on a pilgrimage through a broken world, then his understand­
ing can grasp that the method follows the man, who is 
primarily an explorer. Truly homo viator follows a 
circuitous path.
Another characteristic of existential thought can be 
seen in Marcel's open-ended approach to truth. Man, being 
finite, is limited in his perspective and is unable to see 
the whole of reality. Philosophy, like life, is an un­
finished product. It is not surprising, therefore, to find 
many of the important works of existential philosophy in the 
form of essays, diaries, plays and notebooks. Commenting on 
those who have endeavored to expound his thought, Marcel 
mentions that some have yielded to the temptation to sys­
tematize it. He considers this to be a professional disease 
of the thinker, this yen for system. There are those who
Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel 
Marcel. The Orestes Brownson Series on Contemporary Thought 
& Affairs, No. 4 (New York: Fordham University Press,
1962), p. 11.
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must have a world of rounded-in totality with inner unity 
and completeness. Marcel regards this postulated totality 
as a mirage. He agrees with Bergson’s view of an "open" 
world with a growing edge, necessitating an active and 
imaginative intellect. Marcel should not be expounded in 
terms of finished conclusions for he continues an ongoing 
inquiry with openness of mind.
In spite of his disclaim to systematization of 
thought, Marcel seems trapped in a web of his own spinning. 
He studiously and systematically avoids systematization of 
thought. For all practical purposes he interprets life 
from a particular vantage point and consistently pursues it 
after this manner. On the other hand it appears that he 
often flees an enemy (a systematic approach) that is not in 
pursuit. There is a vast difference between superimposing 
an arbitrary structure or system on life and the discovery 
of some system in the very nature of things. The patho­
logical demand for system and organization to support one’s 
insecurities can.only be equaled by the total liberation 
found by those who seek to escape from the supposed im­
prisonment of system. Freedom from system does not neces­
sarily give one a true picture of reality. System or no 
system, reality should speak for itself. It appears that 
Marcel makes a fetish out of non-system, to the extent that 
one wonders if it is not an overcompensation for the rigidly 
structured days of his youth.
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Marcel, in avoiding philosophic systematization, 
apparently considers it to he nothing more than an arbitrary 
superimposition on life and reality, objectifying that which 
is subjective and hence not analyzable. Following this 
pattern one would be forcing reality into an arbitrary mold, 
not letting it take its own particular shape. Cain tends to 
agree with Marcel's view as he observes,
Marcel is not the kind of thinker who has a system 
of cubby-holes--crude or intricate— into which he puts 
all the stuff of his life and thought, and, when this 
fails, throws what will not fit into the waste-basket 
of intellectual oblivion. He is not the kind of a 
thinker for whom things must come out even, with no 
overlaps or disjointedness, with everything formulable 
in logically consistent and meaningful statements. He 
is not the kind of thinker for whom the world is a neat 
pyramid of billiard balls, in hierarchical gradation, 
from the electron-flash to the Absolute--neat, clean, 
and well-lighted, with everything in its place. He is 
not the kind of thinker who advances with deliberate 
and systematic method along a route that has been care­
fully mapped beforehand to reach points where definite 
answers will meet definite questions.1
In spite of his rejection of systematization in 
philosophy, Marcel's work is based on an underlying principle 
of unity which could be considered a system in its own right. 
For what is a system if not a unifying principle by which 
related thoughts cohere? His underlying vision, though 
dimly seen at the beginning, becomes progressively more 
clear. This unifying vision "expresses itself in the con­
viction that within the temporal and transient order homo
1Cain, Gabriel Marcel, p. 12.
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•1viator is given a foretaste of eternal realities." While 
Marcel's works appear to be more of an overflowing response 
from deep-seated urgings within, yet they are hardly without 
some unifying principle.
Marcel's Unique Method 
An introductory chapter on Marcel's philosophic quest 
would be incomplete without some mention of his character­
istic method of inquiry, which is the most distinguishing 
aspect of his philosophical explorations. Basic to under­
standing all of his investigations of reality is his view of 
the knowing process.
The distinctive note of philosophic thought, at least 
according to my conception of it and I have many au­
thorities for that conception, is that not only does it 
move towards the object whose nature it seeks to dis­
cover, but at the same time it is alert for a certain 
music that arises from its own inner nature if it is 
succeeding in carrying out its task. We have already 
said that the point about philosophic thought is that 
it is reflective; and it is into the nature of reflec­
tion, as an activity, that we must now probe more deeply 
than we have done so far.2
Marcel proceeds to distinguish between two types of reflec­
tion or thought which he calls primary and secondary reflec­
tion. It might be pointed out that both of these are deemed 
necessary and valid when properly used.
 ̂Samuel Me Murray Keen, "Marcel, Gabriel," 
Encyclopedia of Philosonhv. 1st ed., V, 153*
^Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. I: Re­
flection and Mvsterv. trans. by G. S. Fraser. Gateway 
Edition; (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, I960), pp. 95-96.
(Hereinafter referred to as The Mystery of Being. Vol. I.)
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Primary reflection constitutes the characteristic
approach of science and technology. It is brought to bear
only upon problems. It is the kind of thinking done when
one thinks about things or objects.
Science only proceeds by way of abstraction and is not 
concerned with 'being' and the subjective experiences 
of 'being,' which do not change anything in the object. 
The object alone is of importance, and nothing else; 
it is separated from its surroundings and dissected in 
all its component parts.1
This problematic approach has as its salient feature the
separation of the questioner from the object about which he
is questioning. "A problem is something I meet, which I find
complete before me, but which I can therefore lay seige to
2and reduce." Hence, primary reflection is a type of
problem-solving thinking. Since it aims at knowledge that is
universal in scope, as well as abstract and objective, it
consequently excludes that which is personal and particular
as being irrelevant to its purposes. It is specifically
interested in that kind of knowledge which is verifiable.
Problem and verification are complementary ideas; where 
we can get sufficient distance from our own subjective, 
emotional, biographical selves in order to pose an ob­
jective problem, we can in theory get an answer which 
will be verifiable by all observers who will go through 
the appropriate procedures of observation and testing.3
Primary reflection, of its very nature, seeks knowl­
edge which is not only verifiable but also objective. Thus
^Ewijk, Gabriel Marcel, p. 27. 
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. 117' 
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 18.
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it is necessarily abstract and partial in its relationship
between the object and the thinker. It must be remembered,
however, that Marcel does not condemn primary reflection in
itself but only its misuse.
However, intellectual and moral confusion result when 
primary reflection becomes imperialistic and claims the 
right to judge all knowledge and truth by criteria ap­
propriate only to the realm of the objective and the 
problematic. When this happens, persons are reduced to 
mere objects, the world to a collection of things, 
science gives way to scientism, and the inexhaustible 
riches of a kaleidoscopic world are forced to conform 
to the logic of black and white.1
Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is the type 
in which the observer is personally involved. It is found 
more commonly in the areas of religion, art and philosophy. 
In making a subjective approach the individual himself be­
comes a participant. He no longer remains a mere observer, 
and as such an element of mystery is injected into the whole 
process. Secondary reflection thus provides a means whereby 
one is enabled to more deeply participate in the mystery of 
being. The question immediately arises, what does Marcel 
mean by the term mystery?
Marcel makes particular use of the term mystery.
Even though it has been filled with ambiguity, he endeavors 
to invest it with a new and precise fullness. In common 
usage, one often thinks of a mystery as a problem which con­
tains an unknowable element; however, Marcel states that
^Ibid.. p. 19.
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A mystery is something in which I am myself involved, 
and it can therefore only be thought of as a sphere 
where the distinction between what is in me and what is 
before me loses its meaning and its initial validity.1
So when I am a part of and inseparable from that which I am 
investigating, the element of mystery is involved.
Mysteries are recognizable only as one becomes a participant 
in them. It is impossible, therefore, ever to achieve an 
objective view of oneself. Marcel is not hesitant to pro­
claim that authentic human life moves within the realm of 
mystery. There are types of truth, personal truths, which 
are literally inseparable from their abstraction. This does 
not imply that mysteries per se are unknowable. For as one 
participates in these relationships the meaning of human 
existence glows in a new light. "It is of the essence of 
the mysterious to be approachable by a type of rational 
thought which Marcel calls secondary reflection.
It appears that Marcel is seeking to make the simple 
distinction which obtains between empirical fact and truths 
gained by intuitive grasp. In all likelihood, the basic 
difference between primary and secondary reflection can be 
seen in the fact that the latter seeks for inner meaning­
fulness in life’s experiences, not content with that which 
might be simply abstracted from them or objectified by them.
^Marcel, Being and having, p. 117. 
%een, Gabriel Marcel, p. 22.
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Another fundamental distinction as pointed out by 
Marcel between primary and secondary reflection has to do 
with the matter of personal involvement— secondary reflection 
entailing this inseparable type of personal participation 
with that which is being investigated. The fact is, there 
can be no kind of experiencing without personal involvement, 
be it little or great. All experiencing by its very nature 
is subjective and personal to some degree. Is primary re­
flection, thus, any less of a mystery than secondary re­
flection? Can either be totally objective?
Marcel's significant term mystery, with all its 
privately imputed meaning, seems to be an unfortunate choice 
since it is surrounded with centuries of connotation sig­
nifying the unknowable. Perhaps a new word should have 
been coined that would have more clearly conveyed his true 
meaning. This practice of choosing ambiguous, if not mis­
leading terms, continually plagues Marcel's attempts at 
exposition. Strangely enough, he considers it something of 
a virtue for it gives more latitude to an enriched, personal 
interpretation. To him, life has no rigid and exact di­
mensions .
Marcel's Philosophical Context
In seeking to understand the philosophy of any 
thinker, it is of first importance to grasp the world 
situation of his day. Only after this is done can one see 
the person's view in proper perspective. What kind of a
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world is this into which man is thrust? How does he view 
his own human situation? From his vantage point in time how 
does he assess the prospects and condition of man in general? 
More specifically, what is the contextual setting from which 
he philosophizes? All of these factors lend color and tone 
to what he says, and afford a backdrop of existential mood 
against which all his words rise in bold relief.
Marcel, in contradistinction to Descartes' in­
dubitable, sees the existential indubitable as the self in­
carnate in the body and as manifest in the world. Existence 
is nothing more nor less than presence to a body. At the 
first moment of selfconsciousness one finds himself ex­
periencing an apartness, a standing out, over against a 
world which is also indubitably existent. One's body thrusts 
him into a world of real beings; hence, Marcel initially sees 
being in a situation in a personal, individuated sense. Each 
person is a being involved in a particular situation. Family, 
friends, surroundings, past, present and future prospects are 
all a part of him. Man, in effect, is constituted by his 
personal situation.
What is real is the altogether. The cogitans is 
erected by a retreat from the altogether; to that 
extent it is unreal, and if we want to restore its 
existential density we must re-cross to the cogitaturn.
But if we do we find that we recover not our isolated 
existence, but a global reality which is given en masse 
and which alone can give the cogitans real rootsTI
1 Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel, p. 17.
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So Marcel really sees man as being constituted by his total 
situation, and not the total situation by the individuated 
"I." Thus incarnation, the joining of the person to the 
body, is the foundation of one's being-in-a-situation.
Marcel speaks of a "certain general way of looking 
at the w o r l d . T h i s  backdrop, against which he philoso­
phizes, is considered to be a broken world. Perhaps this 
insightful observation can best be stated by the heroine of 
one of his plays :
Don't you feel sometimes that we are living . . .  if 
you can call it living . . . in a broken world? Yes, 
broken like a broken watch. The mainspring has stopped 
working. Just to look at it, nothing has changed. 
Everything is in place. But put the watch to your ear, 
and you don't hear any ticking. You know what I'm 
talking about, the world, what we call the world, the 
world of human creatures . . .  it seems to me it must 
have had a heart at one time, but today you would say 
the heart had stopped beating.2
Here one finds a fashionable lady, Christiana in Monde 
Gassed who is smart, witty, flattered by friends, involved 
in the onrush of a busy, yet desirable type of life, break­
ing through the mask of an inner grief, an anguish, to the 
surface of reality.
No doubt this broken world, which Marcel describes 
as hurtling on towards mass suicide constitutes the price to 
be paid for the amazing progress of our times.^ He pictures
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 21. 
“mrcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. I, pp. 26-2?. 
^See The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 28.
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the world in Its present situation as being whole, single.
"It is from this very unity and totality that it draws its
•1sinister new power of self destruction." This kind of unity 
cannot be other than bad in itself for it is linked to the 
existence of a will to power. He envisions a single con­
queror gaining possession of the technical equipment that 
would render both rebellion and opposition futile. In such 
a collectivized world, made possible through scientific and 
technological advances, the idea of any real community be­
comes practically inconceivable. Life's old intimate quality 
has been lost for individuals by the increasingly complex and 
unified social organization of human life. The socialization 
of life has been brought about in part by all being treated 
more and more as agents whose behavior ought to contribute 
toward the progress of a certain social whole, something 
that is rather distant, oppressive, even tyrannical. This 
view is promoted by a growing bureaucracy that has attained 
a certain degree of power which ultimately tends in the 
direction of a police dictatorship where persons are treated 
as pawns. The inevitable outcome involves a strange re­
duction of personality to nothing more than an official 
identity.
Marcel adds a further dimension to his notion of a 
broken world. He poses a question which has definite theo­
logical overtones.
 ̂Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being< Vol. I, p. 28.
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If anybody r.ccepts the dogma of the Fall, is there not 
implicit in that acceptance an admission that the world 
is, in fad, broken? In other words, is it not the 
case that the world is essentially broken . . . not 
merely historically broken, as we haye seemed to be 
saying, basing ourselves, as we haye done, on a certain 
number of facts about the contemporary world?^
He continues probing by asking if talk about a broken world 
does not imply that there was a period when the world was 
intact? His answer is in the negatiye since it contra­
dicts both the teachings of the Church and all the showings 
of history. He insists, howeyer, that the broken state of 
the present world has become much more obvious than in pre­
ceding centuries due to the socialization of mankind, the 
mechanization of industry, and the consequent loss of dig­
nity associated with being an individual person.
Marcel has weakened his argument about a broken 
world by his mistaken view of the Church's traditional po­
sition. The Church has traditionally held that the world 
was once intact before the fall of man. This, according to 
Church dogma, accounts for the broken state of the world.
The traditional Christian position would have strengthened 
his point if it had been correctly stated.
Marcel insists that one needs to reflect on the 
situation at hand, imagining the logical outcome of present 
world trends. Through careful observation and assessment the 
opportunity still remains for concerted and effective 
action; however, unless the perilous tendencies of the
^Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. 1, p. k2.
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twentieth century are reversed, the prospect for the future
looks bleak indeed to Marcel,
In concluding his Gifford Lectures delivered at the
University of Aberdeen in l9*+9-50? Marcel definitely alludes
to the possibility of this being the end-time. Such terms
as, historical cataclysms, catastrophes, and apocalyptic,
are used without any hesitation. While he does not indulge
in prophesying, yet he warns with a strong sense of concern
and foreboding :
There have been periods in history when a philosopher’s 
audience could listen to him in a certain atmosphere of 
serenity. They could look upon their future on this 
earth as being comparatively safe . . .  at least from 
the great historical cataclysms , . . But our situation 
today is precisely the opposite . . .  we must admit the 
extreme probability that we are heading for catastrophes 
even more terrible, even more uprooting, than those 
which many of us have witnessed during the last thirty- 
five years.1
Marcel depicts the situation of modern man to be that 
of alienation, both from his God and from himself. He is 
unsure of his own essence and a stranger to himself, lost 
and adrift in the universe. His predicament deepens when he 
recognizes that modern man has gained the technical ability 
to change or destroy the earth. Sam Keen well describes 
Marcel's view: "Within this apocalyptic situation, pregnant
^Gabriel Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II; 
Faith and Realitv. trans. by Rene Hague. Gateway Edition; 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 186. (Herein­
after referred to as The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II.)
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with the seeds of both utopian promise and hellish destruc­
tion, modern man exists, ill at ease, a problem to himself.
Concluding Statement 
In coming to the close of this brief introductory 
essay one would do well to recall the importance of a 
writer's background in reference to his later philosophic 
stance. Arriving at a better understanding of Marcel as a 
man should enhance the meaningfulness of his writings. 
Personal biases of earlier years have a way of persisting 
into later life, surfacing at last as settled views.
Nor can one ignore the structure of his unique in­
vestigative procedure— primary and secondary reflection.
This method of approach underlies all of Marcel's philoso­
phizing. One might follow its implications with profit.
Finally, the burden of concern which Marcel exhibits 
for the preservation of the true humanity of man can best be 
grasped in the twilight of his foreboding world-view.
Before proceeding further it would be enlightening 
to consider Marcel's concept of being. In fact, it is neces­
sary to come to an understanding of what he means by being, 
before one can fully grasp the peril of dehumanization. To 
this, one's attention is now directed.
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 9*
CHAPTER II 
MARCEL'S APPROACH TO BEING
The central concern of Marcel is that man will attain 
meaningful self-fulfillment. He is interested in the 
actualization of the rich potential inherent in all persons. 
He is not only aware of the natural "urgency to be" that 
characterizes all men, but also of the threat to personhood 
found in contemporary living. Caught in its current, man 
tends to be swept into a meaningless existence. Marcel 
pictures man as being on a pilgrimage through a broken 
world, largely destitute of true meaning, faced with the 
constant peril of the loss of being. Prior to an investiga­
tion of the predicament of modern man with its many impli­
cations, one needs to explore Marcel's concept of being 
envisioning the richness of full selfhood. Only then can he 
grasp the wealth of being that man stands to lose as he en­
counters the technological methods of a thing-centered 
culture.
It should be stated from the outset that the basic 
interest of this inquiry is not so much the metaphysical 
structure of being as it is the phenomenological aspects of
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being. What does man possess that makes him distinctly 
human— that he is in danger of losing through the process of 
modern living? The remainder of this chapter is devoted to 
an exposition of Marcel's answer to this as well as other 
related questions.
The Meaning of Being 
Nowhere does Marcel attempt to define the term 
being. In fact, his disdain for systematic development ap­
pears to reach its height when he presents his views on the 
nature of existence. Abstract definitions and dialectical 
arguments are all laid aside and instead one witnesses oc­
casional flashes of insight accompanied by sudden sallies of 
thought. While these are appreciated yet the reader feels a 
bit bewildered if not confused, for if ever Marcel has an 
obligation to the reader to be explicit, it is when he 
treats this all-important concept of being. He freely admits 
the difficulty of definition.
As for defining the word 'being,' let us admit that 
it is extremely difficult. I would merely suggest this 
method of approach: being is what withstands--or what
would withstand--an exhaustive analysis bearing on the 
data of experience and aiming to reduce them step by 
step to elements increasingly devoid of intrinsic or 
significant value. (An analysis of this kind is at­
tempted in the theoretical works of Freud.
The fact that it savors of inferiority and subjectivity does
not exclude its verbal formulation and conceptualization;
however, a true definition of being (by genus and difference)
 ̂Marcel, Existentialism, p. 1̂ .
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is literally impossible since being is not a snb-olass of 
some larger class.
At times it appears that Marcel is contradictory; 
however, there is the possibility that these apparent con­
tradictions represent nothing more than the growing and ex­
panding concept of being which he has nurtured over the 
years. Another explanation might be found in his peculiar 
method of philosophizing. "Each statement is a result of a 
re-seeing that flashes out of his absorption with a concrete 
s i t u a t i o n . A  few examples of seeming conflict will now be 
cited--all of which purportedly set forth Marcel's "basic 
concern":
The fundamental datum of all metaphysical reflection is 
that I am a being who is not transparent himself.2
We are accordingly obliged by necessity to recognize 
that being, in the full sense of the word, cannot be 
treated as a datum,3
The problem of the metaphysical foundation of witness is 
obviously as central as any,^
. . o it is on the ground of immortality that the de­
cisive metaphysical choice must be made,?
Gallagher observes that such propositions are actually inter­
related, and the fact that they resemble one another confirms
1 Gallagher, Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 118.
p Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 290.
^îfercel. The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. ^1,
kMarcel, Being and Having, p. 97- 
^Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. II, p. 151•
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the value of his procedure and indicates the pervading
orientation of his thought.
Underlying everything is the blinded intuition--but 
this does not function as a premise from which other 
statements can be deduced. Rather it serves as a light 
which is shed upon and reflected by every concrete 
situation into which thought plunges afresh. And what 
this light discovers is in each case— presence. Every 
one of Marcel's 'central concern' formulas brings out in 
a different way the notion that philosophy is nurtured 
by an experience of presence. Ultimately this presence 
can only be an absolute presence.1 _
Being does not lend itself to easy definition as 
would an object. Being must be grasped, sensed, intuited. 
Marcel speaks of a blinded intuition, a primordial grasp, a 
basic self-consciousness. Since being cannot be objectified 
like a thing, it is best experienced. One does not come to 
an understanding of being through observation but through 
individual participation. Thus it cannot be characterized 
and analyzed as an object. Enumerating its traits cannot 
set it forth in clear light, for one senses a basic elusion
taking place in the process. As an effort is made to pin it
down in so many statements, an adroit escape is made by 
being itself. So the characteristics of being do not consti­
tute it, but are mere indicators of its presence. A fitting 
illustration can be found in seeking to know what it is like 
"to be a woman." In vain does a woman try to communicate to
a man what is involved in her real being. To understand, one
must be one! Under these circumstances, then, how must one
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. 7*
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proceed to make more explicit this ontological mystery of 
being? Through personal introspection a few intuitively- 
gained insights might be set forth, communicable only to 
like beings--persons. Marcel speaks of this inner process 
of comprehension as secondary reflection. It is at this 
point that he speaks of the mystery of being. One comes to 
an assurance of being by a kind of blinded intuition. This 
is a primitive assurance of the presence of being. Since 
the self is part of the content, yet unassessable, this 
mysterious comprehension at best can be tabbed a kind of 
intuition.
One might ask the question, what is meant by the 
affirmation of being? How does one affirm the presence of 
being? Can it be accomplished in a positive, definitive 
sort of way? Or on the other hand can being best be seen as 
a reflection of its polar opposites? As one proceeds into 
the investigation he must constantly bear in mind the un­
certainties (a lack of positive assertive statements) sur­
rounding Marcel's concept of being. His view appears so 
fluid that one must settle in his own mind what he thinks 
Marcel's ultimate meaning to be. Gallagher ventures what 
seems to be the most likely formulation of Marcel's view.
In broad outline, his approach will be followed.^
pp. 53-65.
^Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel.
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Now back to the original question: What is meant by
the affirmation of being? It simply means that one dis­
coverably declares, through the intuitive grasp of self- 
consciousness and the awareness of other selves, that he is 
and others are. To acclaim with certainty that being "is" 
indicates that one has experienced being. At this point the 
essentially anti-Cartesian character of Marcel’s metaphysics 
emerges. "It is not enough to say that it is a metaphysic
of being; it is a metaphysic of we are as opposed to a meta-
•1physic of I think." Marcel seriously doubts that a person 
can abstract the truth about being from his own experience 
as he introspectively looks within himself. It probably will 
involve an intense desire to understand himself in his con­
crete experiences as a man among men.
It may mean devoting myself to understanding my own 
life as fully as possible; and where I use the word 
'life' in that connection, I could equally well use 
the word 'experience.' If I try to do so, I shall most 
likely be led to a strange and wonderful discovery—  
that the more I raise myself to a really concrete per­
ception of my own experience, the more, by that very 
act, shall I be attuned to an effective understanding 
of others, of the experience of others. Nothing indeed 
can be more important and helpful than to realize this 
fully,2
Marcel feels that the discovery of self consists in experi­
encing the "we are" over against the "I think." Concrete 
understanding of the self is not an ego-centric matter. Ego­
centrism is possible only in a being who has not properly
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. 10. 
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. 7»
mastered and assimilated his own experience. When one is
obsessed by an ego-centric preoccupation, that preoccupation
acts as a barrier between himself and others. As a person
breaks down this barrier he tends to rediscover his own
personal experience, for it is in real communication with
other experiences. If I am cut off from the one, I am cut
off from the other. So I can best realize and understand
my own being as I sense being through intersubjectivity.
A complete and concrete knowledge of oneself cannot be 
heautocentric; however paradoxical it may seem, I 
should prefer to say that it must be hetero-centric.
The fact is that we can understand ourselves by start­
ing from the other, or from others, and only by start­
ing from them.1
Marcel's statement is strong. No doubt he is over­
stating his case by using the word "only" in the above 
quotation. There is a sense in which everyone must start 
with himself. For one to be aware of others is predicated 
on the consciousness of his own existence. While their 
presence is no doubt enriching, supportive, and clarifying 
of one's own self-image, yet others do not constitute the 
self, neither are they prior to self-consciousness.
Gallagher experiences some difficulty as he tries 
to unscramble Marcel’s meaning of "affirmation of being."
He finally concludes that one can best understand Marcel's 
meaning at this point by exploring what he intends by the 
opposite, "denial of being." "To say that 'nothing is' is
^Ibid., p. 9-
k2
to declare that 'nothing counts.'' This entails a negative 
kind of definition. In all probability this is the meaning 
of Solomon's statement, "Vanity of vanities . . . all is 
vanity.Nothing signifies, nothing counts, nothing is!
This is certainly the voice of nihilism. So as one views its 
opposite, denial, a clearer concept of being tends to 
emerge. Being is not simply to be there, but to be there 
meaningfully, worthily, valuably. Being is that which re­
sists and defies critical dissolution. It refuses to be 
dissipated in the hollow appearances of functionalized 
living. Being doesn't disappear under the disintegrating 
pressures of contemporary life. Being is not exhausted 
through the analytic techniques of modern science. Being is 
not transparent under the eye of the microscope, nor does it 
yield its treasures of meaning to the observer and tech­
nician. It is inexhaustible and opaque to the eye of the 
logician. To affirm being, then, is to declare a depth, a 
profundity, a mystery in reality beyond mere observation. 
Individual participation, personal experience, and intersub­
jectivity are the key to its comprehension and understanding. 
It rejects a nihilistic "seeing-through."
To both the affirmer and denier, being is considered 
in relation to a need. This need is universal and natural, 
an urge to be, in fact the innate demand for meaningful
lEccl. 12:8.
^Gallagher, The Philosophv of Gabriel Marcel, p. 53*
^3
existence. This is what Marcel terms ontological exigence, 
which will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.
In seeking to understand Marcel's point of view in 
relation to being, one should not prematurely inquire as to 
its essence, for this can best be comprehended by grasping 
the need or demand for it. An insightful analogy can be 
seen in the fact that the nature of water is understood, at 
least in part, by the intensity of need which a man dying 
of thirst has for it. In all practicality it constitutes 
an important property of water from the dying man's point of 
view.
Marcel's view of being, according to Gallagher, can 
best be understood by what he opposes to it. . . being
vs. having; being vs. existence; my being vs. my life. Of 
these contrasted couples, the first receives by far the most 
extensive treatment."^ In the discussion that follows these 
general lines of division will be observed.
Being and Having
In seeking to illuminate his meaning of being, Marcel 
contrasts it with the concept of having. "Fundamentally the 
whole problem comes back to the distinction between what we 
have and what we are. H e  notes that it is extraordinarily 
difficult to express the difference in conceptual terms.
1 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 53*
2Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 311»
Repeatedly he comes back to this point: being cannot be
shown, cannot be signified, for it eludes every category in 
which having is involved. "For Being is, quite funda­
mentally, not something which we can discuss. We can dis-
*1cuss only that which is not Being."
First of all, Marcel suggests that what one has, ob­
viously presents an appearance of externality to himself.
What we have evidently has a kind of exteriority as 
regards the self. Yet this exteriority is not absolute. 
In principle what one has are things (or what can be 
compared with things ) in the extent to which such com­
parison is possible.2
He further observes that one can only have something whose 
existence, for the most part, is independent of himself. So 
what one has is added to himself. This consideration under­
lines the objectivity of that which a person possesses. It 
becomes a thing in reference to him. He thus becomes a sub­
ject in relation to an object. His being is an internality 
in comparison to the externality of the object. Here then 
is established a subject-object relationship.
Marcel also notes that what one possesses is a thing 
over which he acquires a specific right of disposition.
" . . .  the fact of being possessed by me is added to other 
properties, qualities, etc. that belong to the thing I have. 
I only have that which I in some way and within certain
^Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 130.
pMarcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 311.
^5
limits have at my disposal."1 It appears, then, that one's 
possession is a thing which is not himself, but which one at­
taches to the circle of himself. "What I have is a thing. an 
alien quid which I, as a oui, annex and over which I acquire
pa specific right of disposition." Having, then, appears to 
be an activity of an autonomous self.
In Marcel's discussion of having, as related to 
one's own body, he makes the statement that a person does 
not have a body since it is not properly at his disposal, 
such as in suicide.  ̂ Therefore, he would say that one is a 
body, not has a body. As a critical consideration one might 
point-up the need to distinguish between having in the sense 
of ownership and having in the sense of trusteeship. In the 
latter sense one does possess a body. He holds it in trust 
from the Creator yet is free to dispose of it as will, but 
not without being ultimately responsible for it. Notwith­
standing, Marcel continues to insist,
'Having' is being able to dispose of, having a power 
over; it seems clear to me that this disposal or power 
always implies the interposal of the organism, i.e. of 
something about which, for that very reason, I cannot 
say that it is at my disposal. The metaphysical 
mystery of non-disposability may essentially consist in 
the impossibility, for me, of really being able to dis­
pose of that which gives me the disposal of things.^
^Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 311•
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 5*+* 
^See Marcel, Being and Having, p. 156.
^Ibid.. p. 82.
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The situation in regard to one's own body thus seems
ambiguous. In a sense it is a person's prime possession,
since it is through one's body that all other possessing
becomes possible. One's body enables him to intervene in
real events, and as such it is the absolute having.
Yet in a sense 1 cannot enclose my body within the set 
of categories which it alone makes possible. Since 
all having is exercised over another, the body as 
mine is not possessed: it is not a thing which 1 have
at my disposal.1
It is still pertinent to make the distinction between having
in ownership and having in trusteeship. Then, too, one must
realize that the term "myself," referring to the person 1 am,
cannot be equated with "my body," the place of my residence.
Marcel gives further thought to two rather meaning­
ful words: dispose and transmit. Sometimes he tends to use
them interchangeably and at other times he makes a distinc­
tion between them. In reference to the matter of having, the 
word dispose carries the weight of an individual's power to 
control, determine, or regulate. On the other hand the word 
transmit would indicate the ability to transfer something 
from one person to another. " . . .  the case of the trans­
mission of a message which involves an emission at the point 
of departure and its reception at the point of arrival, can 
be taken as typical of what we mean by transmission."^ He 
states that it is only in so far as a thing is attached to
1 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 54.
2Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 312.
>+7
a person, and not an integral part of being, that it is 
transmittable» It is what one has, not what he is that is 
transmittable. Thus, feeling or sensation, as part of one­
self, is not transferrable. "What belongs to me, what I
have, is on the contrary precisely what can be trans- 
-]mitted." He makes a closing observation that, "If the 
category of being is really valid it is because that which 
is not capable of being transmitted is to be found in re-
pality." Marcel's indication here is that being is that 
which is real and that it cannot be grasped or comprehended 
through transmissive knowledge (which is reserved for pos- 
sessable things) but simply and profoundly through indi­
vidual participation. The grasp of being must come by an 
untransmittable knowledge. It arrives via intuition, by 
participation subjectively experienced.
Since one can only discuss that which is not being, 
it follows that being is uncharacterizable. "Characteriza­
tion is a certain kind of possession, or claim to pos­
session, of that which cannot be possessed."3 The question 
could be raised: In what sense is characterization a pos­
session? One should first be reminded that being cannot be 
characterized or abstracted. If this were possible then one 
could possess another by knowing all the facts that
"’ibid., p. 312. 
^Ibid.. p. 311.
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. 169-
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constitute him. Thus, in this sense characterization is a 
certain kind of possession. Knowledge of being comes 
through a blinded intuition, says Marcel, and not through 
sense perception. Sense perception can only net abstrac­
tion; therefore, man has no way of abstracting being. Since 
being cannot be abstracted, then it cannot be possessed.
While possession or having can be rightly predicated of 
objects it cannot be used in reference to beings or persons.
Moreover, being can never be a sum. "X am alwavs
and at every moment more than the totality of predicates
that an inquiry made by myself--or by someone else— about
myself . . . would be able to bring to l i g h t . T h u s  being
does not lend itself to cataloguing. Only a thing or an
object possessed can be characterized. There is that in man
that will not lend itself to enumeration.
But being is beyond all inventory. And man insofar 
as he is held fast by being is a channel of the in­
exhaustible. Our civilization is essentially the 
imposition of the rationalistic side of the human self.
As a discursive reasoner, as one who indulges in pri­
mary reflection, man is above all a manipulator and a 
planner; but only what is possessed can be manipulated, 
and therefore, the vision of modern civilization does 
not extend beyond man as a 'haver.
Marcel's conclusion is that a reality such as being is un­
characterizable, and therefore is., insofar as it is given 
to me as presence. Being and presence always coexist.
Likewise, not-prèsence and not-being are always found together.
^Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 199*
2 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 56.
^9
Being and Existence 
In discussing this subject one encounters the diffi­
culty of Marcel's private use of language; however, it will 
be helpful in understanding what he means by being to observe, 
in contrast, what he considers existence to be. While there 
seems to be a lack on Marcel's part of clear-cut precision 
in differentiating between the two terms, yet an attempt 
will be made to polarize the ideas. Even Marcel feels a bit 
hard put at this prospect: "But are we not beginning to find
ourselves again, in this.perspective, faced by the embar­
rassing question of the relation between being and
Aexistence"? Once again he approaches a near contradiction
in his thinking when he states, "We might be tempted to say
that there is always a gap between me and my being; 1 can
narrow the gap , . , but at least in this life 1 cannot hope
to bridge i t . H e r e i n  he establishes an impassable gulf
between his existence and his being, yet in commenting on
the latter he says,
We shall do better to say that it is scarcely being at 
all; it is as though it rebelled against the demands 
which the word 'to be' brings with it. Later we shall 
have to examine those demands more and more closely.
But if on the other hand, we climb up the slope again, 
existence will seem to us as having ultimately to be 
indistinguishable from authentic being.3
 ̂Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. 11, p. 31* 
^Ibid. , p. 35- 
^Ibido, p. 31.
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In all fairness to Marcel one should be reluctant in drawing
premature conclusions in reference to what, at this juncture,
appear to be contradictions. In granting him a careful
hearing one might be surprised at the extent of the problem
as well as the degree of insight he evidences. The real
issue at hand is brought into focus by Marcel's statement of
what he considers to be the primary question:
We have reached a point where the question that should 
concern us lies in knowing whether there is any way in 
which 1 can have experience of myself as being— being 
in a sense which is not that in which 1 can grasp my­
self as existing.1
Light might be thrown on the subject if the 
etymology of the verb "to exist" is explored. If one empha­
sizes that to exist is to emerge or arise, then the notion 
of self-consciousness tends to evolve. If self-consciousness, 
which is a consciousness of one's existence, is not a con­
sciousness of being, then what is it? Gallagher makes 
Marcel's answer more explicit in putting it thus:
%  own existence 1 can confidently assert, but my being 
is not so much vaunted as it is accepted humbly as a 
perpetually bestowed gift. Actually the use of the 
phrase 'my' being is already in danger of distorting 
things, since the possessive hints at an intrusion of 
egocentricity.2
Marcel feels that it is only in the proportion that my
existence ceases to gravitate about my exclusive self that
it takes on authenticity. So at the transitional point
 ̂Ibid., p. 35.
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 60.
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where authentic existence merges with being it is not m2 
being that is in question but my being. While the word 
existence is said in reference to a body, it is presence 
to a body, the term being should be used only in reference 
to selves, presence among selves.
On the crucial issue of being and existence it would 
be well to note the view of several of Marcel's interpreters. 
While a difference of interpretation will be noted among 
them, yet viewing his position from a number of vantage 
points will tend to enrich the whole.
Troisfontaines, his leading French interpreter,
suggests the following basis for Marcel's distinction between
existence and being:
Man only raises himself to it [being] by a dialectic 
of three stages. In the beginning, before he is even 
at the state of being conscious of it or of reacting 
personally, he finds himself engaged in a situation 
which he has not chosen and which nevertheless consti­
tutes him: this is the stage of existence. A primary
reflection analyzes this conplexus, dissociates the 
elements which are confused in a primitive immediacy: 
but the objectification characteristic of this step, if 
it renders knowledge [science] possible, risks destroy­
ing participation. In order to remedy this, a secondary 
reflection, exercised on the first, permits each one to 
re-establish— if he wills it— communion with the real, 
to engage himself in being. Unlike existence, being, 
then requires the option of the person who voluntarily 
maintains or re-creates his union with the world, with 
himself, with other persons, and with God . . . The 
guiding thread [of my work] is that existence here 
designates a participation in the real anterior even to 
the consciousness one takes of it . . . while being ap­
plies only to the participation in which there freely
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engages himself a subject who, by this very act,
1constitutes himself or affirms himself as a person. 
Troisfontaines' interpretation claims that for Marcel 
existence means a situation imposed, while being means a 
situation freely accepted. Unfortunately, this distinction 
as such is not to be found explicitly in Marcel. In fact, 
Marcel nowhere gives such connotation to these words.
Paul Ricoeur suggests that existence and being refer 
to different levels of participation. As he describes how a 
subject can retreat from participation at various levels he 
observes that existence, evacuated, leaves nothing but ab­
straction; being, evacuated, leaves nothingness and 
despair.2 One might easily infer from Ricoeur's interpreta­
tion that Marcel associates existence with things and being 
with persons. When Ricoeur suggests that existence evacu­
ated, leaves nothing but abstraction, he is pointing to the 
realm of objects and things. By the same token, when he 
combines nothingness and despair with being evacuated, it 
has the sound of subjects and persons.
The isolated self, enveloped in egocentric pursuits, 
is seeking out nothing more than an existence. This Marcel 
describes as a terrible emptiness. An emptiness which
Troisfontaines, De l'existence a I'^tre. Vol. I, 
pp. 4^-45, quoted in Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy 
of Gabriel Marcel (New York: Fordham University Press,
1962), p. 59.
2See Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel.
p. 166.
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"ensues in a functionalized world, a world drained dry of 
being, is a testimonial in reverse to the fact that being, 
when present, is fulfillment."^ In contrast to the cate­
gory of emptiness, fullness depicts the life of him who 
intersubjectively lives in communion with those about him.
I concern myself with being only in so far as I have a 
more or less distinct consciousness of the underlying 
unity which ties me to other beings of whose reality I 
already have a preliminary notion. In the light of the 
ideas which have not yet penetrated to the obscure 
regions in which we have tried to hack a path for our­
selves, I should say of these beings that they are 
above all my fellow-travellers--my fellow-creatures
The need or demand for being, spoken of as the 
exigence for being, is linked to the exigence for perennial­
ness by a bond which cannot be broken. An indubitable truth 
in Marcel’s mind is that the need to be and the need to be 
eternal are identical needs. "The being which is the unex­
pected side of the ontological exigence, that being whose 
presence is felt as fulfillment, is raised on the pillars 
of eternity.
I have said that the discovery of being would mean the 
elevation of oneself to a mode of experience or of 
life over which critical experience no longer had any 
hold. And that, I think, amounts to admitting that 
there is no being save in eternity.^
^Ibid., p. 61.
^Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. II, pp. 19-20.
•3Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 61 
^Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, pp. l83-8^.
One attains the realm of being, not by freely accepting his 
situation, but by recognizing that the roots of his situa­
tion are embedded in the eternal.
Being is the eternal dimension of my existential situ­
ation. Being is that to which I aspire . . . Spirit is 
the channel of being: to experience spirit is to ex­
perience the influx of the eternal. Conversely, one 
who has not become spirit cannot be aware of the 
presence of being.1
Marcel readily adds, "It may seem strange that I should 
identify, as I have done, the problem of being and the prob­
lem of salvation."2 in all probability, this statement comes 
the closest to equating Marcel's philosophy with his the­
ology! Here one finds a frank admission that the attainment 
of being is tantamount to God's purpose for man in salvation. 
"I am come that they might have life, and that they might 
have it more abundantly."3 Perhaps this sheds additional 
light on Marcel's attempted distinction between mere 
existence and being. On numerous occasions, as can be noted 
from direct quotations in this chapter, Marcel definitely 
indicates that one can experience the presence of being here 
and now. While the influx of the eternal begins in this 
life, yet the perfection of being can only be realized in 
eternity.
1 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 62.
2Marcel, Me 
3jn. 10:10.
taphysical Journal, p. l82.
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Marcel's position on the attainment of being is 
largely in agreement with the traditional theological view 
that salvation (in the final sense) is the restoration of man 
to perfection of being. Perhaps the only difference is the 
matter of approach: the theologian through faith in
revelation, Marcel through the labyrinth of philosophical 
reasoning.
My Being and %  Life
Marcel makes a further comparison between my being 
and my life. In effect, he makes a distinction between the 
self and the overt expression thereof. He would insist that 
one's life in no sense can be likened to something which he 
has. Life is not a having. Life is not something to be 
invested or that which is capable of being administrated.
The administration of an inheritance or estate.
Life itself compared to an estate, and treated as 
capable of being administered or managed. In all this, 
there is room for autonomy. But the nearer we come to 
creation, the less we can speak of autonomy, or rather 
we can only do so at a lower level, the level of ex­
ploitation; for instance, the artist exploiting his 
inspiration.̂
If life is not that which one might have, then can it be 
said that I am my life? Marcel also rejects this idea even 
though he embraced this alternative when speaking of the
pbody by saying that "I am my body." Why this inconsistency 
in formulation? It would seem that the two statements under
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. I30.
^Marcel, The Mysterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 123
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consideration should more properly be reversed: "I have a
body" appears more accurate since one's body is simply en­
trusted to him and is at his disposal even in suicide. The 
body is not an integral part of the person since he can live 
on even though the body is dead. Yet again, it appears 
quite obvious that 1 am my life since it is the expression 
of the self and cannot be separated from the existence of 
it. No being— no life. These are inseparable, yet Marcel 
would stress the fact that since one can sit in judgment on 
his own life indicates that the two are not identical.
To say 'my being is not identical with my life' is to 
say two different things. First, that since I am not 
my life, my life must have been given to me; in a sense 
unfathomable to man, I am previous to it; I am comes 
before I live. Second, my being is something which is 
in jeopardy from the moment my life begins, and must 
be saved; my being is a stake, and therein perhaps lies 
the whole meaning of life. This is the only possible 
way to explain the ordeal of human life (and if it is 
not an ordeal, I do not see what else it can be).1
One's self is not, therefore, reducible to its objective
manifestations.
The reality of the self lies beyond its finite and ma­
terial expression. It is precisely here that there 
looms up the threat of betrayal, for there is a constant 
temptation facing man to reduce his being to its overt 
manifestation. Our world not only permits but even 
invites such a betrayal of our being.2
The constant presence of death and the following grief of
the soul in despair, proclaiming that there is no being.
p. 63.
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. 196.
^Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel.
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and thus no life beyond this physical existence, encourages 
the betrayal of being.
Marcel makes a further distinction between "my 
being" and "my life." Not only does my being extend beyond 
my physical life, but my being is in peril from the beginning 
of my life. My being is that which must be saved. Herein 
lies the whole meaning of life. The high risk of losing my 
being is an ordeal in which I must cling to that which has 
been entrusted to me. With these thoughts Marcel gives some 
possible indication of belief in conditional immortality, 
the view that one is entitled to have everlasting life 
(being) by participating in salvation--otherwise, he would 
return to oblivion (non-existence) from whence he had come.
In this case the loss would involve loss of being. "But if 
the spiritual soul of man is the surrogate of being, and if 
being is at stake in his life, then the primary meaning of 
soul must be conceived with reference to this 'ontological 
h a z a r d . T h u s  Marcel reiterates the value of being and its 
separateness from its incarnation in the body. In one's 
lifetime he is a carrier of more than just his physical 
life. One's being constitutes the transcendent dimension of 
his life. By choice he may lay down his physical life as 
absolute fulfillment of being. This physical act of sacri­
fice is an answer to a call from deep within his being, and 
consequently it could be the means whereby he would effect a
^Ibid., p. 6̂ .
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union with his true self. Quite paradoxically, according to 
Marcel, one can find fullness of being by sacrificing his 
life. It could become the means whereby he would ultimately
gain it. It gives depth and meaning to his statement,
-1"What is deepest in me is not of me."
Participation in Being 
An important aspect of Marcel's concept of being has 
to do with its rise or emergence. This in turn raises a 
number of questions: Is there such an entity, physical or
spiritual, as being? If so, what is it? What is its origin? 
One is confronted immediately with the thought of who is 
asking these questions about being: How can he be certain
of his own existence? It would appear at first glance that 
one who formulates this problem, should be able to remain 
outside or beyond it. But this is not so. He is involved 
in being. He cannot extricate himself from its grasp.
Since he can only know himself, his being, by a blind in­
tuition, it forever remains in the realm of mystery not in 
the area of the problematic.
So I am inevitably forced to ask: Who am I--I who
question being? How am I qualified to begin this in­
vestigation? If I do not exist, how can I succeed in 
it? And if I do exist, how can I be sure of this 
fact?2
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. 223. 
2Marcel, Existentialism, p. 16.
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Everything the intellect knows, it knows as being. Outside 
of this there is nothing. "The mind knows being, which is to 
know something of everything that is or can b e . T h e  in­
tellect thus knows itself in act and knows its participation 
and partaking in being. The real solution to the question 
of. Who am I? begins as an unfolding through experience. A 
response to the question is thus generated. This experience 
not only produces wonder but is of a revelatory character.
It is quite apparent in Marcel's case that it is the 
experience of his encounter with existence that initiates his 
whole philosophical endeavor. He seeks to capture experience 
in all its pristine simplicity (purity) and extract from it 
every bit of significance and meaning possible. He emplores 
the mystery of existence, seeking the inner meaning of man's 
life. In the process, Marcel finds mystery in existence.
He recognizes his inability to plumb its depths in this life. 
Existence is not a predicate, for if it is withdrawn nothing 
is left. Experience, rather, is a real participation in 
being.
I am therefore led to assume or to recognise a form of 
participation which has the reality of a subject; this 
participation cannot be, by definition, an object of 
thought; it cannot serve as a solution— it appears be­
yond the realm of problems: it is meta-problematical.^
In effect, this is to postulate the primacy of being over
knowledge. This is not an assertion of being, but of being
^Ostermann, "Discovery of Being," p. 101. 
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 18.
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as asserting itself. In a sense, knowledge is environed by
being— it is interior to it.
From this standpoint, contrary to what epistemology 
seeks vainly to establish, there exists well and truly 
a mystery of cognition; knowledge is contingent on a 
participation in being for which no epistemology can 
account because it continually presupposes it.T
In a very elementary way, then, one can say "I am before I
know." This statement gives some indication of the mystery
involved in being. "A mystery is a problem which encroaches
upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby
2transcending itself as a simple problem."
The recurring theme throughout the writings of
Marcel is that of personal participation in being. Experience
furnishes the stage on which this participation occurs.
Marcel’s traditional method of approaching understanding is
to begin and end with actual life:
I think we must first of all try to map it out in re­
lation to life as it is concretely lived, and not to
outline its shape in the high void of 'pure thought';
for my method of advance does invariably consist, as 
the reader will have noticed already, in working my 
way up from life to thought and then down from thought 
to life again, so that I may try to throw more light 
upon life.3
Marcel not only accents the role of participation but he goes 
one step further when he observes that to be is to actually
participate in being. All experiences of existence are
^Ibid., p. 18.
^Ibid.5 P= 19=
3Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. I, p. 51*
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shared experiences. There are no Isolated experiences of 
existence. The purely private self appears to be an ab­
straction. Marcel concludes that the ego given In experi­
ence Is a belng-by-partlclpatlon. While there appears to be 
more than one level of participation, yet on each level the 
self cannot be separated from that In which It participates. 
For It Is through participation that the self arises or 
emerges. One's experience of existence finds Its only 
foundation In participation. Consequently, the role of 
philosophy Is not to construct a systematic view of reality 
as a spectator (and thus forsake existence for abstraction), 
but to think the existent and actual, as a participant, and 
trace out the Implications of the experience of participa­
tion. ̂
Marcel, writing In the Foreword of Kenneth
Gallagher's Insightful book The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel.
has this to say about the Idea of "participation":
. . . Kenneth Gallagher has had the merit of empha­
sizing an Idea which Is absolutely central to my work, 
an Idea, In fact, that In a way even provides the key 
to my thought, although this has rarely been perceived
by others as clearly as I would like.2
Gallagher proceeds by suggesting that there are three levels
of participation discerned by Marcel though they are not
always set forth In clear-cut language




. . . the level of incarnation, which is actualized 
through sensation and the experience of the "body as 
'mine'5 the level of communion, which is actualized 
through love, hope, and fidelity; the level of 
transcendence, which is actualized through the onto­
logical exigence, primitive assurance, and 'blinded 
intuition' of beingJ
Participation through Incarnation 
The union of soul with body is called "incarnation." 
Sometimes Marcel refers to it as "incarnate personality." 
Incarnation, as such, becomes the central 'given' of meta­
physics. "Incarnation is the situation of a being who 
appears to himself to be, as it were, bound to a body."^
That which one might speak of as the "existential indubit­
able" is nothing more than the self as incarnate in the 
body as well as manifested in the world.
Existence is said in reference to a body; it is presence 
to a body . . . It is my body which sets me down in a 
world of real beings. It is this self in which my 
philosophical concern flares up. And the great datum 
for this self is the non-contingency of the empirically 
given.^
Marcel thinks that one's total environmental setting is not 
something apart from himself, but part and parcel of himself. 
He would identify this as "being in a situation." A person 
experiences this situation, his situation, through the self
^Ibid., p. xi.
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 11.
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel,
pp. 16-17.
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as incarnate in the body and as manifest in the world with 
all its necessary components, such as one's family, his 
past, and his entire set of circumstances. So what is real 
is the altogether. It is via the body that one is plunged 
into the world of real existence. The presence of the self 
in the actual world is accomplished by means of the body.
body is the absolute mediator between me and the actual 
world, the vehicle in which the self deploys itself in 
existence.Incarnation is thus not only the central given 
of metaphysics, but it is also the basis of one's being-in- 
a-situation.
A pertinent question might be raised: In what re­
spect is one related to all else that exists? Marcel 
answers :
To say that something exists is not only to say that 
it belongs to the same system as my body (that it is 
bound to it by certain connections which reason can 
define), it is also to say that it is in some way united 
to me as my body is.^
When one affirms the existence of other things, he indicates
that he considers them as connected with his body to the
degree that it is able to be put in contact with them. It is
in connection with one's body that an existing thing can be
defined and find its proper place.
Thus between me and all that exists there is a re­
lation (the word is quite inadequate) of the same type
Ibid., p. 18.
2 Marcel, Being and Having, p. 11.
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as the relation that unites me to my body . . . This 
amounts to saying that my body is in sympathy with 
things.
And in this way a certain mode of vision becomes 
possible. In other words, I want to show that I am 
really attached to and really adhere to all that 
exists— to the universe which is my universe and whose 
centre is my body.1
Marcel's metaphysics turns on the notion of partici­
pation. Participation is his method of breaking-through to 
realism as well as an escape from individualism. To be is to 
participate in being.
Do not fail to note the twofold affirmation of this 
formula: in existing, we trans-exist. In virtue of
our being we are swept beyond our being. Sensation 
represents but one side of this participation. And what 
can be said of it can also be said of all ontological 
participation: it is non-objectifiable. We cannot ef­
fectively isolate that in which we participate from 
ourselves as participants, since at every level it is 
the participation which founds the being of the par­
ticipants. 2
While feeling is a mode of participation it by no means ex­
hausts the richness of the experience. One's situation 
affects him.at various levels of his being. A person might 
be tempted to call the body-level the plane of existence and 
the intersubjective level the plane of being, but this would 
not be altogether correct. One's situation affects every 
facet of his being; however, the constant connotation is 
that he is not autonomous or self-contained. Others can 
permeate one's being. To be living is indicative of a 
certain type of openness to the reality of others. While a
^Marcel, Metauhvsical Journal, p. 27^.
2Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 20,
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person's presence in the world is accomplished spa-
tiality, it is for the express purpose of communion. The
body is to the incarnate world, as the self in its personal
aspects is to the world of intersubjectivity.
My body is given to me as presence-in-the-world; my 
person is given to me as presence-in-communion.
'Esse est co-esse' is true not only on the plane of
sensible existence but above all on the plane of
personal being. The proper beginning of metaphysics 
is not 'I think' but 'we are.' The tie which binds me
to others gives me to myself.1
A person is fooling himself if he thinks he has a right to be 
prior to or more real than others: "I only exist within a
certain fullness of experience which is not private but 
trans-subjective.Since it is the other who takes priority, 
"I would go so far as to say that it is of the essence of the 
Other that he exists. I cannot think of him as other with­
out thinking of him as exis t i n g . O n e only signifies 
(individuates) himself as he separates himself from the 
other. Perhaps a case could be made for the right one has 
of being "prior to or more real than others." It could be 
based on the fact that self-consciousness of its very nature 
is prior to any other kind of consciousness, even conscious­
ness of an other. Communion is, therefore, a function of 
the particular way in which one establishes a relationship
llbid.. p. 22.
^Ibid.. p. 22.
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. 10̂ -.
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with the other. At this point the second level of partici­
pation is reached.
Participation through Communion 
Of special interest to Marcel is authentic onto­
logical communion. Herein the other is given to me as a 
thou— a presence which is non-objectifiable. In this 
ontological communion one's freedom makes a creative re­
sponse, thus opening the way to transcendence. It should 
be noted, however, that one's relations with others precede 
the expression of one's own liberty. As a child he is one 
among others long before he freely accepts or rejects them. 
There is a way in which one can classify this original to­
getherness in order to show its natural development.^ The 
stage of coTTiTnuni tv is to be seen in this early form of 
togetherness. One dwells in the presence of others in a 
close-knit fashion. In due course the autonomy of one's self 
emerges as a privileged element over against others. At this 
juncture, the stage of c o m m u n ication emerges. Until one is 
aroused out of the slumber of community, no full human re­
sponse can be expected. Even so, at this point, the level of 
communication may be nothing more than a perfunctory kind of 
expression. Much is taken for granted on this level. The 
intersubjectivity here is of a factual nature, not that of an
pp. 22-23.
1 Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel.
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invitation. The stage of ontological communion is reached 
when one freely and purposefully opens himself to a thou in 
a truly personal encounter. This bears the marks of an 
invitation freely extended and an acceptance freely made. 
This passage back to togetherness which is accomplished 
through communion is a work of one's freedom.
Communion speaks of inferiority. It arises through 
oneness of soul. There is a difference between outward 
uniformity and inward unity. While individuals may appear 
much alike outwardly, yet they may be vastly different in­
wardly. Since communion arises only in a personal response 
to a personal invitation, then one can assume an inner unity 
exists where such takes place.
Marcel refers to that virtue in certain people 
whereby they are open to others as disponibilité^. It car­
ries the connotation of openness, availability, abandonment, 
welcoming, surrender and readiness to respond. The 
disponible person is hospitable and outgoing to others; the 
door of his soul stands ajar. This particular concept is 
one of the most important in Marcel's whole philosophy. For 
the time being it is enough to comprehend it as the dispo­
sition that invites communion. It radiates in acts of love, 
sympathy and admiration. And if metaphysics comes only 
through communion then the indisponible man cannot be a meta­
physician.
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If one were to analyze the word "with" in reference 
to personal experience, he would reveal the irreducible nature 
of communion. For two individuals are not with each other as 
two things are with one another— the latter being external. 
Only when one person is present to the other as a thou, does 
the new dimension of being arise which is irreducible to 
non-personal categories. "Between the 1 and the thou a bond 
exists which exceeds any means 1 have to take cognizance of 
i t . T h e r e  is an intimacy which exists in communion that 
cannot be expressed in categories, at least in categories of 
externality.
Personal communion, then, is similar to every form 
of authentic ontological participation in that it is strictly 
non-objectifiable. It cannot be dissected into opposing 
parts. It is participation with no boundaries. In addition 
one must be careful because of the ineradicable objectifying 
bent of language. For it is even possible to set up inter­
subjectivity as a kind of something which can be designated.
In effect, it is nothing more than an implied understanding
peven when 1 try to focus my thought on it. Consequently, 
intersubjectivity shares with all ontological reality in the 
fact that it cannot be signified but only alluded to.
^Ibid., p. 27.
^See Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. 1, p. 55*
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Participation through Transcendence 
The third level of participation is the realm of 
plenitude or fullness of being. It is not sufficient to be 
present in the world through bodily incarnation. Nor does 
man reach his highest development in communion with other 
like beings. For the inner demand of being drives him onward 
and upward to the full-flowering of his own personal being. 
This drive finds its origin in the basic dissatisfaction of 
mere existence. "Let us notice in the first place that the
need for transcendence presents itself above all, is deeply
experienced above all, as a kind of dissatisfaction.Here 
one finds an example of the need to transcend the con­
stricting barriers of a mundane external existence. "The 
dissatisfaction has to do with the absence of something 
which is properly speaking external to me." Yet there is 
another sort of transcending need directed not outwards but 
inwards. Such is the yearning for sanctity, the yearning 
for completeness and fullness of being. This inwardly 
directed yearning forms the basic motive to create. "Might 
it not be said that to create is always to create at a level 
above oneself"?^ So it is that on the level of transcend­
ence the central interpretive insight is the notion of
creation. Being, herein, is only revealed to creative
'’ibid.. p. 52. 
^Ibid., p. 53* 
^Ibid., p. 55.
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experience, and being's role in thought is not so much a
concept as it is a creative-type intuition comparable to that
of the artist's.
The presentiment of transcendence haunts human ex­
perience, as the artist's intuition haunts his con­
sciousness. Just as the artist's intuition only comes 
to be recognized in the artistic process which it alone 
makes possible, so the presence of being is only 
recognized by being read back out of the human experi­
ences which it alone makes possible.1
The experiences to which Gallagher alludes are those on which 
Marcel concentrates--love, hope and fidelity. Marcel is 
convinced that ontological exigence cannot be recognized by 
an ego in isolation, but only by a subject-in-communion. The
acts which establish one as a subject-in-communion, as an I
in reference to a Thou, are likewise those which give a 
person access to being. Freedom characterizes the recogni­
tion of these experiences as having ontological value, point­
ing to the transcendent dimension of man's existence. By 
this response thought freely sustains itself in its own 
source. Man is therefore free, through creative participa­
tion, to transform his mere existence into a fullness and 
plenitude of being, thereby satisfying his need for 
transcendence.
The Thrust Toward Being 
The absence of being can best be observed in the 
widespread emptiness and discontent which is prevalent among
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. xii,
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many today, "To say that the universe leaves me dissatis­
fied, and that in this sense it 'i^ not' is to admit that
-Iwithin me there is an appetite for being." There is a 
metaphysical need which is far greater than just a tran­
scendental curiosity. It is a kind of appetite, the 
appetite for being. It aims at the possession of being 
through the gradual realization of this innate potential.
On the other hand and in a negative sense the lack of its 
presence points to its possible possession.
One thing we, or at least some of us, feel acutely: 
it is this lack of something, this impoverishment, this 
aridity. We have already seen that it is by starting 
from that point that we can experience what I have 
called ontological exigence.2
In his Metaphysical Journal Marcel insists that basically he 
is dealing with nothing more nor less than the opposition 
between the full and the empty. He considers this opposi­
tion infinitely more essential than the one between the 
single and the multiple,3
Being, as I said before, is expectation fulfilled.
There are moments at which life appears to us to be 
entirely empty. Nothing has any importance, nothing 
matters. Such experiences are the very negation of 
the feeling of fulness and profusion that we experience 
on other occasions. .Our attention cannot be fixed, and 
interest is lacking.^
 ̂Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. I83.
2Marcel, The Mvstery of Being. Vol. II, p.
3see mrcel. Metaphysical Journal, p. I8I. 
1+Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 206.
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As one seeks being he is, in effect, seeking that which will
end his disquietude»
Out of the depths of being evolves a metaphysical
concern. Marcel considers it to be similar to a basic
hunger, an appetite, a drive.
But we have had ample opportunity to understand also 
that the exigence of being is not a simple desire or a 
vague aspiration. It is rather, a deep-rooted interior 
urge, and it might equally well be interpreted as an 
appeal.1
He continues at length to explain that it consists of more 
than a need, since need implies little more than strong 
desire rather than that which is demanded. Somewhat in the 
same vein of thought Kierkegaard chose the term existence, 
filling it with much the same meaning that Marcel understands 
by the word exigence. In addition, Kierkegaard’s term in­
volved certain theological overtones and a definite feeling 
of dread. Marcel’s term is more primitive and universal, 
involving intense concern and hunger. ¥. E. Hocking lauds 
Marcel’s choice of the term exigence stating that to the 
extent existing appears precious, the concern becomes grave, 
’’existing for a human being can never be a fact devoid of 
feeling; we have called it a hearth-fire; we have also called 
it a particular passion-filled presence.” Moreover, Marcel 
thinks of exigence as a single and perfect word. ’’This
^Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. II, p. ^1.
2Hocking, ’’Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics,” p. 44%.
73
exigence is Marcel's native air, derived from nobody: this
metaphysical concern and hunger inspired his own search."”'
It is interesting to note that Hocking describes Marcel as
being legitimately concerned to give the "Being of man its
2due gravamen and inward flame."
In speaking about his preliminary reflections on
ontological exigence, Marcel mentions its "indeterminate
character."^ He again refers to the translucent nature of
this inner urge:
The fundamental datum of all metaphysical reflec­
tion is that I am a being who is not transparent to 
himself, that is to say, my being is to me a mystery.
It is only in moments of interior ebb to which I re­
ferred yesterday that I cease to apprehend myself in 
this way.^
In yet another passage he puts the question thus : "What,
then, in my view, is this will for being? Is it a will to 
find myself or a will to create myself? But this either-or 
is far from clear.
From these brief passages one may gain a sense of 
the indefiniteness surrounding Marcel's efforts to clarify 
ontological exigence; however, this inner demand for fullness 
of being may be more graphically seen in the direction which
^Ibid., p. 44^.
^Ibid.. p. 444.
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 15*
s,
5-,
IfMarcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 290.
Ibid., p. 183.
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obtains between such word pairings as potential and actual, 
existence and being, person and personality. When one comes 
into the world he is said "to exist" yet Marcel withholds 
the descriptive term "to be" until he responds to that inner 
urge called forth through intersubjectivity and becomes in 
actuality that which he was potentially. Thus the indi­
vidual gradually proceeds toward being and plenitude. 
Ontological exigence, then, is that innate urge present in 
all persons. It is that demand for being which should 
culminate in a state of being typified by dignity, purpose, 
worth, and meaning.
In making a further distinction concerning meta­
physical need, Marcel seeks to set forth the difference be­
tween the ethical order and the metaphysical order of beings:
The appetite for being is not a desire to acquire qual­
ities nor a desire for self-perfection; and this is the 
fundamental difference between the ethical order and 
the metaphysical order. The metaphysician is searching 
for what is, not what will be (on this point, cf.
Hegel's complaint about Fichte).1
He is seeking to point out a certain metaphysical demand for 
being that is characteristic of all persons, a demand to 
rise from mere existence to being. On the other hand there 
are certain ethical demands, entirely apart from the meta­
physical, which evolve in a desire to add various qualities 
to oneself until he reaches a point of perfection. The 
former has to do with being qua being, while the latter with
'’ibid.. p. 290.
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attaining specific qualities of being. Marcel likens the 
metaphysician to a sick person who is trying to find a po­
sition in which he will be comfortable. The problem seems 
to exist in identifying the center (being) in relation to 
which this position is defined. To develop a correct yet 
comfortable stance on the concept of being seems to be the 
crucial problem. As long as one moves among objects the 
question obviously does not arise. Only when persons are 
involved, does the question become pertinent.
In summary, one might say that the demand to be is a 
dynamic motivating factor which provides thrust toward 
fullness of being. This exigence of being takes the form of 
a self-directed compulsion toward full participation in 
being. This strong, innate desire surges toward wholeness 
and self-fulfillment. It is the thirst for being!
Entree to Being
In approaching the subject of the access to being, 
Marcel prefaces his remarks with the statement that his 
whole philosophical development has been dominated by a two­
fold preoccupation:
Whenever I try to consider that development as a 
whole, I have to observe that it has been dominated by 
two interests which may at first seem contradictory; 
the first of these is more directly expressed in meta­
physical terms, but still lies in the background at 
least, of almost all of my plays without exception.
The latter is what I shall call the exigence of being; 
the first is the obsession with beings taken in their
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individuality but also affected by the mysterious re­
lations which link them together.'
To most individuals, this dual concern presents a dilemma;
however, to Marcel the dilemma does not exist.
Marcel initially admits that his interests are both 
in being-as-such in general, and beings in particular (in­
cluding the mysterious relationships which bind them to­
gether). In broad terms one might say that his obsession 
with singular individuals finds expression in his dramatic 
work, while his study of being in general is found in his 
philosophical writings. The dilemma presents itself thus : 
either one interest himself with the interaction between 
particular beings and thus view being-as-such as a convenient 
fiction; or one should give his attention to being-as-such 
in all its unity and transcendence by abstracting it from 
the diversity of individual beings. Marcel makes simple 
reply:
. . .  I have started from the act of faith which pro­
vides an a priori solution . . . that the more we are 
able to know the individual being, the more we shall be 
oriented, and as it were directed towards, a grasp of 
being as such.2
Thought does not grasp being by making a general abstraction 
from particularized experience, but by an intuitive experi­
ence, personally expressed in individual form.
1 Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. by 
Robert Rosthal. Third Noonday Press ed.; (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 1*+7*
^Ibid., p. 1^8.
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emphathetically relived at its saturation point of 
singularity. Access to being comes through intersub­
jectivity, and being is the source of my assurance that my 
situation in existence is eternally grounded. This assurance 
is not expressible, but intuitively grasped. It is the 
cognitive face of participation. It is a participation in 
itself.
It is the product of the entire self expressing itself 
to itself, and uttering being in doing so. I can only 
become aware of the saving presence of being in so far 
as I am a singular, free, creative, spiritual subject.
And I am such a subject only as a member of a spiritual 
society, not as an isolated ego. Therefore it follows 
that those acts which found me as a subject-in- 
communion are also the acts which give me access to 
being.1
Fullness of being is attained through communion. This is a 
free action on the part of those involved; so refusal is 
always possible. While one may be tempted to denial and 
despair, yet the affirmation of being is bulwarked by the 
assurance evolving from communion.
Intersubjectivity
The basis, then, of communion is to be found in the
realm of intersubjectivity, and the entree to being is found
through this door. The awareness that "I am" proceeds from
the knowledge that "you are." This knowledge emerges from
the unity of all being.
As subject man is a being in the world, with others, 
directed toward God originally, mere is a point at
1 Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel, p. 67*
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whose depth man's existence merges with the existing 
of all that is, thus takes on global character. When
the global character of existence is recognized, it
becomes necessary to expand the metaphysics of !_ 
think into a metaphysics of ive are.1
Hence there is a coming face to face with "Being" in experi­
ence at such a depth that one discovers himself as a being. 
He thereby subsists in a certain mode, participating in 
being. The mystery of Being for man is grounded in the fact 
that he is a being in Being— he is involved, situated.
As one pursues the concept of intersubjectivity, the 
more one's existence takes on the character of including 
others, the shorter becomes the gap separating it from 
being, or the more "he is." Marcel uses a number of dif-
pferent metaphors to describe the being or soul. One can
see it as a pearl to be drawn from the depths, or as a
statue to be released from the stone's embrace, or even as a 
garden to be tilled: yet, from whatever angle one looks at
it he is in danger of not recognizing the higher claims of 
intersubjectivity. He is in danger of sinning against love, 
and of arriving at a depersonalized conception of being.
Each must come to the point of recognizing or dis­
covering himself in others without losing his own inner 
being in the process.
Being man means participating in one's fellowman.
Seen in this way, friendship is a compensation for my
^Arthur Luther, "Marcel's Metaphysics of the WE ARE," 
Philosonhv Todav. X (Fall, 1966), p. 191.
^See Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. II, p. 39*
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limitation. Here we can speak of a subject-subject 
relationship. Confronting the "I" there stands a 
"thou" as a person, not a "he" as a thing or an ob­
ject.1
As man dwells among men a sense of community arises. This 
signals the beginning stages of "man participating in one's 
fellowman." Community naturally proceeds to communication 
and thence to communion. These are deeper levels of partici­
pation. As one draws near to another he discovers himself 
in the other. In effect, the other mirrors himself. While 
man is free and can shut himself off from others and treat 
them as objects, yet a meeting between the I and the thou is 
possible. This is to be seen in the notion of an invitation, 
in which two human beings open themselves toward each other 
(invocation) in a free, inner movement of love, by which 
they pierce their shell of individuality and thus become 
themselves. A new subject emerges— a we. This meeting is 
not approached from the outside but from the inside. "To­
gether we are involved (engagement) in 'being,' and the 'I' 
opens itself (disponibilité) for the presence of the 'thou'
2in its entirety, just as the 'thou' does this for the 'I.'" 
This experience involves a revelation of the one to the 
other. The kind of meeting described here is not just an 
interaction but intercourse between I and thou who come to 
understand and appreciate each other as persons. One
'Ewijk, Gabriel liar cel. p. 68. 
^Ibid.. p. 69-
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becomes present to the other. The word "with" takes on new 
meaning in reference to an other.
The Approach to Being 
Marcel suggests that access to being is gained by- 
three, pathways': The first of these is entitled fidelity or
faith. Perhaps the word faithfulness is more exact.
Fidelity in this contextual setting designates more of what 
one would describe as integrity. For unless one is a person 
of integrity he is not faithful to himself, nor is he faith­
ful in his representations to others. It is literally un­
thinkable that one could be united with another unless he 
is first unified within himself. The actual unity of the 
self is an achievement in reference to one's freedom. The 
self one gives is the one he acquires in its giving. "That 
is to say, the self which fidelity reveals is a self which 
fidelity creates. It is a creative fidelity, for the 
being is created in the acts of integrity. Fidelity is to 
be faithful to oneself, not only in thought but also in 
action. Fidelity implies an ontological constancy.
Fidelity is not an arid dedication to the preservation 
of one's title to self-esteem; its axis is not the self 
at all, but another. It is the spontaneous and unim­
posed presence of an I to a Thou. This sheds an 
indispensable light on the "self-creation" which has 
been spoken of. The creation of the self actually is 
accomplished via an emergence to a thou level of 
reality; I create myself in response to an invocation 
which can only come from a thou. It is a call to which
1 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 69.
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I answer "present." In saying "here" I create my own 
self in the presence of a thou. Marcel succinctly 
declares that fidelity is 'the active perpetuation of 
presence.'^
All are called, in effect, to be persons. In being faithful 
one creates himself, this is creative fidelity, "a fidelity
ponly safeguarded by being creative." We are called "to 
found ourselves in eternal and unqualified meaning beyond 
the sum of our conscious states."3
The second avenue by which one has access to being, 
according to Marcel, is hone. Hope is allied with being and 
consequently inexhaustible. Despair is bound up with the 
objective and is therefore inventoriable. Hope lifts its 
head and refuses to succumb to despair. It is not so much 
a wish as it is an affirmation. This claim of hope is not 
drawn from the resources of the ego but from a source above 
it. "Disnonibilitv is the presupposition of hope— disnoni- 
bilitv that begins in finite communion and is consummated in 
the total openness that turns the soul to a source beyond the 
visible w o r l d . H o p e  is a kind of an appeal to a creative 
power on which the soul trustingly relies. Hope retires 
absolutely in favor of an absolute. Thus the necessary con­
dition for hope is communion. Being in touch with another
^Ibid., p. 70.
2Marcel, Being and Having, p. 96.
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 70.
^ Ibid.. p. 7k.
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being affords one the proper foundation for hope, for hoping 
is putting one’s trust in reality, to proclaim its ability 
to triumph over all threatening dangers. One shall always 
be exposed to the temptation of shutting the door and en­
closing himself within himself. "Against this combination of 
temptations there is only one remedy, and it has two aspects: 
it is the remedy of communion, the remedy of h o p e . O n e  
need not despair for he can rise to a communion which is 
both more intimate and abundant, of which hope can be re­
garded as the foreshadowing. Invariably one opens his soul 
when he hopes; hence, the subject of hope is one in need of 
others. The basic formula of hope, according to Marcel, 
is: "I hope in you for us."^ What is the vital link between
this thou and this us? "Mast we not reply that ’Thou’ is in 
some way the guarantee of the union which holds us to­
gether.
Communion gives rise to hope in each other. This 
becomes an access route to being. But need one not hope in 
the Absolute Thou? The only possible source from which this 
absolute hope springs is found in the Infinite. "It appears 
as a response of the creature to the infinite Being to whom
Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, trans. by Emma 
Craufurd. First Harper Torchbook ed.; (New York: Harper &




it is conscious of owing everything that it has and upon
whom it cannot impose any condition whatsoever without 
1scandal."
It is a presence which evokes hope, not a cumulation 
of probabilities. Borne up by a communion whose very 
atmosphere is eternal, unreservedly disponible to the 
Absolute Presence which enfolds this communion, the 
soul moves ceaselessly beyond the reach of critical 
thought; and this movement reveals the 'intelligible 
core of hope,' for 'what characterizes it is the very 
movement bv which it challenges the evidence upon 
which men claim to challenge it itself.'^
Marcel finally ventures a definition of hope, feeling
better able to handle such an assignment at the close than
at the beginning of his analysis of hope:
. . .  we might say that hope is essentially the avail­
ability of a soul which has entered intimately enough 
into the experience of communion to accomplish in the 
teeth of will and knowledge the transcendent act--the 
act establishing the vital regeneration of which this 
experience affords both the pledge and the first- 
fruits .3
Marcel's conception of presence evokes hope within 
the individual. In each experience of the self or ego is in 
control. Only the person can release the outflowing of him­
self. Presence occurs as an out-flowing directionality in 
response to the proffered other. Presence is not consum­
mated until one unreservedly releases himself in faith, hope 
and love. In effect, it is the mutual sharing of selves.
''ibid., p. 47.
^Gallagher, Thi 
^Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 67»
e Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 77.
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Presence is created by the confluence of these mutual shar­
ings. Togetherness, nearness, oneness characterize this 
experience. Presence is secured by the free act of the self 
in response to the total offering of the other.
The third route of access to being which Marcel 
elucidates is entitled love. Much of what has been said 
about communion is applicable to his doctrine of love. Marcel 
approaches increasingly the position that all experiences 
which open one toward another should be called love. Ulti­
mately, communion seems to be founded not only on love but is 
often equated with it. Here again one's attention is called 
to Marcel's tendency toward ambiguity. He would go so far 
as to suggest that the intimacy of love is a primary mode of 
being, irreducible to any other. As was said of fidelity, 
Marcel repeats in reference to love: the loving act creates
the lover. It is not the act of a previously constituted 
self, but an act which is self-creating.
Love has a transcendent orientation. To the extent 
that love bears on a thou (even creature love) it rises be­
yond the order of things and of the destruction which preys 
upon things.
But it is only possible to maintain the reality of the 
beloved because love posits the beloved as transcending 
all explanation and all reduction. In this sense it is 
true to say that love only addresses itself to what is 
eternal, it immobilises the beloved above the world of 
genesis and vicissitude.^
^Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, pp. 62-63.
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At this time Marcel gives evidence of his life-long 
desire, if not obsession, to be near his mother, who died 
when he was four. Noting that all things come to an end, 
Marcel's prophetic affirmation of love indicates that the 
beloved is exempt from the penalties of thingness. In ef­
fect, to love a person is to proclaim: Thou shalt not die!
It is an affirmation of immortality, of love penetrating 
beyond mere physical death. The more one loves an indi­
vidual the greater is the access to him and knowledge of him
as an authentic being. In turn, this tends to give one re­
assurance of his immortality.
At the limit where total assurance becomes possible, 
it could only be because his thingness is swallowed up 
in an absolute and indefectible presence. Really to 
love a creature, Marcel would agree, is to love him 
in God. Only in the absolute does the promise of 
eternity with which all love is redolent attain to un­
conditionality. 1
One's experience of presence is terminated and his assurance
depleted unless they arise within an enveloping absolute.
Marcel's tendency to confuse the precise meaning of
terms is noted again when in the course of one paragraph in
the Metaphysical Journal he states: "only love is real
knowledge," "love is the negation of knowledge," "Love needs 
to appear to itself as perfect k n o w l e d g e . I n  spite of this 
imprecision Marcel sees love as the superhighway by which
Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 80.
2Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, pp. 62-63.
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access is gained to being. It is the major connecting link 
from being to being and from being to Being.
The Presence of Being
The natural accompaniment of intimacy of being is 
fidelity, hope and love. This experience is characterized 
by disponibilité, the total spiritual availability which 
exudes from beings in communion. The attestation of it all 
can be summed up in the word presence. In fact, presence is 
the culmination of mutual disponibilité. It is intuitively 
grasped. Awareness of presence emerges from mutual 
abandonment in participation.
In contrast, one can see what develops in the lack 
of presence. This consists of a withholding of self. Man is 
in charge of this act and/or process. An opposite kind of 
directionality is noted for it flows inward toward the self. 
Betrayal, denial, despair and alienation occur. Man be­
comes imprisoned within himself. When presence is absent 
then object appears. The subject-object dichotomy obtains. 
Presence involves a reciprocity which is absent in any re­
lation of subject to object or of subject to subject-object. 
Unavailability and absence is always rooted in a degree of 
alienation. One of the characteristics of the being who is 
present and at the disposal of another is that it becomes 
unthinkable for him to relegate anyone to the level of a 
case or a statistic. If one is incapable of presence it is 
quite evident that he is preoccupied, if not encumbered, with
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himself. Perhaps the real contrast is between the person 
who is opaque and the one who is transparent. Transparency 
in this sense speaks of fidelity and personal integrity.
There is a vast difference between "presence and 
absence" on the one hand and "attention and distraction" on 
the other. One can give attention and yet not convey 
presence. His self-centeredness excludes others from him­
self.
The truth is that there is a way of listening which is 
a way of giving, and another way of listening which is 
a way of refusing, of refusing oneself; the material 
gift, the visible action, do not necessarily witness 
to presence. We must not speak of proof in this con­
nection; the word would be out of place. Presence is 
something which reveals itself immediately and un­
mistakably in a look, a smile, an intonation or a 
handshake.^
If one is to listen with a preoccupied look, then he gives 
evidence of absence. If one is truly present, then he gives 
evidence of "the listening eye." While the physical ap­
pearance is not proof of the inner stance, yet in most cases 
it seems to be highly indicative. Withness generally can be 
sensed by the other. True presence can be felt only when 
one is freely and sincerely given. To be aware of the 
presence of being is to be in presence. True presence is 
always enveloped in reciprocation.
Marcel, Existentialism, p. 40.
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Concluding Statement 
From this study on Marcel's approach to being it has 
been noted that "being itself" is surrounded with an element 
of mystery which is incommunicable. This, however, does not 
take anything away from its native splendor inasmuch as its 
richness can only be plumbed by a deep intuitive grasp. 
Words, definitions, and descriptions cannot always convey 
meaning. Of necessity, one must experience some things in 
life in order to come to an understanding of them. Being is 
of this nature. In all probability, the confusion surround­
ing many of Marcel's attempts at explanation stems from the 
fact that he is trying to say the unsayable. Being can only 
be experienced by an existent through becoming. This in­
volves participation which ultimately leads toward plenitude 
or fullness of being. The thrust of being towards self- 
realization, known as ontological exigence, occurs in par­
ticipation with other beings. This entree to being takes 
place via fidelity, hope, and love; being attested by 
presence, which is the ultimate in self-realization. This 
invaluable possession, however, is subject to loss. Since 
one is not completely transparent to himself nor to the 
other, he becomes involved in the greatest mystery of all: 
the personal, transcendental, Absolute Being. "For in him 
we live, and move, and have our being. I n  ignoring this
^Acts 17:28.
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mystery, man has lost the sense of his own being and that of 
others. In consequence, men have become problems for each 
other.
Marcel makes a passionate plea for the recognition 
of value inherent in human personality. This is especially 
pertinent in days which are fraught with influences of de­
humanization and devaluation. The erosion of being is 
largely accomplished today through the emergence of the tech­
nological mentality. The following chapter is an endeavor 
to ferret-out the various aspects of this enveloping 
tragedy.
CHAPTER III
THE EMERGENCE OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL MENTALITY
With the development of science and technology, man 
has come upon unfortunate times. Threatened with the loss 
of his sense of heing. man is battling desperately to main­
tain his dignity as a person. Marcel has sought to analyze 
the deteriorating condition of modern man. It is one thing 
to be cognizant of the obvious symptoms of man's ailment, 
but quite another to trace them to their common source. The 
philosopher must have a broad understanding of their rootage 
and dynamics if he is to intelligently formulate an adequate 
remedy. Marcel insists that a common cause underlies both 
the individual and social alienation of contemporary man—  
the spirit of abstraction. This notion looms so threaten­
ingly on the horizon of Marcel's thinking that his reaction 
to it forms the basis of his philosophical reflection. "The 
dynamic element in my philosophy, taken as a whole, can be 
seen as an obstinate and untiring battle against the spirit 
of abstraction."^ In brief, one might say that the spirit
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. p. 1.
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of abstraction evolves when man discounts, in one way or 
another, the concrete reality from which the abstraction is 
taken.
While the term, spirit of abstraction, is a coinage 
of Marcel's, yet the principle itself has evolved with the 
growth of modern science and technology. As used in this 
manner the term is peculiar to modern man, since the so­
phisticated, analytic techniques of science (as applied to 
the material world) are being increasingly utilized to 
analyze and catalogue man himself. This abstractive spirit 
and technique tends to be more highly prized in itself than 
the man who is being processed.
The Nature of Abstraction
Before looking into the idea of the spirit of ab­
straction it will be helpful to examine Marcel's view on 
abstraction itself. What does he understand by this latter 
term? What is its nature and meaning? While he defends 
abstraction per se. yet he has declared war on the spirit of 
abstraction. Wherein lies the difference between the 
original term and his coined phrase about the term?
Marcel admits that it is rather difficult to estab­
lish the difference between the notion of abstraction as 
such, and that of the spirit of abstraction. Consequently, 
he is not always clear in reference to the precise meaning 
of the term abstraction. This is unfortunate since the word 
carries such strategic weight in his overall thinking.
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It would be convenient here to distinguish between 
the notion of abstraction as such, and that of the 
spirit of abstraction, but it is not very easy to
establish this distinction firmly. Abstraction, as
such, is a mental operation to which we must have re­
course if we are seeking to achieve a determinate 
purpose of any sort . . .  To abstract, in a word, is to 
make a preliminary clearing of the ground, and of course 
this clearing of the ground can appear the strictly 
reasonable thing to do.1
This statement means that one's mind must retain a distinct 
awareness of certain methodical omissions which are necessary 
if an anticipated result is to be had. The act of abstract­
ing is a legitimate process in all reasoning, and is basic
to intelligent action. "Psychologists have demonstrated 
with perfect clarity the close internal link between ab­
straction and action.Without abstraction one could not 
make the necessary distinctions. "Apart from isolating parts 
from wholes, elements and dimensions from totalities, there 
could be no clarity of thought and thus no basis for con­
sistent action."3 So Marcel recognizes the necessity and 
legitimacy of abstraction.
By viewing the term "abstract" in contradistinction 
to the term "concrete," as used by Marcel, a person can 
enrich his understanding of both terms.
These expressions, 'for the sake of the concrete, 
on behalf of the concrete' have about them a flavour 
that may surprise the unreflective mind: one might in
^Ibid.. p. 155. 
^Ibid.. p. 155.
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 13»
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fact be tempted to suppose that the concrete is what is 
given at first, is what our thinking must start from.
But nothing could be more false than such a supposi­
tion: and here Bergson is at one with Hegel.1
So the concrete is not given, it is won. The self apprehends 
it, a self in which the faculties are not dissociated. There 
is a unity in the self beyond all its division into faculties 
such as feeling, willing, and thinking. The concrete lies 
at the point where the unified self participates in being, 
in the inexhaustible. The concrete lies beyond the world of 
objectivity. It is re-created in intersubjectivity. The 
concrete can be regrasped only by going beyond the process 
of scientific analysis. In Marcel's thought, the terms 
abstract and abstraction should be confined to the objecti­
fied world of things. They should not be used in reference 
to human beings. On the other hand, the term concrete should 
only be employed to describe the actual and real which is 
discovered by the participation of the self in being.
Abstraction is a legitimate operation of the mind in 
pursuance of definite objectified goals, but when the 
mind turns toward transcendence it must surpass its 
own abstractions, for transcendence is that which gives 
no hold for abstraction. The blinded intuition which 
the self has of such a supra-abstractive concrete is 
the dynamic principle behind metaphysical reflection.^
While Marcel believes that abstraction is the founda­
tion of all reasoning, yet he insists that the spirit of 
abstraction is a misuse of this legitimate process, and the
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, pp. 159-60. 
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 121.
9^
root from which man's present predicament stems. One's 
first task is to investigate how Marcel's thinking developed 
along these lines. Secondly, to determine the nature and 
meaning of his coined phrase, spirit of abstraction.
As one recalls, the early setting of Marcel's life 
was quite sterile. With "its atmosphere of moral scruples 
and of hygenic precautions, I can see why abstraction was 
the keynote of my early philosophical thoughts." Accompany­
ing this tendency toward abstraction was a profound mistrust 
of experience and things concrete. It would appear from his 
own account of these days that this mood was superimposed, 
because his natural inclinations proceeded in the opposite
pdirection. Marcel experienced a growing distrust of ab­
straction in his formative years of thought, giving it as 
the reason back of his fascination with the Hegelian system;
For, in spite of appearances to the contrary, Hegel did 
make a very splendid effort to preserve the primacy of 
the concrete5 and no philosopher has protested more 
strongly against the confusion of the concrete with the 
immediately given. My severe and hostile criticism, on 
the other hand, of a pseudo-philosophy like that of 
Julien Benda is to be explained by the fundamentally 
abstract trend of Benda's thinking; he has never even 
suspected the existence of the true philosopher's 
urgent inner need to grasp reality in its concrete­
ness .3
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 1C4.
^Ibid.. See pp. 108-13*
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. p. 2.
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Marcel pinpoints his constant battle against the spirit of
•]abstraction as the dynamic element in all his philosophy.
This is a rather sweeping statement. Again he mentions the 
fact that from the time of his earliest philosophical 
writings (1911-1912) he has "played the part of a prosecuting 
counsel against every philosophy that seemed to me to remain
Pthe prisoner of abstractions." He gives evidence of feel­
ing intensely about this matter by the use of strong words 
in describing his feelings such as hostility, battle, and 
horror. In a moment of retrospection Marcel comments, "Can 
there be any doubt, then, that a bent of mind so deeply 
rooted is the point of departure of my whole philosophical 
development. One need only remember the barren and arid 
world of his childhood to understand his intense compensating 
distaste for the abstract and sterile.
And so, in opposition to the strong metaphysical 
tendency in me, there developed an increasingly ex­
plicit refusal to abstract from all the concrete detail 
of my life that detail which made my life my own in all 
its irreducible originality.
Thus a tension developed between these two poles 
which is evident in even the earliest of my essays. 
Abstraction, far from appearing to me as an end in it­
self, presented at best a steep and tortuous path which 
it was of course necessary to follow, but only in order 
to come eventually upon the genuinely concrete.^
^Ibid., See p. 1.
^Ibid.. pp. 1-2.
^Ibido5 p. 3 ! 
uGabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human 
Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 21.
(Hereinafter referred to as Human Dignitv.)
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"ïhe Spirit of Abstraction"
What does Marcel mean precisely by the phrase, the
spirit of abstraction? What is its nature, its meaning?
"Thë spirit of abstraction results when we ignore the con-
•1Crete reality from which the abstraction is taken." When 
one becomes more fascinated with the method of analysis than 
with the concrete reality being analyzed, and prefers ab­
stractive facts over that which is actual, the spirit of 
abstraction is at work.
But it can happen that the mind, yielding to a sort of 
fascination, ceases to be aware of these prior condi­
tions that justify abstraction and deceives itself 
about the nature of what is, in itself, nothing more 
than a method^ one might almost say nothing more than
an expedient.
This situation arises from the passion to value the part 
above the whole since the analyst is the "creator" of the 
part. "The spirit of abstraction is not separable from this 
contempt for the concrete conditions of abstract thinking,
I would even say that it 1^  this contempt.
Special attention should be given to the fact that 
Marcel emphasizes the passional nature of the spirit of 
abstraction. While he considers abstraction as an intel­
lectual operation which is a necessary component to reason­
ing, he thinks of the spirit of abstraction as being
^Keene, Gabriel Marcel, p. 13.
Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. p. 155*
^Ibid.. p. 155*
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emotional in nature. "The spirit of abstraction is es­
sentially of the order of the passions . . .  it is passion,
not intelligence, which forges the most dangerous abstrac-
-1tions." To some observers it might appear that the spirit 
of abstraction is a disease of the intelligence, when in 
fact its roots are in the passions. When Marcel uses the 
term passion he is referring to the emotional nature of 
man. Why, then, should he consider abstraction to fall in 
the realm of the intellectual and the spirit of abstraction 
in the realm of the emotional? The answer is to be found in 
the added investment of emotion and ego-involvement in the 
spirit of abstraction. Spirit of abstraction points to 
intensity of feeling. Thus, when contempt for the concrete 
is added to the simple mental operation of abstraction, one's 
emotions have already become involved. For contempt is a 
feelingful expression of an attitude of disregard, meanness, 
vileness, and scorn.
But Marcel does not stop here, for he considers 
this contempt for the dimensions of concrete reality a kind 
of mental imperialism. "The spirit of abstraction can in 
certain respects be regarded as a transposition of the at-
ptitudes of imperialism to the mental plane." In making this 
statement he alleges that finite man in his attempt to con­
trol and dominate the world about him, looks with contempt
^Ibid., p. 3• 
^Ibid., p. 155.
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upon that which he cannot understand, categorize, or manip­
ulate by his application of techniques. To this extent man 
reaches out to control and dominate as a mental imperialist.
In seeking to extend one's control over all things
in the world, including man, it becomes necessary to become
involved in a kind of reductionism, a devaluation of the real
which arises out of this resentment.
We should have at this point to make a direct attack 
on general formulations of the type, 'This is only that 
. . . This is nothing other than that . . . ' and so 
on: every depreciatory reduction of this sort has its
basis in resentment, that is to say, in passion, and 
at bottom it corresponds to a violent attack directed 
against a sort of integrity of the real, an integrity 
to which only a resolutely concrete mode of thinking 
can hope to do justice.^
Often one resents that which he cannot control, or that which
lies just beyond his reach or comprehension.
Whatever its ultimate meaning, the universe into which 
we have been thrown cannot satisfy our reason, let us 
have the courage to admit it once and for all. To deny 
it is not only scandalous, but in some ways truly sin­
ful; and indeed I am convinced that this is precisely 
the besetting sin of the philosopher, the sin of 
Leibnitz and, less obviously, the sin of Hegel.2
The universe presents many aspects which staggers the imag­
ination and one's power of comprehension, lyfen is unable to 
set forth all phenomena rationally. Reason seems not to be 
a universal key to all truth. It is but natural for man, 
then, to discount the reality of that which he cannot en­
compass with his intellect. This resentment is shown in
^Ibid.. p. 156.
2
Marcel, Existentialism, p. 124-.
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contempt for actual reality, accompanied by a spirit of re­
duction through which he tries to reduce everything to a 
lowest common denominator. This operation is emotional 
rather than intellectual. When men "accord to anĵ  category, 
isolated from all other categories, an arbitrary primacy, 
we are victims of the spirit of abstraction."^ A fitting 
example is seen of this type of operation in the Marxist 
who, victimized by abstraction, claims to interpret the 
whole of human reality on the basis of economic facts. One 
loses all illusions on the matter when he recognizes the 
absurdity of subordinating such matters as art forms, re­
ligious dogma and creative thought to the prevailing eco­
nomic conditions of a given era. There really can be no 
rational justification for this type of reductive operation.
The "Technological Mentality"
Preciseness of meaning and nicety of distinction is 
essential in coming to an understanding of Marcel's concept 
of technomania. As ]Vfe.rcel defends the legitimate function 
of abstraction but condemns the adverse effects of the spirit 
of abstraction, so he admits the value of technology while 
attacking its misuse--technolatry. A careful perusal of his 
comments reveals that he uses the terms, technolatry, tech­
nomania, and the technological mentality somewhat synon­
ymously. All of these designations proceed from the
Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. pp. 155-56.
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assumption that technical thinking yields the only valid 
knowledge about reality. On the other hand the term 
technology simply refers to the practical implementation of 
scientific knowledge to the needs of man. It has to do with 
industrial or applied science. Furthermore, he understands 
the term technique to designate the method or the details of 
procedure essential to expertness of execution in any art or 
science. Marcel's real concern lies in the dangerous effect 
which the technological mentality might have on the human 
spirit.
The Legitimate Use of Technology
Make no mistake about it, Marcel does sense the
positive value of the technological approach. He states that
only a lunatic would deny its usefulness; he also feels there
are other important points to consider beyond its utility.
A technician, in applying a technique which he has mastered,
experiences a joy which is both innocent and noble. This joy
is bound up with the consciousness of power over inanimate
things, over matter which is subordinate and in one sense
meant to be controlled by man. In overcoming the resistance
of inertia in things, the technician discovers a value. This
inertia is overcome by a method whicn has precision. Herein
lies the value of a technique--the precision with which it
must be applied.
No technician can do without the virtue of accuracy: in 
his world inaccuracy is always punished and the
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punishment Is sometimes terrible. Hence the awareness 
of responsibility which he incessantly carries with 
him. 1
Marcel adds that there is also the purity of joy which 
naturally accompanies technical research, especially when it 
results in a discovery. He observes that the positive 
element in all this is due to the technician’s not thinking 
of himself but of his task. There is also a difference in 
human attitudes expressed in actions about things and those 
about people. It is far simpler for an action to be pure if
its bearing is on things rather than on individuals.
Persons are often manipulated by techniques generally re­
served for things. This practice entails grave consequences. 
When the technical mind fails to distinguish between methods
used on things and those which ought to be used with people,
the result is often seen in the crass objectification of 
persons.
The Illegitimate Use of Technology 
In recent years Marcel has been increasingly con­
cerned with the relationship which exists between the thoughts 
of men and the cultural structure. With great interest he 
examines the correlation between the growing technological 
mentality and the gradual erosion of meaningful existence. 
Technolatry, or technomania as Marcel sometimes calls it, 
threatens authentic living on four fronts.
^Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1955)? P* 9-
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First, the technological mentality is oseudo- 
intellectnal. There is the devastating assumption that 
technical thinking yields the only valid knowledge about 
reality. Usually, this attitude presupposes a materialistic 
universe--one in which all qualitative distinctions can be 
reduced to merely quantitative differences. If this is true, 
then proper techniques of measuring, weighing, and dissect­
ing should produce all of the facts worth knowing. However, 
the question arises, will all reality yield its innermost 
secrets through this method of inquiry? Can proper tech­
nique produce the correct answer to all human problems? Is 
all life exhaustible? If so, then how does one account for 
the many intimations of the spirit world? After all, can 
every pertinent fact be tabulated about existants? Isn't 
there a mysterious element in the universe which defies man's 
reason and his probing experimentation? Will the inner 
secrets of being and existence ultimately yield to the tools 
and techniques of modern man? The answer to these questions 
is obviously in the negative. Technology, while quite ade­
quate in the realm of objects and things, finds itself 
without a satisfactory solution for the deeper and inner 
issues of man's life.
Since a scientific method of investigation usually 
involves an analytic procedure, it utilizes various tech­
niques. Furthermore, science not only examines the physical 
universe but probes the realm of living things as well.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that science has extended its 
tentacles of technique to the sphere of man and his inner­
most being. Marcel holds this to be a grave mistake. For 
man is not a problem to be solved but a mystery to be in­
tuitively grasped.
It is impossible for man not to consider himself as 
part of this cosmos— or of this a-cosmos--planned and 
dissected by the technicians; as a result, he inevitably 
becomes a target for those techniques which, in prin­
ciple, are legitimately applicable only to the outward 
world. There are already countless instances of this in 
the fields of experimental psychology, psychiatry and 
so on.1
A classic example of the techniques of the outer world being 
applied to man can be found in the development of psycho­
logical testing. While Marcel accepts the validity of 
psychological testing in the field of motor-sensory behavior 
(this being purely in the realm of the physical) he rejects 
its usefulness and propriety in the areas of emotional and 
intelligence testing. Here a personal invasion is attempted 
to subject the individual to the techniques of science. Can 
that which is of a subjective nature be assessed by physical 
measurement? Thus, when the technical environment becomes 
widespread, it is not surprising that such analytic pro­
cedures are applied to man. As Marcel puts it, "This is one 
more victory for abstraction, the individual being now a
 ̂Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 15*
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unit whom it is possible and right to deal with as with all
•1the other units in his category."
But one must see that a functionalized world pro­
duces a specialized self, when man becomes so categorized 
and classified his resources can be thoroughly tabulated and 
utilized. Since being is beyond all inventory, the tech­
nical approach breaks down in its effort to discover facts 
pertaining to this reality. There is that in man which can 
never be known by way of a cataloguing of details.
It is not the insufficiency of the catalogue which 
causes it to fall short of his being, but the fact that 
it is a catalogue. Unfortunately, the more that others 
tend to lose sight of that 'beyond,' the more he himself 
loses sight of it. If all the world agrees in seeing 
him as the sum of designable functions- he is in dis­
tinct danger of becoming exactly that.2
Secondly, the technological mentality is seen to be 
anthroDocentric. Marcel describes it as a "practical 
anthropocentrism" in which the technological man sees the 
world only as neutral raw material to be transformed to meet 
his desires. In this light the temptation persists for man 
to foster the view that he is the sole giver and creator of 
meaning and value. Thus, man usurps the place of God. It 
generally follows that man tends to bow at the shrine of his 
own productions, self-captivated by his own categories of 
thought and trusting only in that which his techniques can
^Ibid.. p. 16.
2Gallagher, The Philosophv of Gabriel Marcel.
pp. 56-57-
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conquer. To the technocrat, nothing seems to be beyond the
advancing technology of man. Progress becomes inevitable.
To man the technician, the cosmos presents itself as 
matter for domination and he himself appears as an 
autonomous organizer. Now if he plays this role ex- 
clusively--if in fact it is the only role he can 
conceive— then it is no exaggeration to say that he has 
repudiated being. For being is not dominable; and to 
experience being is to experience oneself as non- 
autonomous. 1
When man views himself as the center of the universe as well 
as its ultimate end, he is characterized by a practical 
anthropocentrism. Man has a growing tendency to understand 
the world around him, as well as himself, through the methods 
of technology. This, in effect, is human reason insofar as 
it strives to manage the earth and everything living within 
it. ]yfe.rcel suggests that such an attitude could extend even 
to the management of other planets.
Marcel maintains that man is being misled in under­
standing the world and himself in reference to technology. 
This gives man the impression he can modify the world in 
such a methodical way, as to satisfy his needs in an in­
creasingly perfect manner. This in turn gives rise to a 
genuine anthropocentrism.
Man tends to look upon himself as alone being capable 
of giving meaning to an otherwise meaningless world. 
Doubtless this will have a remarkable effect on man's 
ability to admire the things around him; there will be 
an increased tendency to admire the products of his
^Ibid.. p. 58.
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own technology— as they appear to afford a matchless 
measure of perfection and precision.1
According to Marcel, it lies within the nature of 
techniques to lead the mind into temptation. He quickly 
qualifies his statement by saying that techniques do not 
wield power in their own right, but that they can become the 
occasion for man's temptation. He continues by pointing out 
that temptation accompanies power. Whenever man is endowed 
with power he is exposed to the temptation of abusing it. 
Consequently, any acquisition of power should be accompanied 
by the exercise of control over this power itself. But this 
is by no means inevitable. On the contrary, the more sud­
denly power is acquired the less likely will one feel able to 
control it. He is like a self-made man who believes he is in 
no man's debt, and considers any suggestion at this point an 
intrusion or encroachment. His stance is proudly humanistic.
This being said, my suggestion that it is in the 
nature of techniques to lead the mind into temptation 
simply amounts to this: a man who has mastered one or
more techniques tends in principle to distrust what is 
alien to these techniques; or rather, he will at a 
pinch admit the validity of this or that other technique 
he has only heard of or knows only at second hand; but 
he will usually be most unwilling to accept the idea 
that a meta-technical activity may have value. But in 
respect of technical power which is immediate, what I 
have called power at one remove is necessarily meta- 
technical. Indeed it is these powers at one remove 
which, in a technical civilisation, are most likely to 
be discredited.2
1 Gabriel Marcel, Searchings (New York: Newman 
Press, 1967)? P» ^3»
2Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 11.
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Thirdly, the technological mentality is inadequate 
in meeting the deeper issues of life. Those who are ob­
sessed with the power and adequacy of technology in the life 
of man tend to experience a diminuition in authentic living. 
Life on the human scene is freighted with tragedy, heart­
ache, and eventual death. Nothing can ultimately forestall 
these forces. If one's faith rests in the power of tech­
nological ability to meet these crises, then only despair 
awaits him, for technology finds its sufficiency in a scien­
tific context which speaks primarily to the world of objects 
and things. There is no answer for the spirit of man in 
this sterile atmosphere except for the haunting echoes of 
his own questioning. Technological thought cannot provide 
purpose and meaning in life nor can it furnish a guide to its 
final goal.
Life is deeper than logic. As helpful as reason and 
experimentation may be, they are woefully inadequate in 
meeting the demands of the soul. "Man shall not live by 
bread alone. i s  a profound insight concerning the true na­
ture of man. Life is lived on the level of the personal, not 
on the level of the mechanical. Mechanical accuracy can 
never replace the need for human warmth. Things, in them­




For life to be meaningful, it must be permeated with 
purpose. This, in turn, calls for a system of values. But 
how can the concept of value be introduced into a world of 
mere fact? One is now faced with the stock question: Can
an ought be deduced from an is? Technology, dealing in facts 
and figures, finds itself wholly inadequate in supplying a 
valuable end for man's life. If, as the materialistic tech­
nologist suggests, all qualitative distinctions can be re­
duced ultimately to nothing more than quantitative distinc­
tions, then how can one account for the universal presence in 
man of the deep spiritual yearning for self-fulfillment?
Fourthly, as the technological mentality relates it­
self to life it becomes disintegrative to individuated and 
stable living. Modern society, therefore, presents the 
spectacle of both anonymity and rootlessness.
Science, with its accompanying technological know­
how, has contributed largely to the mass production observed 
in nearly every area of endeavor. Sameness in fad and fancy 
dominates the thinking of modern man. To be accepted by 
others means the presence of a basic likeness. Even the 
various groups of non-conformists give strict allegiance to 
the conformity of their particular group. In a desperate 
effort to be individual and independent they become exceed­
ingly hide-bound to the mores of their clan. Furthermore, it 
becomes highly necessary to develop a standardized man to 
provide a market for standardized products issuing forth in
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mass production. This in turn demands the development of 
mass thinking and mass desire. Psychological appeal in ad­
vertizing coupled with a propaganda-like pitch become the 
order of the day. The tragic result is uniformity of 
persons. Marshalled after this pattern twentieth-century 
man has become faceless, generalized, and anonymous. Thus 
he becomes reduced by a technocratic society to a state of 
technological nirvana, being merged into the great self, mass 
man.
With increased mobility and the ever changing demands 
of a highly industrialized society on him, he finds few roots 
going down into the soil of established community life. It 
has been estimated that fully one-fourth of the total 
American population moves every year. With such a fluid 
situation it is little wonder that the average person is 
experiencing difficulty with self-identification. Who am I? 
From whence have I come? are both significant and character­
istic questions of the day. Marcel always associates 
meaningful living with a sense of individuality and rooted­
ness in a concrete environment. Wholesomeness of being and 
clarity of self-image are always parts of a larger, more 
stable, contextual setting. Meaningfulness and identity 
stem from seeing and thinking perspectively. Rootedness in 
community life encourages such a view.
A society in which nomadism is the outgrowth of tech­
nological demands will produce standardised persons 
devoid of the intimate flavor of regions. Such a so­
ciety will be, as Dostoyevsky foresaw, an ant heap and
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not a community. Its individuals will be isolated atoms 
with no strong sense of identity or of belonging with 
others. Atomisation and collectivisation go hand in 
hand, for it is only faceless and isolated individuals 
who can be formed into a mass.”*
Perhaps enough has been said concerning the extensive 
inroads made by the technological mentality into modern 
society. There is a definite relationship between techno­
logical advance and the destruction of the social fabric 
necessary for meaningful living. Twentieth century culture 
has been saturated with the misuse of technology until a 
number of philosophers have awakened to the fact that they 
must address themselves to the situation, with the hope of 
keeping human life human— of saving man from himself.
No doubt the most devastating evidence of the disinte­
gration of the substance of authentic living is to be found 
in the "techniques of degradation" which evil men have used 
on their brothers. These can be seen in the evil manipula­
tions on the bodies and minds of men during World War II and 
in many areas during the ensuing years. Only mention is made 
of this matter now since the last chapter will be devoted to 
its examination.
Technomania At Work
Since the nature and characteristics of the techno­
logical mentality have been examined it follows that one's 
attention be turned to technomania in action. Three of the
"'Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 12.
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basic characteristics of this type mind can best be described 
in their roles of possessing, objectifying, and desacraliz- 
ing. One's attention is now directed toward these.
Possessing
Having is one of the two basic modes of relating to 
the world--the other is being. The phenomenon of having, 
or possession, is also closely related to the spirit of 
abstraction. While both of these modes of relating to the 
world are necessary and proper in their own right, yet it 
has been noted that as the possessive orientation to life 
increases, the type of thought which deepens participation 
in the mystery of being decreases. Herein lies a real 
danger to modern man. When possessiveness becomes dominant, 
meaningful living may cease to exist.
One of the dangers implicit in possessiveness is
found in what Marcel describes as a sort of "boomerang
•1action." This consists of a subtle, reflexive relation 
which tends to grow between a possessor and his possessions. 
The stronger the possessive instinct becomes, the more the 
possessed object gains control over the possessor. "For the 
fact must be faced, that this tension, this fateful double
action, may at any moment turn our lives into a kind of in-
2comprehensible and intolerable slavery." This possibility
^Marcel, Being and Having, p. I63.
^Ibid., p. 16 .̂
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lias at the heart of everyday experience with its dangers,
its anxieties and its techniques.
So that in the last analysis--and this is a new point 
of view— Having as such seems to have a tendency to 
destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by' 
possessing, but which now absorbs the master who 
thought he controlled it. It seems that it is of the 
very nature of my body, or of my instruments in so far 
as I treat them as possessions, that they should tend 
to blot me out, although it is I who possess them.1
Having tends to destroy being. A fitting example of this 
kind of fateful double action is seen in the fanatical 
positivist, the worshiper of science. When he surrenders 
to the temptation to limit reality to what can be possessed, 
controlled, understood, and categorized he is captivated by 
the ideas which he began by having. "The mysterious full­
ness of concrete reality is sacrificed to a system of ideas
which limits the real to what can be possessed with certainty
2through objectifying, 'scientific' modes of thought."
Of further import is the danger of a scientifically
oriented society selling its birthright of being for the
mess of pottage consisting of nothing but clear, sterile,
factual knowledge.
A society which reserves its highest prestige for science 
and technology will be in constant danger of sacrificing 
being to having, of denying the mystery of presence for 
the clear knowledge which makes technology possible.3
^Ibid.. pp. 16M— 65.
9Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 16.
^Ibid.. p. 16.
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Marcel feels that there is but one way to escape 
the disastrous consequences of a radical orientation toward 
possession: By man remaining closely related to those ac­
tivities that recall him to the mystery of being.
And therefore it is also necessary that these ac­
tivities and autonomous functions should be balanced 
and harmonised by the central activities. In these, 
man is recalled into the presence of mystery, that 
mystery which is the foundation of his very being, and 
apart from which he is nothingness: the grand mystery
of religion, art and metaphysic.1
Apart from such pursuits there is real danger in man being 
dominated by "having" to such an extent that he will ap­
proach his world only in order to subject it to his desires. 
"When this happens, the categories of function and output 
become central, wonder and admiration atrophy, and fidelity, 
hope and love are replaced by the will to power." Marcel 
feels that technological society has already succumbed to 
the ever-present temptation to deny the reality of all that 
cannot be possessed and thus controlled. The predicament of 
modern man has arisen to the degree of this yielding.
Objectifying 
The genius of the technological mentality is to 
reduce all of life to nothing more than objects over which 
techniques have full sway. At this point everything becomes 
possessable, characterizable, manipulable, controllable, and
 ̂Marcel, Being and Having, p. 1/4-.
pKeen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 16.
1 1l+
problematic. All mystery has vanished, nothing remains in­
exhaustible. Presence is in the process of being degraded to 
absence. When this occurs the problematized man appears, but 
bereft of all mystery. He has been dehumanized and ob- 
jectivized— no longer a mystery, only a problem. This is the 
final product of a rationalistic, scientific, industrialized 
civilization.
At the root of the concept of objectification is the 
idea of the subject-object dichotomy. What does one mean by 
subject? By object? Wherein lies the difference? The sub­
ject is the thinking and acting agent while the object is 
the receiver of action. The subject refers to the internal 
self while the object is considered the totality of ex­
ternal phenomena constituting the not-self. The subject is 
the concrete while the object is the abstract. The subject 
savors of mystery while the object indicates the problematic. 
Marcel would continue these polarities by aligning the sub­
ject with such concepts as being, participation, presence, 
invisible, and I-Thou, while he would contrast the notion of 
object with having, objectification, absence, visible, and 
I-It.
The basis for all points of difference is in this 
view of an object as something external to me, some­
thing which is set over against myself. In an objective 
situation, I am here and the object is there, complete 
and open for inspection. For the reason that I meet the 
object as juxtaposed to myself and as not involving 
myself, I can envelop it in a clear and distinct idea 
which delineates its limits. With this clarity comes 
perfect transmittability, and with the transmittability
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the object begins to lead that public and independent 
life which is the privilege of the world of the 
problematic.
A problem, then, is an inquiry which is made in reference to 
an object. The data as presented do not include oneself. On 
the other hand, a mystery is a question in which I am 
personally caught up. The data given cannot be regarded as 
detached from the self. One is completely involved, if not 
engulfed, in the question at hand.
Being is not an object which I can inspect from all 
sides: if I were to have a clear and distinct notion
of being, I would be completely an object for myself 
(since being envelops me, and in order to objectify 
being I would have to objectify myself). But I cannot 
objectify myself; I can not observe myself from the
outside.2
It is important to the self concept to understand 
what Marcel means by the term objectification. Basically, 
the term refers to that process whereby something is caused 
to assume the character of an object. This consists of 
many different things such as externalisation, becoming 
visible, and taking on the character of things. Marcel 
especially makes use of the term when one attempts to ob­
jectify that which is nonobjactifiable, such as in the case 
of being or existence. This action involves mystery as 
contrasted with problem, which is germane to scientific and 
technical thought.
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 31
^Ibid.. p. 33»
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In a problem the enquirer is not tangled up with his 
data; if there is danger of such entanglement, he 
either takes care to rid his data of his (physical) 
personal equation or defines a Heisenberg-region of 
indeterminacy. But if the matter in hand is Existence, 
human Existence, he can purge the topic of himself only 
at the cost of "objectifying" what cannot be ob­
jectified and remain itself. Without the living pulse 
as known by himself, and only in himself, the matter 
before him is emptied precisely of its 'existence, 
its essence has disappeared.1
Marcel is not blind to the value of technique; he is at 
variance only with its dominance. He is not down on objects, 
but only on the object as the exemplary case of being. A 
close parallel can be seen between this approach and the fact 
of his acceptance of the legitimacy of abstraction while 
being against the spirit of abstraction.^ The neopositivistic 
inroads in both Britain and America are responsible for cre­
ating the idol of natural-science objectivity.^
The process of "objectification" normal to the physical 
sciences, with its ideal of knifing the thing thought 
about cleanly off from the thinker, and vice versa, 
would, if applied to existence, through its very success 
destroy the life, of its subject-matter, inseparable 
from being felt.^
How does the process of "objectifying" differ from "thinking
about"; for it is quite obvious that one must be able to
think about existence, being, immediacy, without denaturing
•1Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics," p. '̂+B.
2Supra, p. 91 .
3gee Marcel, Ma.n Against Mass Societv. p. 8.
IfHocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics," p. 44^.
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them; otherwise, metaphysics dies in the process of birth. 
This involves the distinction between problem and mystery.
The answer will be simplified by noting that one objectifies 
a thought-target when he mentally places it within nature, 
"nature as comprehensive object being defined in terms of a 
system of events whose verae causae are solely among them­
selves, or within a common field . . . and therefore inde­
pendent of the thinker."^ Objects such as this are fitted 
for passionless observation and for records whose data are 
valid for all observers on exactly the same terms.
Marcel maintains that objectification occurs when the 
self is observed, described, or classified. There seems to 
be little hesitancy on the part of the technician to treat 
and approach beings as things. Again, this pursuit is en­
couraged by the further, false assumption that the only valid 
knowledge attainable is obtained by this abstractive, objec­
tifying method.
Existentialists often accuse realists of objectifying 
human experience. The concern of the former for the concrete, 
intuitive aspects of individual experience account in part 
for such accusations. In addition, existential thinkers are 
alarmed over the penetration in contemporary life of in­
dustrialization, mechanization, and depersonalization. When 
the self is objectified it appears as an instrument, some­
times as a possession, and at other times as a body of
^Ibid.. p. ‘+̂ 5.
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statistical facts. Thus it is deprived of its individual­
ity, its uniqueness, and its inferiority. On this level it 
is observed as nothing more than an object among objects.
When this occurs the dehumanizing process becomes 
something like a chain reaction. The depersonalized indi­
vidual himself, tends to see himself as others see him. He 
generally offers little resistance to the techniques of 
classification, organization, and functionalization.
He may even be unaware that these operations are 
taking place. Marcel notes that when depersonalization 
takes place, one has no sense of being; he is in a 
state of ontological lack. The philosopher, in turn, 
in objectifying the self, is contributing indirectly 
if not directly to this state.1
Marcel also insists that the philosopher who views man in 
this fashion approaches him in the role of a scientist. 
Aping the technician, he places man before him as an iso­
lated object, suitable for inquiry. He proceeds in an ob­
jective manner to investigate, measure, trace, and evaluate 
the specimen. The self is viewed as a passive object of 
scientific investigation with all spiritual and personal 
aspects ignored. Its identity as a subject is laid aside 
and in its place an objective identity is taken on. After 
this manner the individual can only claim a mode of absence 
in surrender of the mode of presence.
1 Patricia Sanborn, "Objectification and Self- 
Knowledge: A Critical Examination," Philosophv and Phenom­
enological Research. XXVIII (Sept., 1967), P* 39*
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In response to Marcel's stated concept of objecti­
fication, there are those who would sharply disagree. Among 
such philosophers is Patricia Sanborn, who has recently 
published an insightful reply to Marcel's theory. The fol­
lowing remarks will be largely drawn from her views on 
objectification.
Sanborn sets the issue by stating that Marcel's 
"critique of objectification is based largely upon a mis­
understanding of the function of objectification, and that
this misunderstanding leads to unnecessary confusions in
1regard to a theory of self-knowledge."
Marcel argues that the self cannot be an object be­
cause it is a presence. In spite of his claim that one thing 
cannot be both a presence and an object, his discussions of 
the self appear to depend on that very possibility. So it 
seems that Marcel's very procedure supports the position 
that he criticizes. His analyses are based on the assumption 
that the self can be an object.
To discuss the self at all, it is necessary to establish 
a distance from it. Whether he views the self as a 
presence, an instrument or a collection of events, the 
philosopher cannot avoid objectification. Marcel's 
analyses of self-realization do not exclude such ob­
jectification, for the very reason that they are anal­
yses. They purport to suggest or explain various facets 
of the self. The self, of necessity, becomes the object 
of investigation, regardless of the kind of object it
is .2
'Ibid.. p. 39. 
^Ibid., p. )+0.
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Just because the self must be an object in order to be 
studied at all, it does not necessarily follow that it lose 
its subjective identity as Marcel assumes. Marcel would 
insist that objectification alters what it objectifies, 
converts the dynamic into the static, mediates what is im­
mediate, and distorts the data presented to it. Yet it 
could be maintained, on the contrary, that an objective ap­
proach serves to indicate that the object in question is 
dynamic, immediate, and more complete than the character­
ization of it. Rather than distorting the self, it provides 
one description of what the self is. Thus in a study in 
which the self is an object of investigation, it retains its 
identity. It is a certain kind of object. It doesn't lose 
its uniqueness because other phenomena can also be objects. 
Being an object does not alter its unique traits, so reasons 
Sanborn. Marcel apparently overestimates the degree to 
which objectification affects the object.
Marcel appears to be arguing against the misuse of 
objectification rather than against objectification itself, 
yet no such distinction appears in his works. It would ap­
pear as if Marcel could make good use of legitimate 
objectification— which he doesn't! To be consistent with 
his other distinctions between abstraction and its misuse, 
technology and its misuse, he should not be against the 
proper use of objectification over against its misuse. "It 
is misused when it is expected to reveal all aspects of the
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object. This could be corrected by an acknowledgment that 
only some features of the object are being explored.
Marcel's position could better be interpreted, says Sanborn, 
as a proposal for understanding the self to be a certain 
kind of object, rather than as an attack on all objectifi­
cation in reference to man. Consequently, an objective ap­
proach to the self doesn't necessitate the distortion of the 
self.
The phenomena which lead Marcel to designate the self 
a presence are not denied, if the self is made an ob­
ject of inquiry. They are only denied, if the philoso­
pher insists that the self is the kind of object which 
does not exhibit these phenomena. Furthermore, to 
objectify the self is not to say that the self is only 
what is revealed about it as an object.2
In all cases the method should be distinguished from the ob­
ject, for the method simply aims at understanding the object, 
not at converting it or identifying it, or changing it in 
any way.
The self, as an object of inquiry, gives evidence 
of having such features that Marcel designates it as a 
presence. And it can be known as a presence by participa­
tion, a participation in a particular kind of object, but 
nonetheless an object. So Sanborn concludes that the "self 
is an object known by a variety of methods, not by any one 
method to the exclusion of all others."3
^Ibid., p. -̂3. 




In the world of science where technology plays a 
major role, a desacralizing process inevitably sets in that 
downgrades life to the level of other objects. The tech­
nological mentality spawns this desecration of life. Since 
personal being is considered the highest level of living 
existence, then a certain sacredness is generally attached 
to it. In this sense, then, the term sacred can be properly 
used in reference to human life and personality. In dis­
cussing the subject of the sacral in the era of technology, 
Marcel refers to it as one of the more serious problems of 
the day. For in effect it poses the question: "What are we
to make of ourselves in face of the fact that we are grad­
ually being thoroughly manipulated by a technology that we
1ourselves have devised"? In other words, man has become 
victimized by his own doings, by his over-extended technology. 
This is a sweeping claim by Marcel. Has man's methodologies 
and creations outdistanced him? Are they actually in con­
trol, destroying their own inventor? Wherein lies the 
sacred, the valuable? Is being, as the inner core of man, 
desacralized these days and offered as a sacrifice on the 
altar of technolatry?
True, man belongs to a world in transition. Up 
until now men have lived in a world with certain definite 
values, ", = = but at the moment we are facing a different
^Marcel, Searchings. n. *+1.
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world altogether— one still in its inaugural states, where 
the values of yesterday are going to be questioned radically, 
if not denied or rejected outright.Marcel looks with 
foreboding upon the future when he observes that this situa­
tion, cloven as it is, will be the basis of everything to 
come. Man has entered the era of technology and is already 
struggling with its tentacles of abstraction. He has a 
growing tendency to understand the world around him, and 
even himself, in terms of technology. "Technology is not a 
unity we can amass. It is human reason insofar as it 
strives to manage, so to speak, the earth and everything 
living within it.
Marcel maintains that man is being misled to under­
stand the world and himself in regard to technology as one 
who can modify and manipulate it as he pleases and at his 
pleasure. Thus far it appears to be working. But is it 
really, in the last analysis? Granted, man has devised many 
things for his own benefit. To some extent he has manipulated 
the world. But what has happened to the "person" in the 
process. A frightening gap has developed between man's 
scientific accomplishments and his moral development. It's 
questionable whether man will have the strength of character 
to control and utilize his inventions to the good of mankind 




questions whether "man the manipulator'.' is really succeeding 
at his technological task. Yet he continues to look upon 
himself as the sole "one" who can bring meaning to an other­
wise meaningless world. This kind of thinking gives rise to 
a genuine anthropocentrism, to a cheap type of humanism.
The sacredness of life with the attendant responsibilities 
to one's Maker seems completely ignored. Mankind has even 
assumed the prerogative of God, in that he now surrepti­
tiously holds the right to not only manipulate life, but to 
give and take it at will.
Marcel suggests that a most fitting example of how 
the technological has invaded the sacred precincts of life 
is to be found in the widespread use of contraceptive de­
vices today. He observes that they seem about to assure man 
of mastery over a function which hitherto he had little con­
trol. The generation gap is characterized in part by the
. . . fact that life is being less and less felt as a 
gift to be handed on, and more and more felt as a kind 
of incomprehensible calamity, like a flood, against 
which we ought to be able to build dykes. There is 
nothing really ridiculous in the assertion that the 
growingly general use of techniques of birth-prevention 
is only one aspect of a very widespread impingement of 
techniques upon realms from which, until recently, they 
were almost shut out.1
Not uncommonly strange in the Catholic tradition, yet this
view would be met with resistance from the rank-and-file :aan
of today. Perhaps the degree of resentment to this position
is indicative of the degree of independence and autonomy now
 ̂Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 9̂ .
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experienced in the technological world. Marcel belabors his
•1point and makes it the main thrust of an entire chapter.
In fairness to him one should hear him out. He calls at­
tention to the fact that a husband and wife as procreators 
are limited to fulfilling the conditions according to which 
a human being becomes flesh. It is important to realize that 
this privilege is a gift of God, and as such it lends a 
sacred character to life. The power of procreation is a 
gift, and any kind of contraceptive practice might lead to 
the indiscriminate manipulation of human life.
Man tends to function as though he were the actual pro­
ducer and not merely a mediating agent. Furthermore, 
mediation is closely associated with the act of pro­
ducing; in fact every activity looked upon by man as 
creative actually has to be understood as mediative.^
Marcel points out that if God is the source and sustainer of
all life, then in the last analysis man can be nothing more
than the mediating agent. But because of scientific and
technological progress, man tends to look upon himself as a
creator rather than a mere agent. "Consequently, we will
have to make a strenuous effort if we are going to extricate
ourselves and restore the forgotten reality of m e d i a t i o n .
The process of desacralization has brought about the
view of life as one vast stretch of absurdity culminating in
despair. In holding this view many parents look upon
^See Marcel, Searchings. pp. ^1-53* 
^Ibid.. p .  ^ 5 .
3lbid.. p .  I f 5 .
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themselves as having unjustifiably destined someone who did 
not ask for life to share the disastrous gamble with them. 
Philosophically speaking, this is the most crucial aspect of 
the problem:
If we proceed from a completely desacralized, pessi­
mistic view of life we tend to treat life simply as a 
power we have to control if we are going to minimize 
its baneful effects. But in effect this pessimistic 
outlook is a definite component of the technological 
notion of the world. It leads us to arrogate to it­
self the right to manipulate life— simply because it 
has none of those social qualities we discover through 
a theocentric perspective.1
No doubt Marcel's position on desacralization has 
much to commend it. In all probability, this position of 
persons, who have intrinsic value, has gradually diminished, 
while objects and processes have increased in status. But 
when it comes to the matter of Marcel's basic and prolonged 
attack on contraceptive devices, there appear some unanswered 
questions. As an alternative what does he propose to combat 
the growing problem of population explosion? Is there not a 
moral issue involved when starvation is part of the possible 
outcome? Doesn't man have a serious obligation to face-up 
to the consequences of his choices? Furthermore, as a re­
ligiously oriented person doesn't Marcel grasp the reason 
why many people consider it other than a blessing to usher 
children into a world freighted with apocalyptic foreboding? 
Is he not one of the foremost in anticipating doomsday
^Ibid.. p. ^9*
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himself?^ In assessing the whole problem all of these con­
siderations need to be reviewed. Perhaps Marcel has inad­
vertently chosen the right principle but the wrong example!
Another facet of the problem of desacralization is
to be seen in the statistical approach to life as seen in
recent decades.
Here as anywhere else in business life numbers have an 
important function. But the number factor operates 
in absolute opposition to the sacral. The very act of 
counting itself, 1 would think, is the beginning of 
desecration. And if this is so, it is all the more 
true of statistical evaluation, though, admittedly, 
those entrusted with the preservation of genuine re­
ligious values often condescend to this kind of 
reckoning— just so much more proof of how far along 
the process of desacralization actually is. And, con­
versely, it perhaps helps us grasp the true essence of 
the sacral in itself.2
Marcel also mentions the changing attitude toward 
death as an indication of the desacralizing trend. In some 
quarters, where proper respect was once accorded to death, 
it no longer receives more than passing notice. Even murder 
is gradually losing the stigma proper to it in the light of 
the Ten Commandments, he observes. "It would seem that life 
is regarded as entirely useless; consequently, one can ex­
tinguish it like a candle."3 One is almost tempted to speak 
of it in the jargon of the market— as a tragic "drop" in the 
price of life. Perhaps the frequency of large scale wars
See Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. 11, p. l86. 
"̂ Marcel, Searchings. pp. 50-51 •
3lbid.. p. ^9.
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since the turn of the century has contributed its share to 
the desacralization of human life, not to mention the 
atrocities committed in death camps. The cheapness of human 
life is evident all about.
There are those who would predict the ultimate dis­
appearance of the sacred. Their assertions should be viewed 
with caution.
But this by no means signifies that, judged from the 
standpoint of reflective thought, this obliteration 
de facto of the sacred corresponds to a refutation 
de jure. Everything seems to indicate that this radical 
profanation could not be accomplished without striking 
a blow at what are probably unformulated needs which 
are deeply inscribed in the very heart of a human 
being.1
An opportunity presents itself to the philosopher to practice 
the virtue of humility— which indeed is not difficult in a 
technological age! Then he can bring into the open the re­
deeming value which humility possesses, in a world "where 
the manipulation of techniques in the service of the will to 
power threatens, in the absence of any counterweight, to 
engender pride, madness, and death."2 By giving attention 
to the whole man, and making a modest approach to the inner 
meaning of life, the philosopher can hope to make a telling 
contribution in conserving those values of life that can be 
characterized as sacred.




In a world freighted with tremendous possibilities 
for the development of being the emergence of the technologi­
cal mentality poses a serious threat. The potential being 
has much to lose in the process of becoming actualized. It 
is possible that one may suffer the supreme "loss of being" 
itself. The pressures of modern society constantly militate 
against the achievement of his goal--self-realization, full­
ness of being. The privileged position of science with its 
attendant technologies tend to diminish the sacredness of 
human existence. In fact, the devastating spirit of ab­
straction has left man bereft of those qualities which make 
him human. Marcel summarily exclaims:
To be men; to continue to remain men. These are the 
words on which I have concentrated unceasingly for 
twenty years . . .  It is precisely my unconquerable love 
of life that precludes my subscribing to what I would 
call the "mortalism" of those for whom man finally 
breaks down like a machine.1
One's attention is now directed to an investigation 




THE LOSS OF MEANINGFUL EXISTENCE
In an age characterized by swift developments in 
science, one can rightfully expect accelerated growth in the 
field of technology. This of itself is not to be feared, 
for when properly utilized, technology is a boon to man.
But when these same techniques are turned on man himself, 
seeking his objectification, trouble arises. As was noted 
in Chapter 111, the spirit of abstraction soon develops 
into the technological mentality, and man is thereby 
threatened with the loss of meaningful existence.
In the midst of these untoward surroundings man is 
desperately striving to attain realization of being. His 
pilgrimage is beset on everyhand by the alluring temptation 
to depart from the quest and join the ranks of those who 
seek an easy security in the neat, clear, sterile exactness 
of technolatry. This is nothing more than an invitation to 
nothingness and eventual death. This dehumanizing process 
has taken its toll among individuals as well as in society 
as a whole. In this chapter one's attention will be pri­
marily directed toward the loss of being sustained by
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individuals, while the following two chapters will he used 
in the investigation of its penetration of the social fabric.
In experiencing the loss of ontological exigence man 
undergoes a subtle, but devastating, attrition. Ontological 
exigence is the inner drive toward fullness of being. It is 
a native urge, a natural hunger for self-fulfillment, an 
innate demand to rise from mere existence to being. Onto­
logical exigence is the initial human thrust to actualize 
the potential in man. While its primary concern is the dis­
covery of being through participation in being, yet this 
sense of being becomes the basis for all meaningful living 
as well. It is the necessary requisite for the enrichment 
of life at its best. The following discussion will treat 
both the loss of essential being and the accompanying loss of 
meaningful existence.. »
Even a cursory examination of the contemporary scene 
would reveal that man occupies a perilous position. VJhile 
man has always raised questions about the nature of the uni­
verse and his own destiny, yet more specifically in modern 
times has he become unsure of who he really is. Being 
adrift, he apparently has lost his way in the universe. Em­
broiled in a world plagued with irrationalism, he no longer 
admits of being a rational self or the creation of a personal 
God. He is ill-at-ease, shifting about, seeking an ac­
ceptable metaphysical posture. Shot through with purpose­
lessness, he has lost his raison'd'etre.
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Marcel points to the spirit of abstraction as being 
the common cause underlying both the individual and social 
alienation of contemporary man. While this answer seems to 
be worthy of consideration, yet it is something of an over­
simplification, for Marcel occasionally makes mention of 
other historical factors as contributory to mankind's loss 
of meaningful existence. It will be necessary, therefore, to 
give due consideration to these supplementary historical de­
velopments underlying man's loss of ontological exigence in 
order to see the whole picture as it emerges. Needless to 
say, the rise of the technological mentality from the spirit 
of abstraction is both the most recent and crucial develop­
ment of all these causal factors.
In examining man's loss of meaningful existence the 
historical approach will be used in pointing out certain 
broad causal factors. The remainder of the chapter will set 
forth the proliferating effects of this loss on man.
Causal Factors
The Devastating Influence of 
Naturalistic Science
In seeking to trace the gradual erosion of being, 
Marcel is mindful of the historical developments within the 
sciences during the past centuries. He has no argument with 
science, properly conceived, only with science as it is 
structured on a naturalistic philosophy of life. This is 
one which denies that anything in reality has a supernatural
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significance; specifically that scientific laws account for 
all phenomena, and that teleological conceptions of nature 
are invalid. In seeking to ferret-out the causes of man's 
decline as a dignified being, Marcel does not hesitate to 
point toward the naturalistically-inclined scientists. The 
attrition of being in man has closely paralleled the gradual 
exaltation of nature and its laws. Obsessed with his 
methodological techniques, his findings and his naturalis­
tically-inclined interpretations, the modern scientist 
pieces together the story of the universe and man. This does 
not tend to present a complimentary picture of man. Com­
posed of nothing more than the dust of the earth— matter in 
its more refined and sophisticated form, complex, and highly 
concentrated, and organized to perform the functions of 
life— man can be reduced to the lowest common denominator of 
quantity, with no qualitative distinctions possible. Thus 
the view contained in historical materialism pictures man as 
nothing more than an organismic machine, fully determined 
and ultimately predictable. As such he is subject to the 
analytic procedures of technology, the same as all other 
elements and organisms. It must not be overlooked that 
historical materialism as a philosophy developed hand in 
hand with naturalistically-oriented science and a strong 
desire to see the world structured on a mathematical
13^
basisJ Marcel comments pointedly, "It is hardly necessary 
to point out the role which historical materialism on the 
one hand, and Freudian doctrines on the other, have played 
in restricting the concept of man."
The effects of historical materialism.— In turning 
to a brief examination of materialism one finds that 
naturalism and materialism are related terms, but at the same 
time they are not synonymous. While all materialistic 
systems of philosophy are naturalistic, yet some naturalistic 
systems are not materialistic. Materialism, is a narrow or 
more limited form of naturalism, which generally asserts 
that there is nothing in the world except matter, and that 
"nature" and the "physical world" are one and the same. A 
thoroughgoing materialist would claim that only quantitative 
distinctions can be made. As such, the universe is fully 
explainable by the physical sciences. In more recent times 
the doctrine has been expressed as "energism," which re­
duces everything to some form of energy, or as a form of 
scientific "positivism," which emphasizes the exact sciences 
and denies any concern about such things as the ultimate 
nature of reality.
Materialism, in the narrow sense, is the theory 
that all things may be explained in accordance with the 
laws that govern matter and motion. Materialism holds
^See Hunter Mead, Tvnes and Problems of Philosophy 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966;, pp. o1
82. (Hereinafter referred to as Tvnes and Problems.)
PMarcel, Existentialism, p. 10.
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that all events and conditions are necessary conse­
quences of previous events and conditions. The organic 
or ’higher' forms in nature are merely more complex 
than the inorganic or lower forms; the higher forms 
contain no new materials or forces, and the principles 
of the physical sciences are sufficient to explain all 
that occurs and exists. All of nature's processes, 
whether inorganic or organic, are determined and would 
he predictable were all the facts about previous con­
ditions available. 1
So the materialist generally sees the universe monistically,
and that "one" stuff is matter which is governed by causal
laws inherent in its very nature. While it is somewhat of
a hasty generalization to classify all materialists as being
the same in outlook, yet for the most part they would agree
that there is nothing to be known except that which presents
itself through the senses.
The persistent question which presents itself is 
this: Can the structure, function, and behavior of living
beings be interpreted exclusively by physics, chemistry, and 
related sciences? Since the same physical elements found in 
stones and stars are found in organisms, do the same me­
chanical laws operate universally? The materialist would 
be inclined to say so. Traces of this view can be noted as 
far back as the pre-Socratic philosophers culminating in the 
materialistic atomism of Democritus. These particular men 
believed the universe could be interpreted as simply matter 
in motion. Democritus also set forth what might be termed
^Harold H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy. 
Fourth Edition (New York: American Book Company, 196^),
p. 207. (Hereinafter referred to as Living Issues.)
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the first systematic notion of mechanism. During the 
medieval period, however, the idea of mechanism was nearly 
forgotten, yet it later gained considerable support in 
Western thought from the fifteenth to the twentieth cen­
turies. This was largely due to the development of the 
mathematical sciences and of the objective, experimental 
methods in the natural sciences. There were some who thought 
the world to consist of minute physical quantities that 
could be measured mathematically. Others, like Thomas 
Hobbes went further and attempted to raise the science of 
his day to a philosophy by presenting a thoroughgoing, 
mechanistic materialism. Hobbes described conscious life 
as sensations moving in the brain and nervous system.
By the twentieth century, many physiologists, bi­
ologists, and psychologists were using physical and 
mechanistic explanations in their interpretations of all 
living creatures, including man.
According to mechanistic materialism, mind and its 
activities are forms of behavior. Psychology, then, 
becomes a study of behavior, and mind and consciousness 
are interpreted as muscular, neural, or glandular be­
havior. These processes may then be explained by 
physics and chemistry. Values and ideals become merely 
subjective labels for physical situations and rela­
tions .1
In this view, man is lowered to the status of a 
machine, though complex and sophisticated. The dehumanizing 
effects of this philosophico-scientific approach to man are
llbid.. p. 207.
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so obvious that little comment is needed to clarify the 
tragic picture emerging. As if this were not enough, the 
mechanistic materialist also sees all the changes in the 
world— from those involving the atom to those involving 
man— as strictly determined. This constitutes a complete 
and closed causal series explainable by the principles of 
the natural sciences without resort to such ideas as 
"purpose." The world is thus governed by natural laws that 
may be stated in mathematical terms when the necessary data 
are available. This type of metaphysics enlarges the con­
cept "machine" and stresses the mechanical nature of all 
processes both organic and inorganic. Consequently, all 
phenomena are subject to the same kinds of explanation 
found in the physical sciences--that is, the concepts of 
mechanism, determinism and natural law. So what is real in 
man is his body, and the tests for truth or reality are the 
senses such as touch, sight and sound. These are the tools 
of experimental verification.
The implications of a materialistic philosophy and 
science are grave for man. First of all it seems to relieve 
man of personal or moral responsibility. If man were not 
free but fully determined, it would be unthinkable to hold 
him responsible for his actions. When carried to its 
logical end, this kind of view would reduce society to chaos. 
Ethics and morals, if existent, would have nothing more than
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relative meaning. Furthermore, when man conceives himself 
as part of a purposeless universe his existence becomes 
meaningless. This would entail a loss in the sense of being, 
"The world, according to the new picture, is purposeless, 
senseless, meaningless. Nature is nothing but matter in 
motion. The motions of matter are governed, not by any 
purpose, but by blind forces and laws."
Marcel does not accept this concept of man and the 
world, for mechanistic materialism does not appear to tell 
the whole story. It does not offer a satisfactory explana­
tion of all the facts of human existence. How can the ma­
terialist account for love and communion which can occur 
between two beings. How can he, in the language of Marcel, 
explain the sense of "presence"? Or how would he explain 
the mystery of being and intuitive grasp? Can the yearning 
for immortality be explained on a purely materialistic 
basis? But even so, Marcel is not so intent on "proving" 
the presence of being in this world as he is on pointing out 
the devastating effects on the person holding the ma­
terialist's view. Even pragmatically it goes against the 
best in human nature!
Perhaps Marcel, in his abounding zeal for being, 
fails to give the followers of materialism their due. No 
doubt most of these thinkers start from the honest
T. Stace, "Man Against Darkness," The Atlantic 
Monthly, Sept., 19^8, p. 5̂ .
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assumption that ultimate reality is matter-~nothing more.
In the interest of personal integrity they are constrained 
to "tell it as it is" by the means of careful observation and 
accurate description. They cannot afford the doubtful 
luxury of wishful thinking--as some idealists are prone to 
do. They do not permit themselves to "fill in the unknown 
gaps" in their findings as some speculative philosophers 
tend to do. Their approach is not system perfect since 
they must follow the facts and only the facts. In the 
interest of scientific accuracy the materialist accepts only 
that of which he is reasonably sure— through measurement 
and careful analysis. At this point, however, he runs the 
danger of screening-out that which is ultimately real— the 
spirit— if the idealist's dualistic world-view is correct.
For if the world of "spirits" exists it escapes the 
methodology of the materialist. Consequently, he finds him­
self entangled in the reductive fallacy that occurs when an 
otherwise complex situation or whole is mistakenly reduced 
to but one of its parts. For example, a crude type of re- 
ductionism might possibly occur if in a world of both spirit 
and matter one were to conclude that only matter exists.
There is the possibility of blurring both useful and neces­
sary distinctions.
By a paradox which well deserves our attention, the 
more man, misled not by science but by a certain ele­
mentary philosophy of science, comes to regard himself 
as a mere link in an endless chain, or as the result 
of purely natural causes, the more he arrogates to 
himself the right of absolute sovereignty in all that
1̂ +0
concerns the ordering of his personal conduct. The 
more he is theoretically humiliated by a materialistic 
philosophy which claims to deny any special identity 
to himself or his actions, the more does he actually 
develop a practical pride which impels him to deny the 
existence of any human order to which he might owe 
obedience.1
The implications of organic evolution.--Both 
historical materialism and humanistic naturalism are con­
genial to the theory of organic evolution. While the former 
views man simply as a part of the great machine of nature, 
the latter conceives him as the highest product of an 
organic order of things. As such, the humanistic naturalist 
rules out the necessity for cosmic support and has abandoned 
all conceptions of a supernatural Being. He believes that 
man is a part of nature and that he has emerged as the re­
sult of a continuous process. Man appears to be part of one 
all-embracing natural order. He is the highest product of 
the creative forces of the universe, with nothing above or 
beyond him. So it is not surprising to note that humanistic 
naturalism is sometimes known as evolutionary naturalism. 
This, therefore, introduces one to the concept of organic 
evolution— the fact that all forms of life are characterized 
by a process of progressive development. In general it is 
the theory that life proceeds from the simple to the more 
complex, or from the lower to higher forms, with man being 
the crowning form thus far.
^Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 95*
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As one considers the role of the theory of biological 
evolution in regard to the developing status of man today, 
he is made to question the humanistic naturalist's interpre­
tation of the whole matter. Perhaps a person would do well 
to consider Marcel's blunt warning:
I am emphasizing this point to show that the 
genuine scholar is always on his guard against 
scientism and the temptation to determine human conduct 
by a theory of evolution, for example, as though this 
theorv were the equivalent of a definitive discovery of 
truth. In France and Germany today, and surely else­
where, too, it is not difficult to find men who are 
bringing to light the lacunae in the theories of evolu­
tion that were proposed in the past, along with the 
daring and rash claims that attended them.'
Jfercel, therefore, holds in careful reserve any approval of
the theory of organic evolution— that man descended from
more primitive forms of life rather than being created by
fiat by God. If man is not God's immediate creation, then
he becomes nothing more than the highest of animals in a
strictly natural order. No longer is he a spiritual being
created in God's image, as Marcel would hold, but he would
be classified on the basis of his physical body alone— a
complex animal.
While it is not the burden of this paper to defend 
or deny the theory of evolution per se. yet it is of real 
concern to examine the apparent effects which the populariza­
tion of this doctrine has had on the dignity of man and the 
meaningfulness of his existence.
^Marcel, Searchings. p. 31 »
1̂ -2
The concept of evolution has played a prominent part 
in the creation of the modern outlook . . . For many, 
the concept of evolution is the most far-reaching of 
all, since it involves so directly man's status and 
place in the universe. It involves not only science 
and philosophy, but man's religious outlook and his 
educational methods.1
There appear to be two schools of thought in ref­
erence to the effect of evolutionary theory on man's position 
in the world. One feels that he is enhanced as the highest 
link in a natural order, while the other school concludes 
that it downgrades him to being nothing more than an animal. 
The former humanistic naturalists express faith in humanity 
and especially in science as a means of attaining truth. 
Through the use of his intelligence man can create for him­
self, without the aid of supernatural powers, a rational 
civilization characterized by inevitable progress. He has a 
profound respect for modern science: he accepts its as­
sumptions, postulates, techniques, and discoveries. Science 
is thus viewed not as a transcript of reality, but as some­
thing of a human construct to secure control over the world. 
The humanistic naturalist is especially "humanitarian" in 
his outlook and finds great interest in biology, psychology, 
medicine, and the social studies since they are all centered 
on man and his welfare.
Does evolution degrade man, since it relates him to 
the animal kingdom, or does it enhance his nature, 
since man seems to be the crowning achievement of a 
long process of evolution? . . .  At first, some men
1 Titus, Living Issues, p. 136.
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thought that the newer views were degrading to man, 
and there are expressions of this attitude in litera­
ture. Philosophers and many religious leaders, how­
ever, point out that, no matter how man came to be, 
no matter what his genesis, he is not less than what 
he is— a self-conscious being with unique character­
istics . 1
In taking the opposite view of the effects of the 
theory of evolution on the race of man, Marcel points to the 
world-threatening conditions today. He would remind all 
that man, this highest animal, has misused his talents and 
powers and has pushed the whole race to the brink of 
destruction. If he is nothing but an animal, then why not 
act like a beast? Marcel invites all to carefully examine 
the world situation. Hatred, covetousness, and murder 
abound--not only among men but among nations. Since the 
turn of the century this world has experienced two world 
wars and today is threatened by a third world-wide holocaust. 
The depth of degradation to which man will sink in the mis­
treatment of his fellows is cited by Marcel to illustrate 
the debased conduct of those who believe their origin is in 
nature and not in God. The prison camps of World War II are 
cases in point.
Without a supernatural origin man experiences dif­
ficulty in finding meaning in his existence. If there is no 
Intelligent Cause back of this universe and its inhabitants, 
if there is no grand purpose or teleological design, then
''ibid.. p. 137.
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wherein can man find meaning for his own struggles? Life 
turns into a bad joke and man is following a path that leads 
to nowhere.
But on the contrary historical evidence bears out 
the ennobling aspect of belief in a holy and just God, for 
man tends to become like the god he worships. The belief in 
the divine origin of man has much to commend it from the 
pragmatic standpoint. If one believes he is made in the 
image of God he generally feels challenged to come up to his 
best. He usually dwells on a higher plane.
Religious leaders have had three possible options 
as they have faced the theory of evolution: They might at­
tempt to deny and discredit the claims of evolution; they 
might ignore its presence altogether, or they might make 
whatever mental adjustments which appear necessary. Marcel 
feels convinced that the last option has been chosen by 
most religionists. In his view this has had a tendency to 
secularize and downgrade both religion and man. If man is 
not the creation of God, then he only can be less— never 
more I
The rise of atheistic thought.— Over the years the 
naturalistic and evolutionary emphasis in science has taken 
its toll. Man no longer occupies the favored spot he once 
enjoyed. The traditional religious view of faith in a 
supernatural order has suffered extensively. Man has come 
of age, no longer needing cosmic support from an Other.
1^5
From the rational and idealistic points of view, the 
assumptions of science constituted a threat to the dis­
tinctively human aspects of man, to his moral and 
religious convictions, which had provided man with a 
sense of purpose and a reason for expending his 
energies.1
With no need for a superhuman being of any kind man 
has gradually lost his vision of the Eternal with its ac­
companying moral overtones. It has become more common than 
not, to discount any idea of God's existence. Science has 
proved him needless. Man as the greatest in the natural­
istic order has become his own god.
In a general way, if we consider the historical 
and sociological evolution such as it has taken place 
for the past two centuries, it seems that man has lost 
his divine reference: he ceases to confront a God as
His creature and image. Might not the death of God, 
in the exact sense that Nietzsche has given to these 
words be at the origin of the fact that man has become 
for himself a question without an answer?^
Thus Marcel goes on record as definitely relating atheistic
thought with the plight of man today— "becoming for himself
a question without an answer."
In all probability the atheistic teaching of the 
past century is related basically to the concurrent develop­
ment of evolutionary thought. Nietzsche was coming to young 
manhood when Darwin's Origin of Species became popular. 
Without doubt it had a definite influence on this fledgling 
philosopher. He unabashedly proclaims the death of God;
 ̂Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. ^03.
2Marcel, Problematic Man. p. 29.
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furthermore, he insists that men themselves have killed Him.
"The Nietzschean affirmation is infinitely more tragic,
since it states that we ourselves have killed God, and it is
this alone which can account for the sacred dread with which
1Nietzsche here expresses himself." He continues.
Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, 
forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above 
and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite 
nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us?
Has it not become colder? Does not night come on 
continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to 
light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the 
noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God?2
Nietzsche persists in asking searching questions 
pertaining to the implications of atheistic thought for man. 
What must collapse now since the traditional belief in God 
has been destroyed? His words are prophetic as he envisions 
its results?
— because so much was built upon it, so much rested 
on it, and had become one with it: for example, our
entire European morality. This lengthy, vast and un­
interrupted process of crumbling, destruction, ruin 
and overthrow which is now imminent: who has realised
it sufficiently today to have to stand up as the 
teacher and herald of such a tremendous logic of 
terror, as the prophet of gloom and eclipse, the like 
of which has probably never taken place on earth 
before?3
The loss of meaningful existence accompanying the 
demise of God in the thoughts of man can also be noted in
^Ibid., p. 31•
2Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, quoted in Gabriel Marcel, 
Problematic Man, p. 30.
^Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom. Book V, quoted in Gabriel 
Marcel, Problematic Man. pp. 30-31*
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the irreligious views emanating from such contemporary
thinkers as Sartre and Camus. For these men life adds up to
nothingness, despair and dread. Marcel succinctly describes
their situation by stating,
When man, by denying the existence of God, denies his 
own, the spiritual powers which are dissociated by his 
denial keep their primitive reality, but disunited and 
detached they can no longer do anything but drive the 
beings of flesh and soul back against each other in a 
despairing conflict--those beings which, had their 
union been safe-guarded and preserved, would have gone 
forward towards eternal life.1
Apart from the rise of the technological mentality 
out of the "spirit of abstraction," the devastation wrought 
by a naturalistically-oriented science is the next greater 
cause for the loss of ontological exigence in man. In as­
sessing the weight of the various scientific factors, none 
perhaps, is as crucial as the Darwinian theory:
The naturalistic philosopher quite properly regards 
the Darwinian hypothesis as one of his biggest guns, 
since it is largely by means of this theory that it 
has been possible to extend naturalistic thought over 
the biological, psychological and social fields.2
The Distortion of Values 
The devastating influence of a naturalistically- 
oriented science has culminated in the distortion of the 
traditional system of values. In fact, one is inclined to 
describe the situation as an inversion of values, but per­
haps the word would be somewhat misleading. A complete
^Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 96.
p
Mead, Types and Problems, p. 11U-.
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inversion of values would place things above man. But while 
this may be true in some instances it cannot be said to be 
generally the case. Yet in a very real sense a distortion 
or twisting of the traditional value system has taken place. 
Man is no longer valued for what he "is" but for what he can 
"do." This pragmatic approach to valuating man has emerged 
concurrently with scientific technology. Man tends to be of 
value to the extent that he can be manipulated and utilized 
by a highly developed industrialized society. This process 
becomes exceedingly dehumanizing and degrading for man with 
the telltale loss of the sense of "being." The technological 
mentality can best be seen in its misplacement of the idea 
of function— that a man's worth is equivalent to his work. 
This spirit of abstraction is the very breath of a misused 
technology and eventuates in a meaningless existence for 
man.
For centuries, intrinsic value was considered by the 
church to reside in the person, ultimately in the Absolute 
Person— God. All through medieval times he was considered 
the source and sustainer of value. As such, values were 
thought to be as fixed and certain as the stars of the 
heavens. These were moral absolutes. Man, made in the image 
of God, was of supreme value. Being, according to Thomas 
Aquinas, was the universal value. The highest level of 
being, personal being, was the ultimate. But something of a 
tragedy has happened with the development of modern science.
1^9
This whole system of value has become distorted. With no
need for God and an absolute foundation for his value system,
man now speaks in terms of relative value, and as his being
the creator of his own values.
Ultimates, absolutes, and finalities either drop out 
of the picture or retreat to the background. This 
trend is a result not only of the theory of evolution 
but also of the entire scientific development in recent 
centuries.1
Marcel is content and even insistent on holding to 
the traditional approach to value. His theory of value is
based on being. Thus it has a metaphysical grounding. The
notion of value presupposes being. Value is centered in 
being. It is in the realm of the personal or subjective 
(precisely,the intersubjective) and has no meaning in the 
realm of scientific, impersonal facts. So there can be no 
value without being and a subject who can affirm or ap­
preciate it. Marcel chooses to ground his metaphysics in a 
distinction between the full and the empty, rather than be­
tween the one and the many. The important factor to him is 
the quality of being, not the mere number of beings.
I have written on another occasion that, provided 
it is taken in its metaphysical and not its physical 
sense, the distinction between the full and the empty 
seems to me more fundamental than that between the 
one and the many. This is particularly applicable to 
the case in point. Life in a world centered on func­
tion is liable to despair because in reality this 
world is empty, it rings hollow.2
^Titus, Living Issues, p. 139*pMarcel, Existentialism, p. 12.
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"Value varies directly with fullness of being. What is 
'full' of being is 'full' of value and what is empty of 
being has no v a l u e . B y  treating that which has value as a 
fact, one takes away its value. A case in point is the type 
of scientific analysis attempted by Freud. His treatment 
of the data of human experience tends to denude it of its 
value. For example, one cannot accurately reduce a man's 
religious life simply to libido expressed in myth.
Treating a man as if he were a thing, not a being, tends to 
discount his value in both the viewer's sight and his.
Furthermore, for Marcel value must be incarnate. It 
is not a mere abstraction.
Value is incarnated in a person. Each person has 
his own value--has infinite value and should be 
treated accordingly . . . Each person or consciousness 
is the bearer of a unique value destined for eternity. 
There is a real relation between value and immortality.^
Man is destined for the world beyond, and it is through a
grasp of "real" value that one glimpses his true destiny.
Value is the bridge between the terrestrial world and the
eternal world.
Perhaps a stable order can only be established if man 
is acutely aware of his condition as a traveller, that 
is to say, if he perpetually reminds himself that he 
is required to cut himself a dangerous path across the 
unsteady blocks of a universe which has collapsed and 
seems to be crumbling in every direction. This path
^Martha E. Williams, "Gabriel Marcel's Notion of 
Value," Modern Schoolman. XXXVII (Nov., 1959-60), p. 30.
2lbid., p. 37.
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leads to a world more firmly established in Being, a 
world whose changing and uncertain gleams are all that 
we can discern here below.1
One of the major contributing factors behind the 
loss of a sense of being, according to Marcel, is the dis­
tortion of value. As has been pointed out, man's value no 
longer lies in what he i^ but in what he can Function,
action, utility, and cash value are the areas of supreme im­
portance in a technological society preoccupied with 
pragmatism. Consequently, the notion of value has nearly 
been inverted from its traditional source in "persons," and 
modern society is attempting to ground it in the relative 
and passing area of "action."
When being becomes exhaustible, when the spirit can 
be reduced to "nothing more than," man has, in effect, lost 
his soul. This denial of being as the unit of value can be 
seen in man becoming problematicized. No longer is the 
mystery of being present. Man reverts to the level of an 
objective problem to be solved by the techniques of science.
It is my own profound belief that we cannot succeed 
in preserving the mysterious principle at the heart of 
human dignity unless we succeed in making explicit the 
properly sacral quality peculiar to it.2
Underlying the loss of ontological exigence in the 
individual is the contemporary accent on the importance of 
function. It seems as if one's sense of dignity rests upon
^Marcel, Homo Viator, pp. 153-5^-
^Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 128.
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the functions he performs in society. Marcel sees this con­
dition as one of the major symptoms of the disease afflict­
ing man. Man has lost his ontological sense, his demand for 
being, the exigence to transcend. "In an increasing degree 
the awareness of the dignity and sacredness of being is 
eclipsed in the contemporary world and is replaced by the 
idea of function.
A careful survey of present conditions indicates to 
Marcel that the characteristic feature of this age is to be 
found in the "misplacement of the idea of function" (a 
favorite phrase of Marcel's), placing second things first:
The individual tends to appear both to himself and 
to others as an agglomeration of functions. As a re­
sult of deep historical causes, which can as yet be 
understood only in part, he has been led to see him­
self more and more as a mere assemblage of functions, 
the hierarchical interrelation of which seems to him 
questionable or at least subject to conflicting in­
terpretations .2
Again he observes, "I noted that the modern misuse of the 
idea of function tends to debase all human relations.
Man's loss, then, of meaningful existence appears to
begin with his loss of a personal sense of dignity and
sacredness of being.
We view ourselves and others as intricate systems of 
interrelated functions— biological, mental and social.
Our sense of dignity and worth rests upon the functions 
we perform in society and not upon the awareness that
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. ^2.
2Marcel, Existentialism, p. 10.
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. *+2.
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there is an intrinsic sacredness involved in merely
being human.1
Marcel raises the question of what can be the inward re­
ality of the life of this or that man who makes his living 
as a ticket-collector on the underground? His life is taken 
up primarily in the matter of punching tickets. Everything 
in his surroundings tends to conspire to identify this man 
with his functions. After all he i_s a ticket-collector. He
goes on to point out that the rather horrible expression 
"time table" succinctly describes his life. So many hours 
for each function— as worker, trade unionist, voter, etc.
He spends so many hours sleeping, eating, relaxing and fol­
lowing a routine similar to what a robot could be programmed 
to do. This sketch would indicate the emergence of a kind 
of vital schedule. While the details may vary with country, 
climate and profession, yet what matters is that there is a 
schedule. Interruptive factors such as sickness and ac­
cident will break in on the smooth operation of the system; 
however, in lieu of such an event the individual is brought 
in for regular inspection and overhaul as in the case of 
any other machine. The medical clinic and hospital play the 
part of the inspection bench or the repair shop. Marcel 
ironically tabs death, objectively and functionally, as the 
scrapping of what has ceased to be of use— and is thus 
written off as a total loss.
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 9*
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This functionalized world exudes a stifling im­
pression of sadness as well. Think of the retired official 
and many other passers-by who look like people retired from 
life. There surely is something mocking and sinister even 
in the tolerance awarded the man who has retired from his 
work. But the sadness of the onlooker is not the whole 
story for the actor himself seems seized by a dull, in­
tolerable unease due to an apparent consignment of living 
as though he were in fact submerged by his functions.
This uneasiness is enough to show that there is in all 
this some appalling mistake, some ghastly misinterpre­
tation, implanted in defenceless minds by an increas­
ingly inhuman social order and an equally inhuman 
philosophy (for if the philosophy has prepared the way 
for the order, the order has also shaped the philos­
ophy ). 1
When man's worth is his work, then he is thought of 
as a dispensable commodity. The term "manpower" is coined 
from this line of thinking. The whole industrial framework 
is structured on the basis of personal production, man-hours 
of labor, cost-effectiveness, gross national product and 
similar terms which bear the cold ring of the impersonal.
Man has become something to be manipulated, bargained for, 
and figured by the slide rule. Functionalized man is 
nothing but a unit to consider in an economically-oriented 
society.
On the other hand one is reminded that it is only 
through refined technique that government and business are
^Marcel, Existentialism, p. 12,
1^^
capable of handling efficiently large masses of people. 
Without the proper implementation of technique chaos would 
reign. In a highly organized, sophisticated, and interde­
pendent society, technique, system, and computerization 
become a necessity. Function takes on new importance to the 
extent that man might possibly overrate its value. One must 
remember all this activity is just a means to an end— the 
ultimate good of man. While Marcel would accept the neces­
sity of technical organization in this type of society, yet 
he would sternly warn against forgetting the value of indi­
vidual man due to the multiplicity of functions surrounding 
him.
Ihe Growth of Social Statism 
In considering the causes of the loss of ontological 
exigence, Marcel is quite cognizant of the part played by 
socialization on the contemporary scene and the growing 
threat of statism. The word socialization in this context 
refers to the gradual assumption by society, or the state in 
particular, of those prerogatives traditionally considered 
to be those of the individual. In a society that is growing 
soft these benefits provided by the state seem to be nothing 
more than a service which the state owes the individual. But 
already, at this juncture, the individuals making up the 
state have begun the gradual decline in the direction of the
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loss of being. The final outcome of such a process is 
usually a dictatorial state made up of enslaved subjects.
The word statism as used in this discussion indicates the 
growing concentration of control and planning being vested 
in the hands of a highly centralized government. So it is 
with genuine concern that Marcel begins his discussion of 
social statism in his major work, The Mvsterv of Being;
It is, or so it seems to me, by starting from the 
fact of the growingly complex and unified social organi­
zation of human life today, that one can see most 
clearly what lies behind the loss, for individuals, of 
life's old intimate quality. In what does this grow­
ingly complex organization— this socialization of life, 
as we may call it— really consist? Primarily, in the 
fact that each one of us is being treated today more 
and more as an agent, whose behaviour ought to contribute 
towards the progress of a certain whole, a something 
rather distant, rather oppressive, let us even frankly 
say rather tyrannical.1
Marcel speaks repeatedly of the growingly complex nature of
human life these days. What is back of this development?
Undoubtedly, as a first consideration, one can point
to the problems inherent in population increase. Sheer
numbers propose certain difficulties. Significant increases
in numbers as well as in concentrations of people, pose
problems unknown where these conditions do not obtain.
Under such circumstances, one ought not to take proximity
and closeness for fraternity.
In the world whose structure is displayed about us, 
developing at a rate which is not that of organic 
growth, we find human beings increasingly separated 
from one another the more they are herded together.
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. I, pp. 3^-35*
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But this promiscuous closeness that we see, for 
example, on beaches, where people crowd in together 
during vacations has nothing to do with fraternity.'
Marcel observes that with such proximity no one feels at 
home, for it is accompanied by such an uproar that the sound 
is deafening. He views with the same askance the huge 
suburban housing projects. These projects, which spring up 
like mushrooms on the outskirts of big cities, are char­
acterized also by promiscuity and tumult. In encouraging 
solitude he mentions that it is as essential to fraternity 
as silence is to music. Fraternity seems to be a form of 
respect, and there is no respect without distance. In cases 
such as this, "every human being must have access to an in­
terior space without which he withers like a plant, or a 
tree.
A second consideration concerning the increasingly 
complex nature of modern life is the heavy concentration of 
the masses in urban centers. The alarming shift in popula­
tion has been from the rural to urban centers. It has become 
necessary, with the industrialization of society, for indi­
vidual workers to live near the factories of their employ­
ment. Here they produce their products en masse, for mass 
man. The huge metropolitan areas in the United States are 
unmistakable evidence of the growing seriousness of this 
problem. Even now there are indications of the development
^Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 158.
^Ibid.. p. 158.
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of the "megapolls"--continuing cities, joined to one another 
by unbroken chains of business and industrial complexes. As 
the population significantly increases and the density of 
urban population grows, the value of the individual tends 
to decrease proportionately.
A third consideration of complex living emerges with 
the loss of privacy--the loss of personal freedom. It does 
little good to have certain freedoms if one is restricted 
by his surroundings from exercising them. The multiplicity 
of people in congested areas severely limits one's sphere of 
activity because of physical limitations. Regular priv­
ileges are set aside for the good of the whole. Organized 
ways of doing things en masse are the order of the day. Of 
necessity one finds his little niche and fills it, like it 
or not. Soon the people become a multitude, a faceless, 
anonym ou s mass.
A fourth and necessary consideration is that of 
bureaucratic control. Such a mass of humanity can get out of 
hand so easily. Mobs can develop in which separate and 
individual action is nearly impossible. The state must step 
in to protect and control. Statism begins to take over the 
functions of the individual, and man is well on his way to 
becoming nothing more than a statistic. Even though Marcel 
does not admit that such a conclusion is inevitable, yet he 
considers it as being highly likely. He fears the centrali­
zation of authority with its developing bureaucracy:
1^9
But on the other hand one may well fear— although such 
a development is not inevitable— that technocracy im­
plies a tendency toward centralization, and that the 
operation of this central authority cannot be separated 
from a corresponding hypertrophy of offices and there­
fore a bureaucracy.1
The important question at this point is, what relation should
hold between the bureaucracy's development and the growing
technicalization of which one is the witness, or perhaps the
victim?
In this kind of situation, though one may desire more 
individual freedom, he is integrated into a certain totality. 
This evokes diverse feelings ranging between fear and 
aversion. Seldom do these feelings give evidence of "that 
shade of admiration or of quasi-religious submission without 
which a philosophy of the state, however short of optimism,
pseems unable to take form."
A fifth consideration in this growingly complex 
society is the exaltation of the state and the subjection 
of the people. Perhaps the advent of computerization, 
mechanization and automation is nothing more than modern 
means called into existence by the sharp increase of the 
world's population in an effort on the part of leadership to 
control and manipulate the masses in some rational, organ­
ized sort of way. Even so, these systems do not contain the
^iyiarcel. Human Dignity, p. 162. 
^Ibid..  p .  1 6 1 .
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answers to the crucial questions being asked: Who am I? For
what am I living? What is of value?
The State cannot answer him. It only knows abstract 
concepts: employment, agrarian reform, etc. The same
is true of society in general: what exists for it is
aid to refugees, emergency relief, etc. Always ab­
stractions. In the universe of the State and of 
society, this man no longer presents any living reality.
He is a number on a filing-card, in a dossier which in­
cludes an infinity of others, each one with its number. 
Nonetheless, this man is not a number, he is a living 
being, an individual.1
Man has not only been socialized, but in many 
countries of the world he has been subjected to a growing, 
oppressive statism. The social whole, of which one is forced 
to be a part, is partially accomplished through the continuous 
enrollments and registrations which are required by the gov­
ernment on many different occasions throughout life. After 
surviving dozens of such occasions there exists a real danger 
of confusing oneself, one's real personality, with the 
state's official record of the same. A person, any person, 
consists of more than can be placed in a bulging file folder 
about him. It is truly frightening when one thinks of the 
implications of such an identification.
The close resemblance between socialization and a de­
veloping totalitarianism can be noted on many levels, ob­
serves Marcel, but especially so at the level in which men 
begin to view the state as some kind of superpower or deity.
^Marcel, Problematic Man. p. 19*
161
A dangerous point is reached even when one imputes a greater
value to the state, as such, than to the individual person.
It is true that the State in our time, even in coun­
tries where it has not reached the totalitarian 
phase, has become more and. more the engrosser and 
dispenser of all sorts of favours, which must be 
snatched from it by whatever means are available, in­
cluding even blackmail. In this respect the State is. 
properly comparable to a God, but to the God of de­
graded cults on whom the sorcerer claims to exercise 
his magic powers.1
One only needs to think of the various totalitarian states
of the present day or recent past to have vivid examples of
the tragedy that overtakes unsuspecting citizens under such
regimes. The Fascism of Italy, the Nazism of Germany, and
the Communism of both Red China and Russia have created
situations in which man has not only lost his liberty, but
in most instances has been degraded as a human being for the
benefit of the state.
The rapid growth of statism in recent years has been 
due, in part, to the beginning population explosion through­
out the world, and the honest attempt by governments to 
properly handle the masses of people under their care. But 
perhaps regimentation is too high a price to pay for 
bureaucratic convenience. Someone needs to come forth with 
another acceptable option. Marcel seems hard put for a 
practical and effective solution. In the mean time, under 
these degenerating circumstances, man seeks a workable
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 39*
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solution while he continues to sustain an increasing loss of 
ontological exigence.
So far, in this chapter, the discussion has revolved 
around the causes underlying the loss of ontological 
exigence. For the remainder, one's attention will be 
directed toward examining the effects of these factors on 
the individual man.
Proliferating Effects
The Loss of ^fystery and Wonder
Turning now to a review of the effects pursuant to
the loss of a sense of being in man, one is first aware of
the loss of mystery and wonder. A most tragic result of
living in a world devoted to reason and technology is that
nothing retains the element of mystery— hence man has lost
his sense of wonder. Mystery, according to Marcel, is simply
that which is indefinable because one is so intimately a part
of it. Experience, firsthandedness, personal participation
and intuitive grasp are necessary for its comprehension.
But with these tools of understanding the mystery becomes
better known than that which is grasped by reason alone I
Wonder is that emotional response of faith and acceptance to
the mysteries of life, based on overwhelming inner evidence,
though outwardly (rationally) incomprehensible.
What a degree of vacuity it would require to ask the 
mysterious questions in a mood of mere curiosity!
What is being? What is time? Who am I? Is the man
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who asks such questions engaged in a search for in­
formation? Could we say about him that his curiosity 
is aroused?1
How inappropriate to speak in such a manner! Only an 
emaciated person could approach the central issues of being 
in such a way. Herein one observes the sinister results of 
a degraded, scientific rationalism. On the contrary, "Let 
us instead designate by the all-embracing word wonder the 
organ notes of emotion which sound in the soul in the asking
pof these questions." There are many areas of life that are 
sealed from the reason, yet open willingly to the inner 
feelings and intuition. Perhaps the intuition is the un­
spoken, yet clear language of the spirit. Intuitive feel­
ings, though admittedly mistaken at times, can provide a 
depth of understanding not known to the reason. They con­
stitute a main line to the heart of others--plunging on to 
the sacred center of being. But the tragic fact remains that 
man, a victim of his own reasoning, has lost the sense of 
mystery and wonder which should naturally accompany his 
thoughts about being. It is possible, if not probable, that 
a person can become so imprisoned within the strictures of 
his own reasoning that he is effectively hindered from dis­
covering some of the deeper truths of life through fresh 
intuitive grasp! But those who insist on plodding the paths 
of reason alone must occasionally be satisfied with nothing
1 Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel, p. 39*
^Ibid.. p. 39.
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more than outer appearances rather than inner realities. In 
the course of time this can become disastrous for the person. 
The erosion of being can proceed imperceptibly, yet ever so 
surely.
In such a world the ontological need, the need of 
being, is exhausted in exact proportion to the breaking 
up of personality on the one hand and, on the other, 
to the triumph of the category of the "purely natural" 
and the consequent atrophy of the faculty of wonder.1
A word should be added concerning reason. Reason, 
in itself, is profitable and beneficial. The danger lies in 
its exclusive use, its ignoring the insights gained from 
experience and intuition. These afford a check to reason.
By the same token intuition can be very dangerous without the 
balancing effect to be found in sound reasoning or experi­
ence. This has not been a plea for intuition alone, but for 
intuition to play its proper role. Both a misguided reason 
and an unbridled intuition can result in the reduction of an 
enriched sense of being in man.
Marcel suggests that though this world is freighted 
with many problems as such, yet man is determined to allow no 
room for mystery per se. To eliminate mystery in this 
functionally-oriented world is to bring into play in the 
presence of such existential events as birth, love, and 
death— that psychological and pseudo-scientific category of 
the purely natural. To Marcel this is nothing more than the 
remains of what he terms a degraded rationalism, from whose
^Marcel, Existentialism. p. 13»
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standpoint cause explains effect and accounts for it 
exhaustively.
When man’s ways of thinking are thus channeled, his 
sense of true being has nearly been destroyed. A devasta­
tion has occurred. His capacity to commune, to hope, to 
love has been so stifled that he no longer has the ability 
or desire to transcend his deteriorating situation. Alien­
ated and captive he mechanically plods on his weary way.
His life is benumbed by the loss of the mysterious sense. 
With this eclipse of mystery goes the diminuition of the 
sense of wonder.
One may perhaps question and investigate a purely 
natural and functionalized world, but one may not 
stand in admiring awe with a sense of gratitude before 
a mechanism which will one day be completely under­
stood. Life in a functionalised world becomes a 
process without a purpose, a utilisation of means with 
no clearly defined end, a journey without a goal.1
In observing the perilous position of modern man, 
bereft of the sense of mystery and wonder, Marcel feels that 
the individual should be recalled into the presence of 
mystery, "that mystery which is the foundation of his very 
being, and apart from which is nothingness: the grand
mystery of religion, art and metaphysic. Furthermore, 
Marcel seems to speak with approval of Peter Wust's belief 
that philosophy lives off of a fundamental piety or trust 
in being. This is possibly the reverse side of his own
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 10.
pMarcel, Being and Having, p. 1?4.
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doctrine of ontological hiimility, with his thinking that a 
sentiment of reverence is interior to all authentic philos­
ophy. Seriousness, which is a constituent element in 
reverence, is not the only legitimate expression of the sense 
of mystery. Astonishment is an ontological attitude as well. 
Any thought which loses the gift of astonishment cannot 
maintain its zest and vitality.
Philosophy is nurtured by a sentiment of the holy; 
philosophy springs out of a delight'in existence . . . 
what is constant in all experiences of mystery is the 
implicit awareness of my own finitude. The knowledge 
of mystery is sacral knowledge because it reveals 
this finitude.1
Gallagher further observes that this is not a gloomy knowl­
edge, for no one can deny that it is the greatest joy to 
acknowledge one's creaturehood. Creaturehood can only be 
truly acknowledged with joy, for gloom represents a type of 
refusal or rebellion.
The Loss of Human Dignity --------
A sense of true being and a sense of human dignity go 
hand in hand. Consequently, the loss of being entails the 
loss of human dignity. According to Marcel, "The problem 
in question is that of understanding what becomes of human 
dignity in the process of technicalization to which man 
today is delivered over."^ The term "human dignity," it­
self, seems a bit general and needs further explication.
 ̂Gallagher, The Philosouhv of Gabriel Marcel, p. -̂0. 
oMarcel, Human Dienitv. p. 158.
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Human dignity, first of all, is characterized by a
sense of sacredness. With the loss of an awareness of the
intrinsic sacredness of merely being human, one forfeits his
dignity of being. Marcel suggests that a dire need exists
for "the restoration of the sacred.
The only way to rediscover the path to the sacral is 
to turn away from the world and recapture simplicity, 
which is perhaps only another word for uniqueness and 
inwardness, the favorite abode of the sacral.2
Again, human dignity is closely connected with in­
tegrity. The ancients associated the word integrity with 
the idea of integration, one who is master of himself; \xe 
who is in perfect possession of himself.
But this word 'development' becomes really meaningful 
only if the integrity of the human being is considered 
as the central value— and it is precisely this integrity 
which is directly threatened today. Here we rediscover 
the problem formulated earlier, for I believe it is 
possible to show that integrity and dignity are terms 
which, though not identical, are indissolubly linked.3
Today amidst the confusion brought about by the abstractive
devices of technology, man has experienced the reduction from
selfhood to thinghood. He does not represent the integrated
self nearly so much as the fragmented thing, as perfectly
analyzed by the technicians about him.
The loss of human dignity is also closely akin to 
the functional view of life. "What must be stringently
llbid.. p. 166. 
2
3
Marcel, Searchings, p. 52.
Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 162.
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insisted upon is that an anthropology with a functionalist
commitment has no place for anything in the nature of
dignity.Therefore, those who insist on one's dignity
resting upon the functions he performs in society rather
than upon the integrity of his being, are ultimately
destroying the true dignity of man.
The results of such a way of thinking are dis­
astrous for human dignity. As the capacity to love, 
to admire, and to hoj^^|^£s up, the functional man 
loses the abilit%gË0NNNNNNNÊKbe desire to transcend 
his situation ̂ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^aptivity.^




of being, the inexhaustible
within himsel^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Kltimate source of 
fulfillment anc^^^^^^^^^^^^KLonalized world produces 
a specialized se^^^^^^^^^Rrces can be thoroughly 
tabulated and utilizec^^«natever is of having has 
limits. But being is beyond all inventory. And man 
insofar as he is held fast by being is a channel of the 
inexhaustible.3
One cannot live submerged in a functionalized life from day 
to day without becoming robotish, mechanical, and less than 
human. In the midst of these circumstances the true dignity 
and sacredness of being is lost. Kingston offers an in­
sightful comment when he says.
However, when so many people live as machines from day 
to day without any meaning in their lives and when many
^Ibid =5 p. 164- 
2Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 10.
3Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 56.
168
insisted upon is that an anthropology with a functionalist 
commitment has no place for anything in the nature of 
dignity.Therefore, those who insist on one's dignity 
resting upon the functions he performs in society rather 
than upon the integrity of his being, are ultimately 
destroying the true dignity of man.
The results of such a way of thinking are dis­
astrous for human dignity. As the capacity to love, 
to admire, and to hope dries up, the functional man 
loses the ability, and even the desire to transcend 
his situation of alienation and captivity.2
One must guard with utmost care his sense of being which, in
effect, is the spring of all joy and satisfaction. It is not
calculable but truly inexhaustible.
Everything today conspires to rob a man of his sense 
of being, of that living contact with the inexhaustible 
within himself which is the only ultimate source of 
fulfillment and of joy. A functionalized world produces 
a specialized self whose resources can be thoroughly 
tabulated and utilized. Whatever is of having has 
limits. But being is beyond all inventory. And man 
insofar as he is held fast by being is a channel of the 
inexhaustible.3
One cannot live submerged in a functionalized life from day 
to day without becoming robotish, mechanical, and less than 
human. In the midst of these circumstances the true dignity 
and sacredness of being is lost. Kingston offers an in­
sightful comment when he says.
However, when so many people live as machines from day 
to day without any meaning in their lives and when many
 ̂Ibid.. p.
2Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 10.
^Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 56.
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who seek for meaning turn to the imaginery world of 
abstraction, Marcel points the way in which men can 
come to a realization of what they are, to find their 
dignity as creatures, based on the world as it is, on 
the level of Truth and Love, where of course, one finds 
God Himself.1
One further effect of the loss of human dignity is
observed in man's loss of freedom. Bound and fettered by
his own limited concepts of himself, he ceases to be creative.
He ceases to function as a real person. He finds his true
dignity when he frees himself from his own egocentrism by
participating in the reality of intersubjective communion.
True freedom is freedom from self. The loss of ontological
exigence is to be seen in the accompanying loss of human
dignity and thus of true freedom.
The Loss of Individual Identity 
Insidiously resulting from the loss of ontological 
exigence is the absence of individual identity. Some indi­
viduals even question the fact of whether they are or not, 
while others phrase the metaphysical question by asking: 
Really, who am I? Marcel mentions that this answer can be 
found only in the communion of intersubjectivity. En­
sconced in participation the answer is found.
The experience of being arises in communion; even more 
strictly, it is an experience of communion: esse est
co-esse . . .  we must immediately make clear that 
there is no self except in so far as there is




on. %  self apart from other selves quite 
is not. It comes to be in communion.i
If being develops from intersubjective participation and 
communion, then it is prior to, and requisite to self identi­
fication. An individual cannot know who he is apart from 
his relationship to others. Consequently, the loss of 
ontological exigence precludes the possibility of individual 
identity. So to be, in a limited way, is to be related: in
fact it is to be-in-relation to others. By the same token, 
it is not to be apart from the co-presence of others.
Not only is the continuing existence of the self a 
gift from a transcendent generosity, but the most 
intimate treasures of the self are minted by the com­
munal generosity of other finite selves. I am 
literally given to myself by others. Unless I am a 
self, being will not be present to me; unless I am 
with others, I will not be a self.2
Marcel is evidently making a distinction, though not too
clear, between the self as simply incarnate in the body, and
the self as it comes into full being through participation.
Unfortunately, his exposition at this point is not all that
could be hoped for.3
Marcel continues to observe that wherever there is
being there is also presence. If presence is absent, then
there is not being. In this respect, being is uncharacter-
izable. It cannot be approached as a totality and "added




■up" in a morcellized way. One is always and at every moment 
more than the totality of predicates which he possesses.
"If the category of being is really valid it is because 
that which is not capable of being transmitted is to be 
found in r e a l i t y . O n e  therefore grasps being by an un- 
transmittable knowledge, perhaps by what Marcel calls a 
blinded intuition.
The loss of individual identity is not only to be
seen in the lack of communion and the absence of presence,
which is typical of life today, but it can be noted in the
lack of community. Marcel finds it exceedingly difficult,
if not impossible, to answer the question. Who am I? from
the standpoint of an onlooker or from the outside,.
. . .  we have gradually come to acknowledge how impos­
sible it is not only to give, on one's own account, an 
objective answer to the question, 'Who am I'? but also 
even to imagine the valid giving of such an answer by 
anybody else who was considering one's life from the
outside.2
As one views himself as a part of a community that has de­
veloped over the years, he sees himself in a given role and 
as an integral part or segment of the gestalt. The aware­
ness of such relationships results in a proper perspective 
of the whole community. Identity and meaning evolve from 
perspective viewing. Rootedness in a given community life 
makes for identity.
1 -  Marcel, Metanhvsleal Journal. p. 311*
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 210.
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The success of technology is in a large measure 
responsible for the rootless and anonymous character 
of modern society. The technological explosion has 
created a mass-produced society of standardised 
products and uniform workers. It has increased mo­
bility to the point that roots are lost, Marcel sees 
vividness of life as linked to a sense of individuality 
which is inseparable from rootedness in a concrete 
environmentJ
The modern type of society cannot be considered a community,
"Its individuals will be isolated atoms with no strong sense
2of identity or of belonging with others." Atomization and 
collectivization usually go together.
Loss of individual identity is aptly illustrated in 
what Hans Zehrer, in Man in This World, calls the barracks 
man.3 He paints a picture of the typical displaced person 
following World War II. He has experienced the loss of the 
sense of individual being. He asks the questions: Who am I?
What am I living for, and what is the meaning of all this?
The State cannot answer him. It speaks only of ab­
stract concepts: employment, gross national product, social
security and the like. Society offers little more of an 
answer--aid to refugees, emergency relief or a new homeland. 
Always abstractions. In the universe of the state and so­
ciety this man no longer presents any living reality. He is 
simply a number on a filing card, or represents a given
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 12.
^Ibid.. p. 12.
^Hans Zehrer, Man In This World (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1952).
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dossier with its appropriate number. But this man is not a
number! He is a living, personal, individual being. As
Marcel sizes up the situation,
A strange and incomprehensible power has stolen from 
him everything which constituted his home, everything 
which permitted him to take on form.
But this man is not there simply for himself, on 
his own account. He is also the last link of an 
historical development. He marks its ultimate possi­
bility. For thirty years this question has been in 
the making for a whole continent, and soon for the 
entire planet.1
So with the loss of ontological exigence goes the loss of
individual identity. The powers and pressures of life have
combined with the heat of political adversity to dissolve
the individuated person into mass man, faceless man,
spiritless man with a broken self-image and powerless to
extricate himself from the throes of non-identity and
anonymity.
The Loss of Meaningful Existence 
The culminating effect of the loss of ontological 
exigence is to be found in the forfeiture of meaning in 
life. When the demand to be has been dissipated, all of 
life tends to lose its lustre and allurement. The very 
heart has been cut out of striving. The desire to transcend 
mere existence has vanished. Pitiful man has utterly failed 
in his primeval effort to become. Nothing is left for which 
to work.
^Marcel, Problematic Man. pp. 20-21.
17>+
This signifies the confluence of the three or more 
causal streams eventuating in the loss of ontological 
exigence. The devastating influences of naturalistic 
science has taken its toll. The distorted system of values 
which modern man has nurtured has reached its unwanted 
harvest. The growth of social statism has all but crushed 
man in to servitude and a place of unimportance. The mis­
placement of the idea of function has minimized the sacred­
ness of being while accenting what man can do and accomplish. 
For these reasons and many more, individual man has lost his 
place in the universe, devalued, dehumanized, and degraded. 
He has lost the sacred sense of being. This individual and 
localized failure at the very core of his personality has 
spread its inoccuous virus to all areas of life, rendering 
them meaningless and inconsequential. Now nothing really 
matters— nothing can ultimately matter. Marcel sees this 
tragic condition as a repetition of that which overtook 
Solomon in his declining years, and when at the end of his 
tether he saw all things as vanity.^
Life truly has lost its meaning when shallowness, 
hollowness, and emptiness characterize its everydayness. On 
the contrary, "Being is the culmination of hope, the experi­
ence of being is its f u l f i l m e n t . M o s t  individuals, how­
ever, seem to live on the level of the superficial. Their
^Ecc. 12:8.
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. 50.
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lives do not have an authentic hearing. In consequence, 
the malady of despondence has permeated all levels of so­
ciety. Marcel observes that this functionalized world has 
produced a stifling impression of sadness. It is possible 
for a man to be involved in a functionalized world and yet 
retain the power to reject it. He need not succumb per­
sonally to the pressures about him. One possibility is 
found in his rejecting this kind of world by humanizing the 
relations which unite him to others. By so doing he has 
enriched his own life as well. This would indicate that 
being is not indifferent to value, but finds its greatest 
value in personal fulfillment. Perhaps it is by presence 
that one can,effect the transition from being to enrichment 
of being. That which has value is also that which increases 
in us the feeling of presence. While fulfillment primarily 
takes on a positive meaning from the creative standpoint, 
yet functionalized activity is the lowest depth of degrada­
tion to which creative activity can descend.
I think that we must all, in the course of our lives, 
have known beings who were essentially creators; by the 
radiance of charity and love shining from their being, 
they add a positive contribution to the invisible work 
which gives the human adventure the only meaning which 
can justify it.1
Fulfillment is not something to be considered on its own,
but as part of a personal experience in which a profound
requirement is satisfied. This should give some intimation
 ̂Ibid.. pp. 50-51
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of what life ought to be, as over against what it actually 
is for many frustrated moderns.
Meaningful living presupposes that the universe is 
teleological in character. Pattern, purpose and plan must 
be discovered throughout. A sense of direction stemming 
from an ultimate goal sets the personal life into a meaning­
ful frame. Meaning, according to Marcel, suggests outgoing 
relationships. One tends to discover sense and worth as he 
sees himself and his life in relation to the rest of the 
universe— the larger whole. More than movement is required. 
Life takes on meaning as one detects movement goalward. Keen 
incisively notes,
Life in a functionalised world becomes a process with­
out a purpose, a utilisation of means with no clearly 
defined end, a journey without a goal. When the sense 
of dignity and purposefulness in life'is lost, nothing 
ultimately matters.1
Life without a purpose is tantamount to life segmented from 
the whole, having no conscious connections, no visible rela­
tionships, and no rational belonging. Dehumanized man is 
consequently isolated, alienated, and adrift— without chart 
and compass he becomes an aimless wanderer, restless and 
uncomfortable, haunted by memories of a better day.
It is quite certain— and I have taken care to 
emphasize it— that man, reduced to a destitution such 
that his life has become meaningless for him, preserves 
the memory of a different life which still presented a 
character of plenitude. It is then a question of 
knowing what anoraisal it is nossible to make of this
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 10.
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other life, or this other world, on the basis of a 
situation which is that of a being entirely dispos­
sessed. 1
To Marcel, and these thoughts have portrayed his 
feelings, such considerations should bring one face to face 
with the brokenness of the world in which he lives. Despair 
and nihilism constantly prey upon man. It is as though a 
conspiracy exists to strip him of his being, for the only 
ultimate source of fulfillment and joy comes from that living 
contact with the inexhaustible within himself. Quite like 
Camus and Sartre, Marcel admits that despair and suicide are 
always possible alternatives facing an individual in this 
tragic world.
Despair is possible in any form, at any moment and to 
any degree, and this betrayal may seem to be counselled, 
if not forced upon us, by the very structure of the 
world we live. The deathly aspect of this world may, 
from a given standpoint, be regarded as a ceaseless in­
citement to denial and to suicide.2
As one evaluates the world from the non-theistic 
viewpoint he can find nothing in it that withstands critical 
dissolution. Despair is rooted in this fact. The source of 
despair on the contemporary scene is found in the visible 
danger that what one sees of this world may be all there is 
to see.
What we see is the moment-to-moment boundary of our 
being, the nothingness that completes itself in death, 
our own and that of the race: in such a world.
'Marcel, Problematic Man. p. 39*
^Ibid.. p. 26.
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riddled the while with horror-filled actualities, how 
can a being aspiring and infinite be other than con­
demned to frustration? And in just this world we are 
nevertheless condemned to engage and to act as men: 
is it possible?'^
Underlying much of the despair and rebellion toward life is
the apparent fact that to be alive in such a tragic and
threatened world as this, is not a gift but a penalty.
’"I never asked to be born, by what right— by what right!—
has life been inflicted on me'? that lies at the roots of
that contemporary nihilism, to which I shall have to come
back much later.
Concluding Statement 
With the loss of ontological exigence the individual 
ceases to find meaning in life. In most instances he is so 
paralyzed by this loss of being that he fails to desire its 
transcendence. Although there are many contributing factors 
leading to man's dispossessed condition, yet of first im­
portance is the emergence of the technological mentality from 
the spirit of abstraction. All other causal factors, though 
important, form the supplementary historical context out of 
which the spirit of abstraction could more easily arise.
The tragic loss of being, suffered by man, is char­
acterized by a shallow, empty, apathetic existence. Aliena­
tion from God, self, and others is surfaced in
^Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics," p. k-6y.
^Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. I, p. 2M+.
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purposelessness, eventuating in despair, absurdity, and 
nothingness. Dehumanized, degraded, and nearly discarded, 
man appears to be little more than a useless passion. Not 
only has he lost the exigence of being but his life has be­
come utterly meaningless and therefore absurd. He totals it 
all and the answer is NOTHINGNESS!
Having examined the causal factors and the prolifer­
ating effects of the loss of meaningful existence on the 
individual, the reader's attention is now directed to the 
broader social implications of dehumanization resulting from 
the industrialization of society.
CHAPTER V
DEHUMANIZATION THROUGH INDUSTRIALIZATION
The question arises as to how the industrializing 
process contributes toward the dehumanization of man. In 
what ways and to what extent has this taken place? Could it 
have been avoided or is it a natural accompaniment of the 
industrial revolution? In what way has industrialization 
contributed to the good of mankind? Does this outweigh its 
bad effects? These and other questions tend to flood one's 
mind as he considers the age of mechanization and its impli­
cations. Fortunately, Marcel has spoken both clearly and 
provocatively on the issue at hand. He definitely feels 
that the technological mentality, developing concurrently 
with the rise of science, has affected society in an ad­
verse way. On the other hand he is not oblivious to the 
blessings which technology has brought to a burgeoning 
population. In this chapter an examination will be made of 
the societal effects of dehumanization. While the indi­
vidual man will not be overlooked, the accent will fall on 
the dehumanizing effects of industrialization on various 
groups within society and on society as a whole. Marcel
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believes that industrial civilization carries the seeds of 
societal decay. The contagion of technolatry has woven it­
self into the very fabric of the industrialized culture and 
man has become depersonalized in the course of events.
When the term Industrial Revolution is mentioned it 
usually has reference to the change brought about in England 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century— and later in 
America, by the introduction of power-driven machinery to 
replace hand labor. The gradual, yet drastic changes, 
instituted by this progressive event have influenced the 
lives of all.
A brief setting forth of the more common terms used 
in this chapter will be of help in maintaining proper dis­
tinctions. The word science is used to indicate the organ­
ized research being done to discover new truths in any field 
of knowledge. Technology signifies the implementation of 
the necessary know-how to apply the discoveries of science 
to the practical needs of man. The word industrial relates 
to the cooperative effort by both capital and labor to 
produce the needed articles in any given field. Mechaniza­
tion usually signifies the introduction of power-driven 
machinery in a given industry for both the saving of labor 
and the speeding-up of production. In a broader sense the 
term is used to include not only the introduction of ma­
chinery, but other laborsaving devices and processes such as 
automation and data processing.
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The Industrialization of Society 
The Industrial Civilization 
Of recent date in the history of the western world 
has been the mechanization of labor. As has already been 
indicated, this gradual occurrence has taken place in England 
and America in the last two or three centuries. When 
mechanization comes to a given society it brings a radical 
change in its life and power. The outcome is a society that 
makes great use of machinery, conducts its operations in 
industry and commerce on a large scale and supplies the 
needs of its simplest members by an elaborate series of 
world-wide exchanges. The creation of such a society must 
be in some respects a gradual development. While there was 
large capital invested in industry and commerce long before 
the eighteenth century, and mass-production was not alto­
gether unknown before that time, yet the flurry of sweeping 
new inventions and power-driven equipment changed the 
picture in a very definite way. No people and no age could 
pass directly and immediately from a primitive and simple 
economy to a life so complicated and complex as that found in 
modern England or America. There are some who criticize the 
term revolution in this connection, arguing that it implies 
sudden and catastrophic change; however, on closer examina­
tion one finds that the great inventions that distinguished 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the new dis­
coveries in physics, chemistry, and atomic power, have
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played such a decisive part in creating a new kind of 
society that the term revolution is not too violent a 
description of the changes produced. While this change has 
come to different peoples at different times, yet its basic 
characteristic is to be found in the transformation which 
takes place from a rural-type society with its local 
markets to an industrial society with world-wide connections; 
from a culture embedded in a natural setting to one sub­
merged in a technological environment.
Marcel is more interested in the term industrial 
civilization than in the term industrial revolution. His 
major concern rests on the effects which an industrialized 
society has suffered because of these revolutionary changes. 
Industrial civilization speaks more to him about the people 
than the machines. This term seems to have an obvious mean­
ing; however, Marcel feels this to be true only because it 
evokes a set of images and ready-made ideas.
The moment we say 'industrial civilisation' we see 
factories, smoke, slums, suburbs, what have you, and 
all the commonplaces about mechanisation spring into 
our minds; 'Mechanisation means progress,' or 
'Mechanisation is a scourage,' and so on.1
He thinks that the notion of civilisation itself has its
ambiguities, and that the idea of industrial civilization,
seemingly more exact, is affected by them. Perhaps a better
and more meaningful term could have been chosen by Marcel.
The word industrialism might convey a more accurate meaning
1Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 1.
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since it signifies a social organization in which industries, 
especially of the large-scale type, are dominant.
Marcel enlarges on his concept of civilization by 
stating that it first meant the state of civilized man as 
over against a savage or barbaric state. This was the 
prevalent view among the Greeks. A much later notion ap­
peared which incorporated the humanistic accent of the 
Renaissance. Thus civilization as a somewhat global con­
cept became inseparable from certain universal values.
In the eighteenth century, especially in the writings 
of Rousseau, the idea of civilization was confronted with a 
form of nature worship which pin-pointed its corruption. On 
the other hand, in the nineteenth century, "the West, 
fascinated by the progress of science and technics, seized 
on the idea of civilization as the reward of the fullest
idevelopment of man's rational faculties." This constituted 
the basis of positivism and all the schools of thought con­
nected with it. For them it was the triumph of enlightened 
order over confusion, violence and disorder. Those who were 
among the optimistic a hundred years ago even thought of it 
as being the solution to the ills of the world. Positivism 
was certainly the means to universal peace, implying the 
gradual substitution of right for might, with the possible 
corollary of the harmonious development of the sciences and
^Ibid., p. 1.
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the arts. Marcel calls into question such optimistic state­
ments :
It would be difficult for us after the events of 
the past half-century to share this optimism and in 
particular to see why man’s growing mastery over nature 
would go hand in hand with the triumph of right. In 
any case, the development of historical science and 
sociology has in the meantime given rise to a very dif­
ferent conception.1
It is indeed tempting, observes Marcel, to say that in view 
of all this there came about a dissociation between the con­
cept of civilization and value which had theretofore been 
inseparable on a global scale. Up to that time civilization 
as a global concept was identifiable anytime and anywhere by 
certain universal values. Now it appeared more and more 
evident, especially in the light of ethnological discoveries, 
that those whom the civilized had presumptuously tagged as 
savages had their own civilization with its recognizable 
structure. Instead of the confused notion of civilization 
as a whole there has developed the idea of civilizations 
which are distinct, separate, and irreducible to one an­
other's terms. Where once the civilized world was the de­
pository of universal values with the primitives identified 
as the have-nots, now a variety of civilizations possessed 
relative values. With no absolute or universal values, "it 
would be more true to say that with the development of a 
pluralist and historicist theory of civilisations, values
^Ibid.. p. 2.
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came to be relativised."^ A civilization does imply be­
liefs, that is to say values. Marcel states that it is 
dangerous to assert a priori that these values are neces­
sarily those which rationalistic European thought has 
attempted to define as universais. Not that such a reduction 
is necessarily impossible, but one should proceed with the 
utmost caution.
On the other hand, when one looks further into the 
concept of rural civilization, he needs only to think of 
England to see how these two kinds of civilization were 
able to co-exist for a very long time, with industrial 
civilization finally predominating in the end, and this in 
circumstances which can easily be defined. "What is also 
evident is that each of these civilisations forms around a 
particular way of life, and above all that each of these 
ways of living belongs to its own particular environment."2
So Marcel agrees that there are different types of 
civilizations with their relative values. More than one 
civilization can be present at the same time in a given 
society. Marcel is deeply impressed by what Georges 
Friedmann has to say about the technical environment which 
permeates industrial civilization.3 Friedmann contrasts 
this type of environment with what he terms the natural
^Ibid.; p. 2.
^Ibid., p. 3.
^Ibid., See p. 3.
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environment, which is more comparable to the personal, if 
not primitive, kind of civilization.
The Technical Environment
Marcel has a tendency to use synonomously such terms 
as technical, industrial, and scientific. As he discusses 
what Friedmann terms the technical environment, he could 
have well-used the term industrial civilization, or in­
dustrial environment. One's attention is now directed to 
the technical environment which has emerged from the indus­
trial civilization.
In speaking of the natural environment Friedmann 
states that man is therein present in his work. His span 
of work is no bigger than his natural movements in their 
technical capacity. He is thus very close to the article of 
production. Only a tool would intervene between his hand 
and/or foot and the material he is shaping. Thus his 
production is humanized due to his expert craftmanship and 
the pride he finds in making a superior article. Creativity, 
imagination and extensive planning go into the make-up of 
each item. Part of the person can be seen in the finished 
product. It thus becomes the highest expression of the 
soul through the skill of trained hands and feet. The com­
pletion of the work by himself adds not only continuity and 
precision but the harmony of the finished whole. The pro­
fession of medicine still affords a fitting example of the 
fullness of human presence.
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The natural environment as such is a climate of 
presence and sympathy. In it 'a life rich in direct 
understanding, in presence, is combined with the 
spread of craftsmanship and the beginnings of in­
dus try.'1
From the opposing view nothing more different could 
be found than the technical environment which, as such, is 
artificial and inhuman in the strongest sense. Even in
situations in which everything has been done to improve the
material conditions of work, boredom is the worker's mate.
In the factory world all that remains of nature is man him­
self. If there were no other persons in it one might perish. 
One's hand of flesh and bone seems very fragile in compari­
son to the hard, dense metal which it handles all day. As
long as this world is frequented by men, by comrades, there 
appears to be a chance of moulding it to the ends of culture 
and dignity. But the question remains as to how much longer 
and on what terms this comradeship can remain genuine. Marcel 
comments that
It stares us in the face that it is in grave danger of 
being impaired by the intrusion of politics, or if you 
like of propaganda.
The moment men are brought in whose function is to 
pass on slogans, a milieu which was still living and 
charged with currents of friendship and even genuine 
brotherhood is in danger of being frozen, or to put it 
in another way, of turning into a field for the 
transmission of quite different currents, which are 





In recent years, the education of so many has been almost 
exclusively technical to the point of raising the question 
whether this type of person is more susceptible to the kind 
of propaganda Marcel refers to than those possessing a more 
general culture of half a century ago. Marcel observes that
"it seems that a counter-weight to the growing technical
-]trend in education needs to be invented."
There is also an artificial character about the in­
dustrial environment. Sometimes the Soviet Union is used to 
illustrate this fact. Its culture is described as having 
room for nothing but pre-established plans and manufactured 
objects. Anything that develops naturally or grows is 
suspect. Marcel adds that what is true of the Soviet world 
is not necessarily true of industrial civilization in gen­
eral, "but is this not perhaps merely because in other 
countries that civilisation has not yet unfolded all its 
impli cations
There is a danger of the technical environment be­
coming for us the pattern of the universe. In other words, 
one might say that the categories of its particular struc­
ture are valid for an objective conception of the world.
This interpretation becomes embodied, seeking to reconsti­




When Marcel visited Venezuela he had the feeling that what
had been a landscape was being turned into a builder's yard.
There you may witness the kind of planned sectioning 
and cutting up which I would venture to call sacri­
legious. I had this feeling most strongly in Rio de 
Janeiro, where the hills were going to be levelled 
without the slightest consideration for the reality 
of the original site.1
This experience is very significant for Marcel, for in the 
past a city moulded itself on the natural structure or pre­
structure, now one is likely to see larger and larger ag­
glomerations piling up without any regard for natural pre­
formation. There is no hesitation in doing violence to 
nature to carry out an abstract plan.
These words, abstract, abstraction, keep coming 
back, and this cannot be helped because it is just the 
crux of it. But we must try to understand the reason 
for this predominance in the industrial world of the 
abstract, the planned, the organised, the dissected.2
Extensive mass production is related to the existence
of the masses whose needs must be satisfied. It is very
obvious that an individualized economy is inadequate to meet
such needs. But.these masses are at both the beginning and
the end. As masses, they are partly its consequence, in
every economic field.
There is also the fact that big industry tends itself 
to create the needs which it later claims to satisfy..
And no doubt it must be added that this whole process 




if you prefer, it tends to create its own inevit­
ability. 1
Marcel states that one is confronted by an enormous system 
which consolidates itself more and more. He does not see the 
logical possibility of anything altering it in principle. 
History teaches that such logical considerations are in­
adequate. He considers the mysterious role of crises, 
natural upheavals and catastrophes to be the possible bring­
ing into play of compensating elements which tend to con­
found one's reason. Hocking differs to some degree with 
Marcel in viewing the nature of this problem; yet he does 
not minimize its importance:
In the end, Marcel makes this proposal, that 'the 
world of techniques' is one of those imaginary 
'unities or totalities which do not exist in fact'
C203), and I would nominate for the same title 'the 
masses,' outside of actually totalitarian lands.
They, with the world of techniques, are abstractions 
but not thought-creatures alone: they are tendencies
with heavy psychological draft. As abstractions with 
the potency of becoming facts, they constitute a menace 
against which no guard is superfluous and no warning 
too early nor too grave.2
Contrasting Developments 
Technical Progress 
There are certain values to be found in industrial 
civilization and by linking these with the accompanying en­
vironment one might be able to discover the limits of this
^Ibid., p= ll+ =
pHocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics," p. ^65.
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type of civilization. Such a situation, however, contains a 
fundamental paradox. Mastering the forces of nature by 
increasingly elaborate technical processes is a liberation 
and should be welcomed as such. On the other hand, it is no 
less true that this liberation is in danger of being itself 
turned into slavery. The drama of industrial civilization 
lies within this contradiction. This particular civiliza­
tion runs the danger of developing against certain universal 
values which appear to be a part of civilization in general. 
This harks back to the ambiguity Marcel encounters when dis­
cussing the word civilization.
But here one must proceed with caution. So with 
great care he admits that it is ridiculous to denounce tech­
nical progress as such. Some of those who attack technical 
progress and machinery tend to turn them in to some kind of 
a monster. This is a case of mistaken identity. For if 
work is poorly done it is not the fault of a machine but an 
operator, a somebody. The lifeless machine is not at fault, 
but man who has used it wrongly. Marcel, however, would 
take issue at this point. He feels that such a statement 
is an over-simplification or a mistake. The truth to him is 
infinitely more complex than that, as will be pointed out 
later.
To condemn technical progress would be quite 
absurd. It is possible to establish certain principles which 
would be difficult to dispute. To start with a definition.
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. . .  a technique is a specialised and rationally 
elaborated form of knowledge, and let us add that the 
techniques we are concerned with here are all skills 
which contribute to the transformation of the world.1
All of these offer certain basic characteristics which it 
would be difficult to overstress. They do not run the danger 
of getting lost as does a knack, so-called by craftsmen. A 
knack can be passed on by example if at all, and not by 
theoretical training and instruction. The basic character­
istics of techniques are:
(1) They are specialised and, almost always, 
within their own specialised field they tend to give 
rise to new forms of specialisation.
(2) They are perfectible.
(3) And they are transmissible. Indeed, the more 
rationalised they are, the more easily can they be
transmitted.2
The perfectibility of techniques should be empha­
sized as well. One technical process is better than another 
because it improves output or makes it possible to produce 
the same amount in less time or at less cost. Furthermore, 
only in the technical domain has the word progress kept the 
fullness of its meaning. The moment it is applied to such 
fields as morals or institutions it becomes obscure, for the 
criteria applicable to ethics or politics can not have the 
same precision as they have in the field of technics.
But Marcel feels that the essential questions after 
all are those "which have to do with human happiness, or
^Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 7*
^Ibid.. p. 7.
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shall we say contentment on the one hand and with spiritual 
quality on the other.Moreover, it has yet to be shown 
that the progress of social techniques has either increased 
contentment or developed spiritual quality.
In commenting on the positive value of technical
progress Marcel makes the point that he is not thinking only
of its usefulness but of something more than utility.
There is no doubt that in applying a technique which 
he has mastered the technician experiences a joy which 
is not only basically innocent, but even noble. It 
is a joy which is bound up with the consciousness of 
power over inanimate things, that is to say, over a 
reality which is subordinate and is in a sense meant to 
be controlled by m a n . 2
It is true that things tend to offer a resistance, the re­
sistance of inertia which is good to overcome. This presents 
the technician with a challenge, for this inertia can only be 
overcome by methods which are quite precise. "The value of 
a technique is that of the precision with which it is ap­
plied, and we must remember the connection between precision 
and intellectual h o n e s t y . Hence, the technician carries a 
constant awareness of responsibility.
And, again, there is the purity and soundness of 
the joy which goes with technical research when it re­
sults in a discovery. I am inclined to think that 
what is positive in all this is that the technician 





here again there is the saving virtue of pre­
cision. ̂
One should make a distinction between human attitudes 
involved in actions applied to things over against those ap­
plied to people. It is much easier for an action to be pure 
if it bears on things, while if the same procedure was ap­
plied to persons it would be an abuse of the gravest kind.
Hocking tends to look on science with its attendant
2technology as a "passionate respect for dispassionate fact." 
He considers this a monumental moral achievement. But then 
he is quick to add,
Now when this science is turned on man himself, 
these very moral impulses tend to make the science of 
man morally immoral! For while it is evident em­
pirical righteousness to be dispassionate and objective 
about man's physical insertion in the context of nature, 
yet to be dispassionate and objective about man the 
passion-filled maker of science is plain empirical 
unrighteousness. Marcel's strictures on a technological 
society, inspired by a rigorous science of man, are en­
lightening and fully justified.3
Hocking further observes that it is not with impunity that 
man thinks of himself and his actions in terms of the causal 
linkages of physical events; "and to show how this highly ra­
tional emptying society of its soul bears on the desolation 
of mass-mindedness and its inherent criminality are services
^Ibid.. p. 9*
pHocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta=
physics," p. k-62.
^Ibid., p. h 6 2.
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of instant importance.""' It i-s only when technology assumes 
control of the whole of life that it becomes a death threat. 
Hocking raises the question whether, when thus kept in 
place, an economy inspired by technology may not have a 
positive contribution to make to human fraternity. He 
further suggests that the functional and fraternal relations 
among men run contrastingly deep. Paralleling this rela­
tionship is the contrast to be found between impersonal and 
personal relations.
Economic relations are as a rule relatively impersonal 
and abstract; family relations (for example) relatively 
personal and concrete. In the market a man is valued 
for what he can do; in the family for what he is, re­
gardless of 'output.'2
Yet, in spite of this difference, Hocking states that the 
world of work and the world of love belong together in 
natural alternation. He cites the instance of the pride 
with which a youngster brings home his first week's pay for 
a week's labor. The family assumes that his function as 
future provider for his family is a mark of character 
closely related to his love for the family. Though he must 
function in the impersonal order of the market, this char­
acter trait as a provider enhances his being-loved-for-what- 
he-is in the home. "The hardness and impersonality of the 
economic judgment is its virtue, and its contribution to the 
soundness of intimacy.
llbid.. p. h62. ^Ibid.. p. 462.
^Ibid., p. 463.
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In continuing the investigation of the effects of
technical progress on man, one's attention is called to an 
1earlier remark that it is always the operator and not the 
lifeless machine which is at fault. Marcel further adds,
We might say, using Christian terms--and these 
terms are urged on us not only hy faith but also by 
reflection— that it is in the nature of techniques to 
lead the mind into temptation . . . All we have to ask 
ourselves here, and this without trespassing beyond 
experience, is what the notion of temptation means and 
in what circumstances it may become active. My view 
is that it is invariably bound up with power. The 
moment that we are endowed with power of whatever sort 
we are exposed to the temptation of abusing it.2
To exercise this sort of power demands an exercise of control
over this power itself. However, on the contrary, the more
suddenly power is acquired or the less it simulates natural
growth, the more it tends to resemble the self-made man who
believes that he is in no man's debt. It rejects, as though
it were an encroachment, all forms of limitation or control
over itself. That it is in the nature of techniques to lead
the mind into temptation can be seen in the man who has
mastered one or more techniques distrusting in principle
what is alien to these techniques.
The effect of technical progress on man can not only 
be seen in the temptation to misuse power, but also in the 
dependence which develops in man on the machine. This is 
accompanied by a comparable decline in creative thought and
^Supra. p. 192.
^Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 10.
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activity. The virtue of resourcefulness is also gradually 
diminished in man. A further limitation is to he seen in 
the fact that he is laced to a set, undeviating pattern of 
machine production. He must, of necessity, he satisfied with 
a standardized product. As part of the total process in 
mass production, man becomes an accomplice in a great con­
spiracy against the person as an individual. Furthermore, 
since the technician constantly deals with quantitative 
measurements, he tends to discount the value of qualitative 
distinctions such as are found in religion, love, and morals. 
The ultimate peril, consequently, is the half-haked man, 
cognizant of only half the issues involved.
The Dehumanizing Process 
In the midst of the industrial civilization with its 
technical environment, it is well-nigh impossible for man to 
consider himself apart from it. He inevitably becomes a tar­
get for those techniques which are legitimately applicable 
only to the outward world. Marcel views the fields of psy­
chology and psychiatry as replete with such instances. By 
way of example he cites the incredible development of the 
use of tests in America and in Americanized countries.
While admitting that there are certain areas in which their 
use is altogether justified (e.g. the field of motor- 
sensory behavior) yet when tests are implemented in de­
termining intelligence, Marcel strenuously objects to their 
use.
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I have had a recent confirmation of it in talking with 
a Swedish psychologist who told me that he had liter­
ally discovered since he came to France the limitations 
of certain techniques which were sanctioned in his own 
country without the slightest warning as to the con­
ditions in which they could be suitably applied.1
As a further observation he states that as soon as the tech­
nical environment becomes the predominating environment it 
is usual for such techniques to become generalized and to 
proliferate. "This is one more victory for abstraction, the 
individual being now a unit whom it is possible and right 
to deal with as with all the other units in his category. 
This approach to life is bound up with a certain technical 
representation of the world. When man projects upon the 
world the light of a knowledge which is technicalized, he 
receives in return an increasingly monstrous image of that 
world and himself— an image which is ever more distorted.
As a result the subject tends less and less to be 
treated as a subject and is consequently less and less 
respected. Hence that spreading violation of privacy 
which is one of the most horrifying features of the 
modern world, whose worst excesses in this direction 
show themselves in literature,3
Marcel was once told of a situation, by a person con­
nected with the terrible problem of displaced persons, that 
a certain country only wanted people who could make shoes 1 
"The entity one-who-can-make-shoes is substituted for the 
concrete reality of so-and-so, married to such and such a 
person and father of such and such a c h i l d . H e  feels this
llbid.. p. 15. 2ibid.. p. 16.
3jbid.. p. 17. ‘+Ibid.. p. 17-
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to be an insult to life understood in its deepest sense. 
Here one finds life conceived only in bio-sociological 
terras, as a process whose physico-chemical conditions are 
objectively definable and which exists in view of a certain 
task related to the collectivity. "Here again the wildest 
excesses of the totalitarian regimes seem only to be the 
ultimate expression of monstrous logic, the logic of de­
humanisation."^ This hallmark is always to be seen in the 
surge for power, finally ending in "an immense holocaust to 
nothingness.
In his typical vein of thought, Marcel sees in all 
this a huge inverted caricature of what the Christian calls 
the plan of redemption. For if on the one; hand the develop­
ment of persons is accented, then a true inversion takes 
place when a devitalized rationality is turning human beings 
into nothing but robots. This enormous process of de­
humanization is constantly eroding the personal element in 
society.
Thus, I do not hesitate to say that, if we could dis­
cover what this process is at bottom and in principle, 
putting aside the illusions and misconceptions which it 
encourages and exploits, we would see that it cannot be 
considered as anything except basically d a e m o n i a c . 3
Marcel thus exposes the dehumanizing process for what he 
sees it is— a devastating, insidious, anti-Christian atti­
tude emerging from the cauldron of industrial civilization.
''ibid.. p. 17. 2pbid.. p. 18.
3lbid., p. 18.
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Thus far one's attention has been called to the 
general aspects of industrialization and its consequent 
effects on man and society— especially as they pertain to 
the dehumanizing process. The discussion has closely fol­
lowed Marcel's approach and his thinking. His concern has 
centered on what he terms "industrial civilization" with 
its technical environment. Since man is submerged in this 
atmosphere, he is the subject of Marcel's philosophic con­
cern. An examination will now be made of the salient and 
more specific factors involved in the dehumanization of man 
resulting from modern industrialization. Collectivism, 
atomization, and mechanization will be explored in their 
relationship to society.
The Dehumanizing Effects of Industrialization 
Effects of Collectivism on Man 
The concept of collectivism has arisen in conjunction 
with industrialization. A simple dictionary definition of 
the term usually signifies some type of politico-economic 
system of organization which is characterized by collective 
control over production and distribution. The way in which 
the term is used herein is broader than the one just given, 
for in addition to what has been mentioned, the idea of the 
formation of the masses is added. Mass man, mass production, 
mass thinking, and mass consumption are included in the 
present usage of the term. The basis of collectivism and
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some of its more serious implications for man are to be 
examined.
Collectivism has arisen with industrialism by means
of technology. In fact, collectivism is based on technology.
Without it the formation of the masses would be impossible.
Technology spells the mobilization of everything which 
was immobile heretofore. Man too has become mobilized.
He not only follows automatic motion without resistance; 
he even wants to accelerate it still more.1
Without the mechanical aids and the scientific processes it
would have been literally impossible to form a rational mass
out of conglomerate humanity. Mass thinking develops as man
exhibits a growing tendency to understand the world around
him, and even himself, in terms of technology. In speaking
of technology, reference is not made to the cumulative sum of
a variety of different skills, for it is not a unity which
one can amass. Technology is human reason as it seeks to
manage the earth and everything in it. Marcel readily poses
the question thus: "Are not the most enlightened spirits of
our age intent upon organizing the earth as scientifically as 
2possible"? He joins forces with his fellow existentialists 
even to the point of using the same phraseology as he issues 
a warning about the enervating influences which issue from 
mass civilization. He battles for the authentic image of
Friedrich Georg Juenger, The Failure of Tech­
nology. Gateway Edition: (Chicago: Henry Regnery Comnany,
1 9 4 9 ) , 'p . 157.'
^Marcel, Searchings, p. 44.
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man against all the forces that threaten to mar it. This 
even includes forces which man has let loose upon himself by 
applying technological methods (designed for things) to 
human beings.
Massomania, an excessive enthusiasm if not craze 
exhibited by those technicians who wish to categorize all of 
humanity, has been the constant pursuit of many technicians 
taking part in the industrialization of society. Each indi­
vidual, however he may desire it to be otherwise, is molded 
and integrated into certain totalities. As such he uncon­
sciously finds himself preying upon others and being preyed 
upon. He is engulfed in the current of a gigantic collec­
tivism. As part of a great economic system he finds that he 
has little to say in reference to the direction of flow and 
the establishment (or choosing) of values.
The great majority of men are merely consumers and to 
that extent wholly dependent. They are thereby self- 
condemned to a new kind of slavery the true nature of 
which is, moreover, concealed from itself. Nor should 
we overlook the fact that this slavery is actually a 
consequence of the omnipresence of advertising, which 
is itself organically connected with industrial de­
velopment. Those who produce television sets or re­
frigerators must be able to create an environment 
capable of absorbing them."'
No doubt these facts have been noted many times; however, 
they do raise the question of the possible effects on man.
How does he view the situation in reference to human be­
havior and how does he tend to evaluate himself in this
^Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 160.
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contextual setting? To say the least, he sees himself in a 
passive role as a consumer. , He no longer sets the pace, 
but finds himself controlled and directed by outside forces. 
In all probability he considers himself more and more in 
relation to the products of his own techniques, probably 
undervaluing himself in comparison with the far more accurate 
and enamoring apparatus which his technical skill has per­
fected.
In commenting on the loss thus sustained to the 
person and that which he considers to be sacred, Marcel has 
an encouraging word pointing to a possible solution. He 
suggests that the way to rediscover the path to human value 
is by turning away from the world and recapturing the sim­
plicity of individuality, uniqueness, and inwardness.
It is vain to hope that human reality as it is 
comprehended by statistical methods could ever admit the 
sacral. It is completely foreign to grace. Grace can 
only reach the individual, and if it reaches the masses 
through the individual then it will only happen if the 
masses arouse themselves from the stupor that made them 
masses in the first place.1
In the midst of criticism and analysis concerning 
the forming of the masses and the accompanying blight on 
humanity, there are opposing views which have recently de­
veloped. The radical position of Harvey Cox is a case in 
point. In his recent book, The Secular Citv. he actually 
celebrates the progressive secularization and urbanization 
of the world as the logical outcome of Biblical religion.
1Marcel, Searchings, p. 52.
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Man is becoming mature and of age in accepting the challenge
of technopolis. He is coming to realize that his duty and
privilege is to face up to the problems of urbanization and 
secularization. This is his world. His interest should lie 
here, not in the hereafter. He should not seek to return to 
the good old days but make the most of the present day. This 
is God's will for man. He should view technology as a 
blessing since it enables men to live together in a close, 
meaningful way. Cox's concept of urbanization is certainly 
far more inclusive and meaningful than most. Cox admits that 
urbanization is not just a quantitative term. "It does not 
refer to population size or density, to geographic extent, 
or to a particular form of government."^ Also, urbanization 
is not something that refers only to the city.
Urbanization means . . .  an impersonality in which 
functional relationships multiply. It means that a 
degree of tolerance and anonymity replace traditional 
moral sanctions and long-term acquaintanceships. The 
urban center is the place of human control, of rational
planning, of bureaucratic organization— and the urban
center is not just in Washington, London, New York, and 
Peking. It is everywhere. The technological metropolis 
provides the indispensable social setting for a world 
where the grip of traditional religion is loosened, for 
what we have called a secular style.^
In making use of his coined term technopolis, Cox 
states that it has a meaning all its own and expresses
1Harvey Cox, The Secular Citv. rev. ed., (New York; 
The Macmillan Company, 1966), 4.
^Ibid.. p. 4.
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vividly his concept of the foundation on which a new cultural
style has appeared.
It will he used here to signify the fusion of tech­
nological and political components into the hase on 
which a new cultural style has appeared. Although the 
term is an artificial one, it reminds us that the 
contemporary secular metropolis was not possible before 
modern technology . . . Technopolis represents a new 
species of human community.^
Cox goes on to detail the characteristics of the
secular city. He speaks of its "shape" as that of anonymity
and mobility. These symbols suggest both possibilities and
problems. They describe the social shape of the modern
metropolis. These symbols are central, but not necessarily
evil— possibly good.
How frequently is urban man depicted by his detractors 
as faceless and depersonalized, rushing to and fro with 
no time to cultivate deeper relationships or lasting 
values? Anonymity and mobility can of course become 
damaging. But since they have been made into anti-
urban epithets it is even more important to examine
their positive side. Anonymity and mobility contribute 
to the sustenance of human life in the city. They are 
indispensable modes of existence in the urban setting. 
Seen from a theological perspective, anonymity and mo­
bility may even produce a certain congruity with 
biblical faith that is never noticed by the religious 
rebukers of urbanization.^
The style of the secular city is pragmatic and 
profane. The modern city dweller is always interested in 
consequences, will it work? He is also interested in the
here and now, thus classed as this worldly.
We have affirmed technopolitan man in his prag­
matism and in his profanity. To do so we have not 
abandoned the Bible; we have found, on the contrary,
^Ibid.. p. 5* ^Ibid.. pp. 33-34.
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that its views of truth and of creation display im­
portant areas of similarity with the style of the 
secular city . . , The Gospel does not call man to re­
turn to a previous stage of his development. It does 
not summon man back to dependency, awe, and religious­
ness. Rather it is a call to imaginative urbanity 
and mature secularity. It is not a call to man to 
abandon his interest in the problems of this world, but 
an invitation to accept the full weight of this 
world's problems as the gift of its Maker. It is a 
call to be a man of this technical age, with all that 
means, seeking to make it a human habitation for all 
who live within it.1
In considering the position of Harvey Cox as de­
lineated above one must constantly be reminded that all he 
says is to be placed in a theological framework, not a 
sociological one.
If one assumes The Secular City to be a sign 
pointing to an analysis and description in socio­
logical or historical modes, he will be misconstruing 
Professor Cox's announced intention. Cox's primary 
interest is not in actual cities, a utopian city, or 
exclusively in 'urbanism as a way of life.' The crucial 
phrase in the subtitle 'in theological perspective' 
decisively qualifies both 'urbanization' and 'secu­
larization. ' Within his theological perspective Cox is 
working in an economy of symbol management.2
The respected sociologist Andrew Greeley strongly 
suggests that Cox, the theologian, is outside his field of 
competency when dealing with sociological concepts.
So by all means let there be a dialogue between 
sociology and theology. But if theologians are to 
make use of sociology in their speculations, then let 
it be the most recent and the most factual and the 
most sophisticated sociology and not the
llbid.. pp. 72-73.
^Ruel Tyson, "Urban Renewal in the Holy City," in 
The Secular City Debate, ed. by Daniel Callahan (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, I966), p. ^6.
208
popularized, romanticized, sentimentalized sociology
of the college sophomore.
First of all, Cox could be charged with the over­
simplification of the subject at hand. In reality, is any 
city totally secular? Or does secularity exist in any city 
to such a degree that it could rightfully be called the 
secular city? One cannot presume this to be the case for, 
"The city is a dynamic balance of the anonymous and the 
tribal, the sacred and the profane, the secular and the un­
secular, the rational and the traditional, and the balance 
does not seem to be a very precarious one." The question 
does not seem to be whether the unsecular city is better than 
the secular one but whether the secular city and the secular 
man actually exist, or is very common. Secularity is not the 
only major dimension to be dealt with, for unsecularity is 
equally important.
Perhaps the most serious accusation that can be 
brought against Cox and his approach to the glorification of 
technopolis is that his whole case is a matter of begging 
the question. He assumes as a basic premise that the pro­
gressive secularization and urbanization of the world is the 
logical outcome of Biblical religion and therefore a neces­
sary good. All that one need to do is to embrace it, as 
such, and seek those values to be found therein. Technology
^Andrew Greeley, "An Exchange of Views," in The 
Secular City Debate, p. 108.
^Ibid.. p. 107.
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is consequently the blessing which enables man to dwell 
successfully under modern circumstances. Of course Cox asks 
one to accept in premise-form what he is seeking to prove in 
his conclusion. No doubt his argument would be much more 
appealing to thinking people if he were to examine the urban 
situation and determine whether or not it is to man’s ad­
vantage or disadvantage (as a person) to live under such 
circumstances.
Marcel continues to observe the effects of collec­
tivism on man by noting that mass production insists on a 
rigid uniformity of desire. A common market must be created 
to sustain the economics of mass production. Man and his 
desires must be ’:andardized through advertisement and 
propaganda in order to provide this common market. Further­
more, the technology emerging from industrial society is 
based on standardization of method and precision of measure­
ment. The whole system is based on the theory of the 
greatest production at the least cost. Of necessity this 
demands uniformity of product. In turn, this requires 
robot-like performance from the worker. No room is left for 
creativity, imagination or pride in personal craftsmanship. 
Man becomes little more than another arm of the machine with 
a predetermined method of operation— his freedom gone he is 
little better than a slave. In demanding uniformity, mass 
production requires a technology that is equally rigid and 
devastating to the creativity in man.
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But it must be added at once— that technology looms 
as more and more indispensable to the realization of 
the design of increasing uniformity, variations from 
which can only become progressively ineffectual.1
Some may think that uniformity of habit tends to 
produce some kind of unification of mankind. Marcel has a 
word at this point while discussing the matter of the in­
crease in perfection of the system of communication:
In other words, this perfecting of communications is 
achieved everywhere at the expense of an individuality 
which is tending today more and more to vanish away: 
and we are thinking here of beliefs, customs, tradi­
tions, as well as of local costumes, local craftsman­
ship, and so on. If we were taking a quite superficial 
view of human psychology and history, we might be 
tempted to say that this elimination of the picturesque 
is the unavoidable price that we pay for a greater 
good; for this reduction of habits to a general uni­
formity might, of course, be the beginning of a genuine 
unification of mankind.2
There is nothing to support the view that uniformity thus
produces unification, but on the contrary it seems to develop
in mankind narrow loyalties of the more aggressive sort and
to set competing groups against each other.
The masses also exist and develop at a low level, 
following purely mechanical laws. "Because the masses par­
take of the human only in a degraded state, they are them­
selves a degraded state of the hu m a n . M a r c e l  adds,
One mark of that state is that the masses are of their 
very essence— I repeat, of their verv essence— the stuff 
of which fanaticism is made: propaganda has on them the
1Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 159*
2Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. p. 86.
3Ibid.. p. 10.
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convulsive effect of an electrical shock. It arouses 
them not to life, hut to that appearance of life which 
particularly manifests itself in riots and revolu­
tions.1
Effects of Atomization on Man 
The forces at work in an industrialized society have 
an ambivalent effect on man. As has been seen in the fore­
going section on collectivism, there is a reaction on the 
part of men to be amalgamated into the ambiguous and uni­
versal man, thus losing their individuality, identity, and 
uniqueness. But in contrast to this tendency to merge, men 
under the same pressures simultaneously react by erecting 
walls about themselves to preserve their individual ego and 
self autonomy. This latter response initiates division, 
segmentation, isolation, and atomization. So the pressures 
from industrialization are both those which force men into 
mass-man as well as those which isolate and alienate them 
from each other. Marcel speaks quite revealingly to this 
point in his chapter on "A Broken World":
The truth of the matter is that, by a strange paradox ■ 
and one which will not cease to exercise us during the 
course of these lectures, in the more and more col­
lectivized world that we are now living in, the idea 
of any real community becomes more and more incon­
ceivable. Gustave Thibon, to whom I referred just now 
in connection with Nietzsche, had very good grounds 
indeed for saying that the two processes of atomization 
and collectivization, far from excluding each other as 
a superficial logic might be led to suppose, go hand in
^Ibid., p. 10.
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hand, and are two essentially inseparable aspects of 
the same process of devitalization.1
Marcel concludes that one lives in a world in which the 
preposition "with," or Whitehead's noun "togetherness," seem 
to be gradually losing their meaning. The very idea of a 
close human relationship such as exists in a family or be­
tween friends and neighbors is hard to put into practice 
and is even being disparaged. Individuals have experienced 
the loss of "life's old intimate quality.Because of the 
growingly complex organization, socialization and industrial­
ization of life, man has been treated as a unit of produc­
tion. His worth has been equated with his work. No longer 
is he viewed as a living, valuable being. He has a number, 
fills a slot, performs a function. As a unit he is a thing. 
He is isolated, segregated, and alienated from himself, 
others, and even his God.
The mechanization of life is the mill which grinds the 
individual down into atomized masses. Where human 
beings are concerned, the whole organization of tech­
nology achieves nothing but the acceleration of this 
grinding down of the individual into the mass.3
Juenger, in the above quotation, accurately describes the
predicament in which man finds himself, ground down into
atomized masses. This depicts both the segmentation and the
collectivization— paradoxically--at the one and the same time.
^Marcel, The Mystery of Being. Vol. I, p. 3^*
^Ibid., p. 3I4-.
3
Juenger, The Failure of Technology, p. 156.
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Marcel sums up his appraisal of this matter by
saying,
We have to reject the atomic just as much as the col­
lective conception of society. Both, as Gustave Thibon 
has so pregnantly remarked, are complementary aspects 
of the same process of decomposition--! would say of 
local mortification.1
Now the spotlight is turned on the paradoxical effect of 
atomization found in these agglomerate cities, cities which 
have grown with no sense of community. These cities become 
mere collections of humanity drifting in and out according 
to the demands of labor and with no sense of organic whole­
ness.
Following Out this line of thought, we should be forced 
to ask ourselves whether technical progress does not 
run the risk of having, as one of its consequences, a 
kind of return to nomadism.2
One can note something of this sort among many of the un­
skilled workers who have the tendency to take root nowhere. 
They carry with them an understandable resentment against 
the growingly inhuman conditions of life about them. Keen 
observes that a society in which nomadism is the outgrowth 
of technological demands will produce standardized but iso­
lated persons.
Such a society will be, as Dostoyevsky foresaw, an 
ant heap and not a community. Its individuals will be 
isolated atoms with no strong sense of identity or of 
belonging with others. Atomisation and collectivisation
Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. p. 267.
^Ibid., p. 93.
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go hand in hand, for it is only faceless and isolated 
individuals who can be formed into a mass.1
In densely populated areas, individuals can be so crowded 
that the only sense of privacy comes as a result of their 
inward withdrawalo Crowdedness is a powerful segmenting 
force and works toward the granulation of the mass. Coming 
from many sections of the country, these urbanites bring their 
many differences with them. These in turn become barriers 
which tend to isolate and alienate them from one another.
These are the uprooted ones— uprooted from their home com­
munities throughout the country, "What we said of agglomer­
ations replacing cities is relevant: an agglomeration is,
2as it were, the very embodiment of unrootedness."
A vivid example of this atomization brought about by 
the forces of industrialization can be seen in the mass 
transfers of populations which have taken place in the 
totalitarian countries. The predicament of these masses may 
well become the general rule once the vital link is broken 
between man and his environment. This problem is increased 
where persons are viewed as mere units of production, as 
machines which are needed here or there for the fulfilling 
of the demands of the general economy and whose individual 
feelings are of not the slightest interest to those in con­
trol. Under these circumstances dehumanization takes place
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 12.
2Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 17-
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more rapidly than usual. These kind of effects are seen in
man, though on a less alarming scale, even in non-
totalitarian but industrial countries.
The automatism in which man is trained and drilled day 
in and day out not only inures him to perform without 
a will of his own his mechanical operations; it also 
breaks down certain resistances in his personality by 
depriving him, under guise of a new order, of that 
self-reliance which alone can halt the inroads of 
chaos.1
An interesting facet of the whole problem of in­
dustrial atomization is to be found in the group cleveages 
appearing on the contemporary scene. "It would seem at 
present that each man intends to constitute , , . with those
whom he still calls his own people— a sort of island of
2autonomy." The development of trade unions would be a case 
in point. Men who do the same kind of work day in and day 
out tend to become narrowed in their interests. Specializa­
tion of skill also makes for isolation among men, Men of 
common skill generally form exclusive interest and trade 
groups. Hocking observes that
Industrial functionalism today rings with the metallic 
clang of group-egoisms, now well armed with 'rights,' 
in almost profitless collision. Freedoms and equali­
ties within the momentum of vast industrial mechanisms 
begin to appear abstractions such as men are tempted to 
trade away in exchange for deceptive economic security 
in dictatorial states.3
1Juenger, The Failure of Technologv. p. 156.
o . .-Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 159»
^Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics," p. 463.
216
So it appears that in such an amassed urban society, frag­
mentation is encouraged by the multiplication of small 
interest groups, most often without any attention being given 
to geographical proximity within the agglomeration called 
city. Intense loyalties develop within many of these groups 
who in the course of time become aggressive. In many in­
stances competing groups are set against each other to their 
own hurt, furthering the atomizing process.
Andrew Greeley does not hesitate to set forth an 
opposing concept concerning atomization as such.
The Chicago school of sociology, to its credit, 
never did buy the mass-society theory. Since Robert E. 
Park took his first hard look at Chicago it became 
clear to this school that metropolis was not anomic but 
symbiotic, that the city was made up not of atomized 
individuals but of hundreds of tightly organized and 
competing local neighborhood communities.I
Greeley apparently refuses the idea of collectivism insofar 
as it would indicate the formation of the masses, but would 
embrace the idea of tightly organized communities. This 
seems to be an oversimplification, for even a simple exam­
ination of the modern metropolis would reveal the presence 
of mass activity whether it be on the basis of race, eco­
nomic, political, or some other line. In addition, there is 
much evidence as he suggested of small group activity be it 
family, union, or tightly-knit neighborhood groups.
^Andrew Greeley, "An Exchange of Views," in the 
Secular City Debate, p. 10^.
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One of the most alarming trends in an industrialized 
civilization is to be seen in the breakdown of the family 
group. Inasmuch as this is a genuinely personal and intimate 
group its decay is viewed with real concern. Marcel com­
ments :
As a simple illustration of what I mean by a barren 
world, take the family and the danger it runs in a tech­
nical milieu where the women work as well as men, the 
children are virtually left to themselves and there 
often arises between them and their parents a sort of 
mutual hostility. When I spoke of a world which is 
generously watered by life I was thinking particularly 
of the benefits of a strongly established family.1
Hocking, voicing an opposing view in some respects, 
observes that doing one’s work and its attendant fighting 
under the hope of making the economic struggle with its 
mechanized functions a breeder of men, will add to the depth 
of all the more intimate human ties, including that of the 
family. "For love is deep in proportion to that with which 
one loves. It is the normal destiny of impersonal human re­
lations not to clash with the personal but to enhance the 
personal."2 He continues by saying that if there were a 
thoroughly technological society, whose existence is doubt­
ful, then there could not be any genuinely personal or 
fraternal' groups: in fact the family itself would be reduced
to nothing more than a convenient economic arrangement. So
/' 'the role of impersonal relations would be one of degrading
^Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 12,
2Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Meta­
physics," p. 464.
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rather than enhancing personal relationships. However, 
where a community contains families that keep their economic 
functions in their proper place, using them simply as a 
means to an end, the family's end, then the phrase techno­
logical society signifies a threat rather than an actuality.
And if, with the family, there is also a vitality of 
the arts, of music and drama, or religion, of literature 
and philosophy, the danger that such a society should 
surrender to technocratic control would seem remote,-- 
it would W  remote were the world less subject to 
violent strains than at present, and had it not been 
visited with such dislocations and perversions that 
abnormalities now commonly thrust themselves forward 
as norms, even in the arts.1
Here Hocking appeals to that particular strain developed
early in the life of Marcel; for, Marcel considers his
family's interest in the arts, especially music and drama, a
saving feature of his boyhood home. In such cases Marcel
himself mentions that one must refer back to his childhood
memories which "seem to me to play the part belonging to
preminiscence in the philosophy of Plato." He further adds 
that most individuals have been able to prove by experience 
the existence of the "family as a protective skin placed 
between himself and a world which is foreign threatening, 
hostile to h i m . H e  testifies of how painful it is to ex­
perience the tearing away of this tissue by the sudden hand 
of death. Marcel is here alluding to the sudden death of his 
mother at an early age.
Ilbid.. p. ^65.
^Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 77* ^Ibid.. p. 77*
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As Marcel comes to serious grips with the modern
problem of the breakdown of family life he speaks of the
primitive us., the privileged ua, that is only realized in
family life. "This us is in general inseparable from a home 
*1of our own. " The similes of nest, cocoon, or cradle most 
exactly illustrate the downy element of the family. All this 
seems to be bound up in principle, indissolubly, with the 
existence of the family both as a fact and a value. In­
versely, one should recognize that all which tends to destroy 
the sense of habitation of a being in process of formation 
will contribute to the weakening of his consciousness of the 
family itself.
In passing, I may say that I am convinced that therein 
lies one of the cl̂ ièf causes of the disappearance of 
family consciousness among the working population of the 
great industrial centres, where nomadic life, not of 
tent and caravan, but of lodgings and furnished rooms, 
is the order of the day. The family tends to become 
simply an abstract idea instead of the very essence of 
the atmosphere a human being almost unconsciously in­
hales, an essence which imperceptibly impregnates and 
saturates his thinking, his appreciation and his love.^
Mankind then has been devitalized by a tragic inner reality
which has two phenomenal and inseparable aspects: on the one
hand the depopulation of the country, and on the other the
dissolution of the family. These two factors have united in
the dehumanization of man.
The inexpressible sadness which emanates from great 
cities, a dismal sadness which belongs to everything 
that is devitalised, everything that represents a
1lbid.. p. 77. ^Ibid.. p. 78.
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self-betrayal of life, appears to me to be bound up in 
the most intimate fashion with the decay of the 
family.1
This sadness is a kind of sterility, it is a disavowal that 
is felt by the heart. This disavowal concerns the very con­
ditions of life. It affects the very color of existence. 
Marcel then considers nothing less than tragic the atomiza­
tion of the family brought on by the pressures of an in­
dustrialized and urbanized society.
The effects of the atomization of society include the 
tendency in man to isolate himself from others. This has 
probably encouraged the individual to look within, to become 
more introspective. In one sense it has accented the im­
portance of the individual, so the whole process has not 
been without some value. In an age when objectivity and 
externality have been overaccented perhaps this effect of 
"atomization" is a healthy kind of development. Without 
doubt, as man turns his thoughts inward, he becomes more 
existentially oriented. In many cases one's value system 
changes. So in one sense at least the process of atomization 
may carry its own antidote with it. The importance of 
things may decrease while the value of persons increase.
But on the other hand, as one observes the isolating 
and insulating effects of atomization he is made aware of 
the fact that in such a society the loss of ontological 
exigence may tend to multiply. Isolated individuals do not
^Ibid., p. 81.
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participate in being. Communication, communion, and com­
munity become a thing of the past. Hence the dehumanizing 
power of industrialization and urbanization is again apparent 
in all of its devitalizing ugliness.
Effects of Mechanization on Man
When the term mechanization is used it generally 
indicates the change which takes place between hand- 
operated functions and those same functions operated by 
machine. In this closing section the term will be broadened 
to include that which has happened to man as a result of his 
being submerged in a world of machinery. As machines have 
gradually taken over certain functions which man once per­
formed the status of man has comparably diminished. In ad­
dition to this loss man has suffered from becoming more 
mechanical himself. The value of man has experienced another 
drop as he is constantly being replaced with labor-saving 
devices. There is no question about the distinct advantage, 
work-wise, in the use of modern machinery; however, the time 
is far past when serious concern should surface in regard to 
its devastating influence on man.
A significant step was taken when machines and 
equipment became automatized. The labor and thought of man 
was further reduced as automatic controls took over the 
operation of the machines. These self-acting and self- 
regulating machines made the personal operator obsolete.
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Automatization has had a singular history all of its own in
the industrialization of America.
It is exactly this automatism which gives its peculiar 
stamp to our civilization and sets it apart from the 
techniques of other eras. It is automatism by which our 
technology achieves its growing perfection. Its sig­
nature is the independent and unchanging repetitious 
operation of its apparatus.1
Not only have mechanical work processes grown im­
mensely, both in number and scope, but it is apparent that 
their automatism, controlled and observed by man, in turn 
has had its influence on man. Often the power that man gains 
by his automatic tools ultimately gains power over him.
He is compelled to give them his thought and his at­
tention. Inasmuch as he works with automatic tools, 
his work becomes mechanical and repetitious with 
machinelike uniformity. Automatism clutches the op­
erator and never relinquishes its grip on him. To the 
consequences of this we shall return again and
a g a i n . 2
In more recent times the machine has not only been 
enhanced by automitization but its productive power has been 
multiplied by combining electronic know-how with its total 
operation. Amazing speed, unbelievable accuracy, and 
breadth of programming have transformed the simple machine 
into a mechanical man with power and comprehension that 
staggers the imagination. In the field of data processing, 
equipment has become so complex and efficient that it re­
minds one of gigantic minds in operation. The simulation of
Ji
•Ibid.. p .  3 5 .
uenger, The Failure of Technology, p. 3^*
2,
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man's mind has become so realistic that certain philosophers 
believe man's mind to be nothing more than a complex machine 
which processes millions of stimuli and responses per day. 
Gilbert Ryle, in his popular book Concept of Mind.̂  
strongly supports this view of man and mind. In fact, 
programmed computers in a totally^^redetermined manner seem 
to simulate thinking, selecting, choosing, and concluding.
From this glimpse into the process of mechanization 
one might catch an idea of how this technological 
"Frankenstein" developed. In the course of perfecting this 
monster, man has increasingly become its slave. In an in­
dustrial society the need for man and his labor at one level 
has decreased as sophisticated machines have increased in 
number and kind. Men now bow at the shrine of the mechanical 
gods of their own invention.
Marcel is genuinely concerned about the dehumanizing 
effects of mechanization. For a number of years this has 
been at the center of his thoughts. "To be men; to continue 
to remain men. These are the words on which I have concen-
ptrated unceasingly for twenty years." His love of life, 
his respect for persons and his high regard for human values 
shines through all his work.
^Gilbert Ryle. Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes
and Noble, Inc., 19^9/»
2Marcel, Human Dignity, p. 169.
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For centuries men have maintained an intellectual 
fascination with machines. They tend to give a presentiment 
of the uncanny and sometimes an almost unaccountable feeling 
of horror. This is the same type of horror that seized men 
on their first viewing of clocks, water mills, wheels of 
varying complexity, in fact in the presence of any contrivance 
which acts and moves though it has no life of its own. The 
onlooker is not satisfied to study just the mechanical ele­
ment nor to understand its operation; he becomes obsessed 
with mechanical action and at times even disquieted, for the 
motion produces the illusion of life.
The machine, however, gives the impression that some­
thing lifeless penetrates into, and permeates, life.
This is what the observer senses and what evokes in 
him ideas of age, coldness, death, akin to the aware­
ness of a lifeless, mechanically self-repeating time 
such as clockwork measures.^
When one observes the industrialization of society 
which has transpired over the past decades he is actually 
thinking of the process of mechanization. So much of man's 
work is with automatic tools that his entire function can be 
characterized as repetitious, with machinelike uniformity. 
Following the same pattern day in and day out does something 
to him. His thinking and feeling gradually follow the same 
mechanical bent. His temperament often becomes machinelike. 
This mechanization of life is the mill which grinds the in­
dividual down into nothing more than part of a faceless mass.
1Juenger, The Failure of Technoloev. p. 36.
22^
Even the countenance of these people bear the marks of ex­
pressionless, emotionless robots. Marcel describes their 
daily setting as that of being
— in a mechanized world, a world deprived of passion, 
a world in which the slave ceased to feel himself a 
slave, and perhaps even ceased to feel anything, and 
where the masters themselves became perfectly apathetic: 
I mean, where they no longer felt the greed and the 
ambition which are today the mainsprings of every con­
quest, whatever it may be.l
This is basically the hypothesis of those who imagine human
society as transformed into nothing more than a sort of ant
hill. Marcel feels that such a society is implicit in, and
that its appearance would be the logical outcome of, certain
given factors in the present society.
There are sectors of human life in the present world 
where the process of automatization applies not only, 
for instance, to certain definite techniques, but to 
what one would have formerly called the inner life, a 
life which today, on the contrary, is becoming as outer 
as possible.2
In a mechanized world man soon loses his sense of 
imagination, initiative, and creativity. His thinking has 
become so routinized that he breaks its fetters with a great 
deal of difficulty. Over the years the vast reservoir of 
creativity in mankind has continually diminished. The 
personal touch has often been lost. Joy and pride in indi­
vidual craftsmanship is nearly a thing of the past. Boredom 
is the end result. This is discernible on the faces of
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being, Vol. I, p. 30.
^Ibid.. pp. 30-31.
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those who trudge their weary way to and from work. In many
instances modern man views himself as nothing more than a
small cog in the industrial or commercial machine. His
dignity and sense of worthwhileness is gone. His life is a 
monotonous routine. The zest for living has vanished. He 
truly has experienced the loss of ontological exigence. His 
whole life and temperament have become machinelike. He
dwells amidst thousands of other robots who perfunctorily go 
through the motions of living. His schedules vary little 
from a programmed computer's. His automatic movements give 
evidence of the devastation wrought within. In some in­
stances the dehumanization is so advanced that he is little 
better than a modern zombie.
One might think the above picture a bit overdrawn, 
yet it is practically warranted by the deep inroads made by 
mechanization in the lives of human beings. Marcel aptly 
adds 5
The human machine, indeed, is conscious of itself as a 
machine, and to that extent it is more than a machine, 
but there is no more real creation with one than with 
the other. I may add, to keep the thread of my argu­
ment clear, that any functionalized activity is 
manifestly the lowest depth of degradation to which 
creative activity can descend; and I cannot stress 
too emphatically that the word 'fulfilment* can take on 
a positive meaning only from the point of view of 
creation.^
One should be reminded of the fact that from the human hand 
all things originate and into it they all return. In the end
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. II, p. 50-
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all mechanisms have evolved from and are controlled by man. 
Nonetheless, these inventions of man have sometimes become 
his master and he their slave. Consequently the demand that 
all that can be mechanized must be mechanized is not always 
a valid call. The technician is intent however, on extend­
ing the dominion of the machine after this method. One 
might reduce his argument to absurdity by asking the simple 
question if pedestrians should be abolished because there 
are mechanical conveyances that relieves one of walking?
Concluding Statement
The dehumanizing effects of industrialization are 
hard and ugly facts with which to reckon. Not only indi­
vidual man but society as a whole has been irreparably 
damaged. While Marcel does not give up all hope of recovery 
yet very realistically his outlook and mood are both one of 
foreboding. The development of industrial civilization 
with its technological accompaniment has confronted mankind 
with its most crucial spiritual test: how to preserve its
sense of being in the midst of a prevailing materialistic 
philosophy.
Marcel offers but one solution. The world, says he, 
is in need of the exorcising power that can only be found in 
love, love incarnate in man. "For to have exorcising power, 
action must be on the level of good will, that is to say.
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love of one's neighbour."^ So the problem simply stated is 
to know how one might struggle effectively against the 
crushing excesses of technology. Marcel feels that the only 
forces capable of checking this immense drift toward de­
humanization, brought on by technological excess, are
spiritual. "That these forces are spiritual nobody will 
2deny." In addition one should react with his whole 
strength against "that dissociation of life from spirit which 
a bloodless rationalism has brought about.Reiterating his 
original approach to a possible solution for the ever- 
spreading virus of dehumanization, Marcel suggests.
It is in gift, that is to say in grace, that there 
assuredly lies the only principle capable of breaking,
I will not say the world of the techniques in so far 
as they are admirable means to be used for the good of 
all, but those superstructures which threaten in the 
long run to stifle their beneficent power, because they 
are ordained to the triumph of pride which ultimately 
encompasses the destruction of the proud.^
^Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 20.
2
Ibid.. p. 20.
Ibid., p. 19* 5Ibid., p. 19*
CHAPTER VI
THE ULTIMA.TE IN DEHUMANIZATION:
DEGRADATION AND NIHILISM
With the emergence of the technological mentality, 
man has sustained a number of severe blows. As the tech­
niques of scientific analysis were applied to him, he ex­
perienced the individual loss of ontological exigence. As 
industrial civilization developed it brought about societal 
decay and the further depersonalization of man. In fact the 
degrading effects of technomania have permeated nearly every 
area of life. "One must fear that wherever the technocratic 
attitude of mind gains strength, so will this evil of de­
personalization."^ Even though the dehumanizing results have 
been devastating in the normal course of life, yet the ulti­
mate tragedy is usually observed during times of war and the 
following days of disillusionment. The depths to which the 
dehumanizing process can reach have been witnessed by those 
who experienced the degrading acts under the totalitarian 
regimes during and since World War II. The various
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. pp. 203-20*+.
229
230
techniques of degradation practiced with carnal skill during 
the past decades of war indicate the shocking limits to which 
the spirit of abstraction can lead. These evil workers 
utilized every possible means to degrade the person. Their 
goal was the complete degeneration of the individual being. 
Man as an object of manipulation has been reduced to little 
more than a beast.
The Basis of Degradation:
The Will to Power
Throughout the preceding chapters reference has been 
made occasionally to such concepts as mental imperialism and 
the will to power. These have been considered in relation­
ship to the technological mentality, that tendency to misuse 
legitimate technology by applying it to the realm of the 
personal. The technician seeks to have, to possess by his 
application of techniques. There is the ever-present tempta­
tion to discount the value of that which does not yield to 
his particular methodology. His contempt for the dimensions 
of concrete reality, which cannot be understood or controlled 
by his techniques, is a demonstration of the extension of the 
attitudes of imperialism to the mental plane. This however 
is not a mere intellectual process. Marcel maintains that 
the mistake involved in yielding to the spirit of abstraction 
and the resulting contempt of the concrete is of a passional 
nature. Here one sees a kind of reductionism, a devaluation 
of the real which apparently arises out of resentment.
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"Whatever resists our mental and physical attempts at pos­
session stands as judgment and a threat to the one whose
"jlife-orientation is toward having rather than being." In 
using these techniques of degradation to manipulate the 
bodies and minds of men there is some evidence of the triumph 
of a will to power which can be put into operation only when 
one ceases to regard man as being created in the image of 
God.
When man, under the Promethean impulse to possess and 
dominate the earth, ceases to use his technology under 
the guidance of charity and truth, human life is even­
tually degraded. It is to this situation that philos­
ophy addresses itself in our time, with an aim to 
keeping human life human.2
With the advent of collectivized thinking in recent 
times, especially as it applies to political philosophy 
fired by the will to power, to possess, and to control, man­
kind has entered a particularly dangerous era. Unscrupulous 
men of power, aided by every kind of technique, have at­
tempted to degrade those individuals who have come under 
their control. Not only as applied to political thinking 
and its implementation, but also as it is applied to the 
affairs of industrial civilization does the will to power 
appear as the chief motivation. "And we have seen that 
order, stability and truth are mortally compromised as soon 
as it is the will to power that predominates and turns the
l&een, Gabriel Marcel, p. 14-.
^Ibid.. p. 13.
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world into a factory.Following this it appears that the 
practical and the metaphysical problems merge into one.
So as modern man seeks to extend his power and con­
trol over other men as well as nature, he exemplifies what 
Nietzsche so vividly portrayed, the will to power.
Do you want a name for this universe, an answer to all 
these urgent riddles, a light even for yourselves, you 
of the fellest darkness, you the most secret, the 
strongest the most intrepid of all human spirits? This 
world is the world of the Will to Power and no other, 
and you yourselves, you are also the Will to Power, and 
nothing else.2
Nietzsche does not hesitate to identify the will to power as 
that which permeates all of nature, all the universe! He 
further indicates that man, as part of this universe, is 
caught-up in this self-same spirit— he the will to power.
The moving power of the universe is to possess, to control, 
to dominate. Herein one finds the rootage of the techniques 
of degradation.
As this spirit penetrates the nations of the world
the tendency is for them to unite in alliances in order to
obtain what they want. Marcel questions whether this kind of
unity could be considered a good, for as he views the world
split into two opposing ideologies he realizes they both
have the power to commit world suicide.
There is every reason to suppose that the kind of unity 
which makes the self-destruction of our world possible
'Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 55*
2Nietzsche, The Will to Power, quoted in Gabriel 
Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being, Vol. I, p. 32.
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(and by possible, I mean perfectly conceivable) can­
not be other than bad in itself, and it is easy to 
perceive where the badness lies. It is linked to the 
existence of a will to power which occurs under aspects 
that cannot be reconciled with each other, and which 
assume opposite ideological characters.1
Marcel feels that from the philosophical point of 
view, the fundamental question is whether it is a mere 
contingent fact that the will to power always presents this 
discordant character, or whether there is a necessary con­
nection between this discordance and the essential notion 
of the will to power itself. One should not be content with 
a mere analysis of the notion of the will to power, comparing 
that with the notion of discordance,
. . . but to reflect in the light of history, whose 
lessons, in this instance, have a strict coherence, on 
the inevitable destiny of alliances, which, when they 
are instituted for purposes of conquest, are inevitably 
fated, to dissolve and to transform themselves into 
enmities.2
Marcel suggests that history teaches one that when alliances 
are made for purposes of conquest (the will to power) they 
have always culminated in division and enmity. On the other 
hand he raises the possibility of a single conqueror gaining 
possession of the technical equipment capable of rendering 
rebellion and opposition futile. Based on slavery and terror 
it is conceivable that such a government might last for an 
indefinite period. Even so, he reflects, such a government 
would only be another form of the state of war and a very
^Marcel, The Mvsterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 29.
^Ibid.. p. 29.
23^
odious one at that. In fact the victor in such a case is 
always
a certain group of men in the midst of whom there must 
always arise the same sort of rupture which, as we 
have seen, always menaces alliances: so that at the 
end of the day, it is still to war, and to war in a 
more obvious form than that of a perpetual despotism, 
that the triumphant will to power is likely to lead.l
His apparent conclusion is that the will to power always
(necessarily) is accompanied by discordance, whether among
allied countries or ultimately within the camp of a single
conqueror. Therefore, the will to power when prompted by
wrong motives always leads to discord and degradation. This
seemingly holds true in the ordinary world (a world at
peace) or in a world at war. In both instances there can be
noted the "pillage which is inseparable from its reckless
and ruthless squandering of men and material.
It has been pointed out that the basis of degradation 
is found in the will to power. But one should realize that 
the will to power is simply the end product of the spirit of 
abstraction. When man is reduced to nothing more than an 
object of manipulation, whether by a technician or political 
leader, the process of degradation is well on its way.
Coupled with evil design and a will to power the unscrupulous 
leader hastens the dehumanization of his subjects. Likewise 
the technician, driven by a strong desire to conquer all
^Ibid., p. 30.
5■Juenger, The Failure of Technoloev. p. 201.
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before him by his abstractive methods of analysis, reduces 
man to the status of all other things. So a will to power 
both in men and nations ultimately leads to degradation.
Techniques of Degradation in 
the Ordinary World
In considering the various ways, methods, and means 
used by man to degrade his fellows Marcel has chosen the 
term technique to designate this action. In fact he has 
entitled a whole chapter in one of his recent books "Tech­
niques of Degradation.The term ordinary world as used in 
this section indicates the modern, industrialized world when 
not at war nor under the heel of a dictatorship. Marcel ap­
plies the word degradation to any result which tends to limit 
man in realizing his highest potential as a person. More 
particularly he uses it to indicate the most extensive 
degree of personal deterioration found in modern man. So one 
can see that it may be applied to the depersonalizing aspects 
of the ordinary world as well as to the dehumanizing effects 
as seen under totalitarian regimes and the world at war. In 
the less intense use of the word as applied to the ordinary 
world Marcel suggests.
Where there is creation there can be no degradation, 
and to the extent that technics are creative, or imply 
creativity, they are not degrading in any way. De­
gradation begins at the point where creativeness falls
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. Chap. III.
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into self-imitation and seIf-hypnotism, stiffening and 
falling back on itself.'
On the other hand, when Marcel uses the term de­
gradation in the stronger sense of the word he is referring 
in part to the type of philosophy espoused by Sartre.
I have recently surprised and even scandalised some of 
Sartre’s followers by classifying his philosophy among 
the 'techniques of vilification,' by which I mean 
techniques which result, whether deliberately or not, 
in the systematic vilification of man.^
Superficially, this seems to be a paradox for does not Sartre 
constantly exalt man and his freedom in the face of the 
radical absurdity of the universe? One must not forget, 
however, that the Fascist dictatorships, whether in Germany, 
Italy, or elsewhere, similarly exalted the people and of­
fered them a cheap adulation filled with a"hidden contempt. 
This can be seen in the abject depth to which they ulti­
mately reduced many of their citizens. Etymologically, to 
vilify a thing means to destroy its value, and this is pre­
cisely what Marcel means when he speaks of degrading man in 
the strong sense of the term.
Fully recognizing that one observes the techniques 
of degradation in their most obviously shocking aspects in 
totalitarian states and during times of war, Marcel further 
concludes, "we shall have to push our analysis much farther
'Marcel, Existentialism, pp. 33-3^»
Zfbid., p. 85.
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if we are to recognize how firmly these techniques have
taken root in our ordinary world today.
In fact, Marcel believes that one extremely general
fact appears to dominate the contemporary situation. Men
have entered what he calls the eschatological age. By this
term he simply means that man is in possession of the power
whereby he can commit racial suicide if he so desires. He
feels that the atom bomb is a "symbolic summary of a given
2state of affairs." These words not only signify the 
portentousness of world-wide, total war, but also a situation 
in the ordinary world wherein man has been captivated by his 
own techniques. In spite of the many desacralizing tenden­
cies today, man has maintained a healthy reaction against 
the horrors of personal degradation witnessed in two world 
wars and the uneasy peace following. This indicates a deep 
and spontaneous sense of piety towards life, which is indeed 
hopeful in spite of the multitudinous acts against its 
sacredness as seen in time of war. Unfortunately, these acts 
against man himself are not confined to war times, but are 
to be seen in varying, if less intense, forms in ordinary 
life.
The situation of the worker is signalized by his 
dependence on machinery and organization. It is sig­
nalized by the absence of reserves on which he could 
fall back. He is reduced to the sale of his bare
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Societv. p. ^9*
^Ibid.. p. 76.
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working capacity, and he must sell it unceasingly and 
unstintingly if he wants to live. He has no funds to 
guarantee him peace of mind, leisure, or even an ex­
tended vacation. This already existing pattern of so- 
called normal, civilian life, simply gets incorporated 
into the pattern of total war.
Moreover, on the everyday scene, there is a concrete 
relationship which develops between technical processes and 
human beings. Since a technique is something that one can 
acquire it can be compared to a possession like a habit, 
which is basically a technique. "And we can at once see that 
if a man can become the slave of his habits, it is equally
probable that he can become the prisoner of his tech-
2niques." Oftentimes for the man who invents the technique
it becomes more than just a means to an end. He can become
so absorbed in it, obsessed by it, that it becomes an end in
itself. All technical progress implies a certain moral and
intellectual outlay which betrays itself by a feeling of
power or pride. Such feelings are the natural accompaniment
of inventive activity.
What we are noticing here is the passage from the realm 
of the technical, properly so called, to that of a 
kind of idolatry of which technical products become the 
object or at least the occasion. And if we follow out 
this line of reflection, we can see that even this kind 
of idolatry can degenerate into something worse; it can 
become autolatrv. worship of oneself.3
^Juenger, The Failure of Technoloev. pp. I8O-I8I. 
2Marcel, Ifan Against Mass Societv. p. 8 3 .
^Ibid., p. 8 .̂
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So technology can assume the character of technolatry, and 
as such it can easily degenerate into an idolatry of the
r
product it creates. This may be seen as man worshiping his 
own man-made gods, the elevation of gadgetry to the status of 
the divine. Man thus becomes degraded to nothing more than 
a subject or slave. Perhaps seIf-enslavement is of the 
lowest kind. The transformation that takes place in this 
area seems to have deep metaphysical significance for in 
worshiping the products of his own hand, man has experienced 
a comparable weakening of the sense of the sacred.
It appears quite obvious that there is no technical
process which is not either actually or potentially at the
service of some human desire or fear. "We can say that all
techniques exist in relation to man, in so far as man is
moved by desire or f e a r . M a r c e l  hastens to say that this
world of desire and fear is that of the problematic. At
this point he is interested in reinstating the notion of
mystery in opposition to the notion of problem. In contrast
to the world of the problematic which is wholly apart from a
person and in front of one, the world of mystery is the
place of one's total commitment.
As soon as we postulate the notion of mystery, we abolish 
that frontier between what lies in the self and what 
lies before the self, a frontier which, as we saw just 
now, could be thrust back or restored to a former po­
sition, but without ever ceasing to reconstitute itself 
at every moment of reflection.2
^Ibid.. p. 89. ^Ibid.. p. 90.
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These observations are very germane to the problem at hand. 
For the inroads made in these days by techniques cannot fail 
to suggest for man the obliteration and the progressive ef­
facement of his world of mystery which is at once a world of 
presences and of hope.
It is not sufficient merely to say that, at the level 
of mystery, man's desires and fears, which lie behind 
his technical achievements, are lifted up beyond any 
assignable limit; we must add that human nature is 
tending to become more and more incapable of raising 
itself above desire and fear in their ordinary state, 
and of reaching in prayer or contemplation a state 
that transcends all earthly vicissitudes.'
The term earthly here is significant and revealing. For the 
perfecting of techniques is apparently making man more and 
more earthly. And the more he becomes riveted to the earth, 
the more of a tendency he will have to multiply his tech­
niques so as to assure him a better grip upon it. The more 
earthbound he becomes the less appreciation he will have for 
persons and things spiritual. The more abstract-oriented he 
becomes the less he will tend to seek the concrete values of 
life. Such is the degrading pattern he follows as he pursues 
the world of technical processes.
As Marcel contemplates on these distressing develop­
ments he notes a number of ensuing results which are quite 
disturbing. First, but not necessarily foremost, is the loss 
of feeling for living reality as seen in the lowering birth-- 
rate in all countries of so-called advanced civilization.
Ibid. , p. 92.
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The excessive development of techniques in these countries 
is tending to superimpose on life an almost factitious 
superstructure, and this superstructure is becoming for men 
in general the familiar background that they cannot do with­
out. If one is to understand the gap which has developed 
between the generations he must take note of the fact that 
life is being less and less felt as a gift to be handed on, 
and more and more felt as a kind of growing calamity like a 
flood, against which dykes should be built.
There is nothing really ridiculous in the assertion 
that the growingly general use of techniques of birth- 
prevention is only one aspect of a very widespread 
impingement of techniques upon realms from which, 
until recently, they were almost shut out.1
Marcel feels that a technical world with a negative attitude 
toward life, is heading for sure despair. For by the very 
nature of such a world it can offer no help where techniques 
are useless--such as the problem of death. For such a world, 
the appearance of death could be little more than the "fling­
ing on the scrap heap of a being that has ceased to be of
service--and that no longer is anything, the moment it is no
2longer of any use." This now brings one to the nub of 
Marcel's argument. It is now possible to understand how 
techniques, which to start with seemed neutral in relation 
to human values, can become techniques of and for sin. In 
fact, Marcel would call them techniques in thé service of 
sin.
^Ibid., p. 9̂ . ^Ibid.. pp. 9'+-95*
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Man appears to be proceeding on a direct road toward 
the laying utterly bare of his human condition and all its 
implications. This human condition, whatever may be the 
foundation on which it ultimately rests, seems to be de­
pendent on the manner in which it is understood. It is be­
coming more and more obvious.
. . . that when man seeks to understand his condition 
by using as his model the products of his own technical 
skill, he infinitely degrades himself and condemns 
himself to deny, that is, in the end to destroy those 
deep and basic sentiments which for thousands of years 
have guided his conduct.1
Perhaps an explanatory word should be given in refer­
ence to Marcel's use of the term sin in the foregoing para­
graphs. His use of it is not to be construed in its theo­
logical sense, but in a broader philosophical perspective.
In this light Marcel would consider any act or acts against 
the sacredness of life as sin. This could include anything 
from the technician's gradual erosive work on the being of 
man to the indiscriminate bombing of innocent women and 
children during war. Regardless of the method or means, that 
which tends to degrade the sense of being in man is to Marcel 
a sin.
It is from this extremely general and even meta­
physical point of view that one must view the problem of the 
relationships between technical progress and sin, between 
technical progress and the degradation leading to the
llbid.. p. 98.
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dehumanization of man. Perhaps the excessive development of 
techniques during the last century is accountable in part at 
least, for the degradation visited upon man, culminating in 
the widespread dehumanization observed in the ordinary world.
Techniques of Degradation in 
the Totalitarian World
In the foregoing section an attempt was made to give 
a meaningful definition of the word "degradation" in its less 
intense usage by Marcel. This is the sense in which it is 
used when applied to the ordinary world. Now as the dis­
cussion focuses on the world of totalitarianism and later 
on the world at war, the more intense usage of the term 
degradation is signified. Marcel clearly delineates the 
meaning of the term in this stronger sense:
Perhaps it might be useful here to make a sort of pre­
liminary attempt at definition: in a restricted
sense, I understand by 'techniques of degradation' a 
whole body of methods deliberately put into operation 
in order to attack and destroy in human persons belong­
ing to some definite class or other their self-respect, 
and in order to transform them little by little into 
mere human waste products, conscious of themselves as 
such, and in the end forced to despair of themselves, 
not merely at an intellectual level, but in the very 
depths of their souls.1
When the term totalitarian is used it signifies the 
forming into one mass all the segments of a given group.
More particularly, in the last few decades its use has been 
somewhat limited to a given approach to government which 
encompasses all departments in one. This type of government
^Ibid.. p. 42.
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is highly centralized, under the control of a political 
group which recognizes no other political parties, and is 
typified by such national governments as in Fascist Italy or 
Germany under the Nazi regime. The concept of totalitarian­
ism can be seen in the all-embracing and undisputed rule of 
one political party. In this instance the state becomes the 
party. This particular form of government tends to be dic­
tatorial, arbitrary, severe, and makes a god out of the state 
itself.
A totalitarian regime can only be formed from face­
less and isolated individuals. Its individuals are similar 
to isolated atoms with no strong sense of identity. They 
enjoy no feeling of belonging. The group has been atomized. 
No participation in being or community are experienced.
Under dictatorial regimes of this type one can easily note 
the systematic effort of the government to reduce the person 
to a manipulable unit. Under these circumstances the masses 
can be formed.
But in point of fact the masses exist and develop 
(following laws which are fundamentally purely mechan­
ical) only at a level far below that at which intel­
ligence and love are possible. Why should this be so? 
Because the masses partake of the human only in a de­
graded state, they are themselves a degraded state of 
the human.^
In line with Marcel's thought one ought to dismiss any idea 
that the masses are educable. This is a contradiction in 
terms. Only an individual is educable, or more precisely a
^Ibid.. p. 10.
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person. Individuals in this mass state of abasement and
alienation cease to think as individuals. On this level they
are subject to training only. Regimentation is the order of
the day. Individual thinking is submerged in the mass mind.
One mark of that state is that the masses are of their 
very essence--I repeat, of their verv essence— the 
stuff of which fanaticism is made: propaganda has on
them the convulsive effect of an electrical shock. It 
arouses them not to life, but to that appearance of 
life which particularly manifests itself in riots and 
revolutions.̂
It is quite common on the occasion of riots and revolutions 
for the very dregs of the populace to rise to the surface 
and take command of the situation. Mass impulses to violence 
crystallize on the lowest levels in such a society.
It is enlightening to note the connection which tech­
nical development bears to the totalitarian movement. The 
spirit of abstraction is basic in the causal relationship 
which exists between advancing techniques and the developing 
oetupus of totalitarianism:
I wish only to draw attention to the inevitable 
effect of all this upon mental attitudes. I admit that 
it is difficult to judge with certainty of a process 
which is still developing. But in observing those 
around us it is hard not to conclude that, as I have 
tried to show elsewhere, the spirit of abstraction is 
gradually taking hold of human beings and alienating 
them increasingly from the sense of life and living 
realities, while at the same time it makes of them a 
field which is dangerously favourable to the growth of 
totalitarian ideologies.2
^Ibid., p. 10.
2 1 _Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, p. 4-y
2k6
Marcel points out that the spirit of abstraction, in which 
the concrete values of life are absent, provides a ready 
field for the inception of totalitarian seed. Technology 
binds and sets free at one and the same time. It tends to 
emancipate human thought from most transcendentals, but at 
the same time it confines this thought to that which is 
practical and mechanical. One might say, with some accuracy, 
that technological thinking tends to be collectivistic. But 
collectivistic thinking presupposes the individual, those 
who are freed and cleansed from conflicting considerations 
so that they will give themselves unreservedly to the collec­
tive. "Technology has no objection to the individual as 
such, so long as he surrenders unconditionally to the tech­
nical organization.
With every act of mechanization, technology drives 
the wedge of its causal mechanism deeper into the 
state. Every expansion of technology drives the wedge 
of its causal mechanism deeper into the state. Every 
expansion of technology brings new infiltrations of 
mechanistic thought that change the very essence of 
the state.2
In totalitarian governments, those who are grasping 
for power make it their aim to utilize the power demon­
strated through technology. Marcel speaks directly of this 
unholy partnership in stating that there is "a tendency for 
a sinister alliance to be concluded between the masters of
ljuenger, The Failure of Technology, p. 105*
^Ibid.. p. 106.
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scientific technique and the men who are working for com-
•1plete state-control."
What happens to the individual person in such a 
state? Marcel suggests that the human powers that make up 
one's life no longer sustain any practical distinction be­
tween the person and the abstract individual whose par­
ticulars can be listed on the few sheets of an official 
dossier. This strange reduction of a personality to an of­
ficial identity must have an inevitable effect on the way one 
is forced to grasp himself. Under these circumstances, what 
happens to one's inner life? In what way does a person think 
of himself after being pushed around from pillar to post, 
ticketed, docketed, and classified? Perhaps he experiences 
a social nudity, a social stripping, in effect a dehumaniza­
tion. Marcel observes that one might compare the state of a 
man in his social nakedness, stripped by society of all 
personal protections, to that of a man who finds himself thus 
exposed to the observation of an omnipresent and omniscient 
God of evil intent:
This comparison is all the more necessary and important 
because the Moloch State of totalitarian countries does 
tend to confer on itself a sort of burlesque analogue 
of the Divine prerogatives. Only the essential is 
lacking (that is to say, the State is not in fact God, 
or a God), and this fundamental lack lies at the basis 
of the evils from which any society must suffer that 
seeks to enchain itself by submitting to the yoke of 
the Moloch State.2
^Marcel, The Mysterv of Being. Vol. I, p. 41.
^Ibid.. p. 37.
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He concludes by stating that the common factor in the two 
different types of nakedness--nakedness under the eyes of the 
State, nakedness under the eyes of God— is without question 
fear. In the presence of God, this fear has a note of 
reverence, sacredness, and adoration. This kind of an 
emotional response can do nothing but ennoble and upgrade 
man. However, in the case of nakedness under the eyes of the 
state, true adoration is impossible unless it attaches it­
self to the person of a leader and then it is pure . 
fanaticism. A clear example of this can be recalled in the 
hysterical cult which surrounded Hitler, making him the 
fanatical center of attention.
Furthermore, it is all too clear that the state of 
continuous registration from birth to death can only be 
realized in the bosom of an anonymous bureaucracy. Such a 
bureaucracy cannot hope to inspire any other sentiment than 
a vague fear, similar to that which grips many individuals 
as they are forced to deal with some impersonal government 
official who identifies himself with his job. The workings 
of this administrative machine is better felt than contem­
plated.
Thus it is quite natural that, in countries where a 
bureaucratic system prevails, there should be a tendency 
towards the general bureaucratization of life; that is 
to say, really, towards the abandonment of concrete and 
creative activities in favour of abstract, depersonalized, 
uncreative tasks and even— one could illustrate this
2̂ -9
point easily--an active opposition to all kinds of 
creativity.*
When the Moloch state is looked to in the sense of an all-
powerful being, a god, who is the dispenser of all good, it
is asking to be treated as a creator or father. Marcel, in
using the term Moloch has introduced a graphic representation
of the state. Moloch was a Semitic deity whose worship was
accompanied by human sacrifice. To this he likens the
totalitarian state that demands all from its subjects.
It is true that the State in our time, even in countries 
where it has not reached the totalitarian phase, has 
become more and more the engrosser and dispenser of all 
sorts of favours, which must be snatched from it by 
whatever means are available, including even blackmail.
In this respect the State is. properly comparable to a 
God, but to the God of degraded cults on whom the 
sorcerer claims to exercise his magic powers.2
In such a totalitarian state certain techniques of 
degradation must be used by the leaders to control their 
subjects. One of the most oft-used and effective such tools 
is that of propaganda,. Perhaps one should say the misuse of 
propaganda. Marcel agrees that the term propaganda should 
not have an evil or derogatory connotation. Modern use of 
the term tends to color it with evil motivations, and not 
without reason. But in the strict sense of the word, 
propaganda indicates any organized or concerted group effort 
to disseminate doctrines or information. As such, it is a 
perfectly legitimate pursuit and ought not to be classified 
among the techniques of degradation. There is, however, a
^Ibid.. pp. 38-39. ^Ibid., p. 39*
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close kinship between propaganda and the techniques of de­
gradation. Of its very nature it is easily corrupted. More­
over, in recent times propaganda has become a method not 
only of persuasion but sometimes of seduction as well. As 
long as one employs propaganda for a good cause and in a 
forthright manner he cannot be guilty of seduction or cor­
ruption. But when the cause is backed by an evil purpose 
and the methods become underhanded then the misuse of 
propaganda is immediately in evidence.
But we get a much more dangerous situation when 
propaganda moves out of its original orbit; when it 
ceases to be exercised on behalf of a number of com­
peting movements and parties within the State, and 
instead is taken over by the State itself; when the 
State, in short, begins to behave as if it were itself 
a movement or a party.1
Recent history bears out the fact that the scourage called
the single party prepares the way for the further application
of state propaganda. The single party appears to be the
common root from which modern dictatorships spring and from
which they flourish. Marcel's comment is in order when he
suggests that "It is in this connection, I think, that the
kinship between propaganda and the techniques of degrada-
2tion can be seen most clearly."
There are those who might raise a voice of objection 
by saying that propaganda does not aim at degrading those on 
whom it has its effect. Perhaps this is true up to a point.
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 0̂.
^Ibid., p. 50.
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but in spite of everything that can be said to the contrary, 
as misused by dictatorships, "is not the real and deep 
purpose of propaganda after all that of reducing men to a 
condition in which they lose all capacity for individual re- 
action"? The indication is that such propagandizers hold 
in basic contempt the individuals under their control. 
Dictators presume they can think for the masses while in 
effect they are usurping the rights of the individual. What 
greater miscarriage of justice can be found than that of a 
leader controlling, managing and censoring public informa­
tion before it reaches the people. One must hold a cheap if 
not degraded view of man to thus participate in such a 
misuse of propaganda.
If we really attach any value at all to what a man is 
in himself, to his authentic nature, how can we assume 
the responsibility of passing him through the 
flattening-out machinery of propaganda?
What we ought to enquire into, however, is the 
nature of this contempt. There are, of course, fine 
shades of distinction that analysis ought to bring out: 
but is there any essential difference between the at­
titude of someone like Goebbels, for instance, and 
that of a chief of Communist propaganda?^
In such cases as have been cited one is faced with a radical
and cynical refusal on the part of leaders to recognize the
competence of the individual's judgment. And one might add
that the sense of truth is gradually destroyed in those who
assume the task of manipulating opinion. No doubt it would
require a high degree of simple-mindedness in a professional
llbid.. p. 50. ^Ibid.. p. 51-
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propagandist for him to continue to believe that his truth 
was the whole truth. This kind of naiveté is to be found in 
a fanatic or renegade, or both. Thus when playing his role 
the propagandist of evil intent is not so much interested 
in the truth as he is in exploiting the weaknesses of 
others.
Effective propaganda, in short, is a matter of recon­
noitring and exploiting as skilfully as possible the 
weaknesses of the enemy's position, while at the same 
time as little as possible giving the enemy the feel­
ing that he is an enemy, that one is fighting him.1
Another technique of degradation often used by 
totalitarian governments, but not exclusively by them, is 
blackmail. Marcel sees this as being closely associated with 
propaganda. For example, when one government allows the 
results of its research in the field of extremely toxic sub­
stances to be broadcast, implying that the world's population 
could easily be wiped-out with a few pounds of the same, 
then there appears to be real purpose in the release of such 
facts. Marcel insightfully concludes.
Its purpose, in a word, was intimidation. We are in the 
presence here of blackmail on a world scale.
It may be said that such blackmail is obviously a 
reaction to blackmail from another quarter: blackmail
more veiled possibly, but just as threatening.2
The use of blackmail and intimidation on a world-wide scale
is reprehensible, but when utilized to keep one's own
populace in fear it becomes a greater crime. Under such
circumstances the individual loses his own dignity, begins
^Ibid.. p. 52. ^Ibid.. p. 78.
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to question his own activity and loses faith in his fellow 
man. The degradation of the individual is thus accelerated.
Marcel feels that one ought not to close his eyes to 
certain disturbing occurrences of the past. He points to the 
experiments that numerous Nazi doctors made with live 
prisoners as a case in point. These doctors made use of 
human merchandise which their tyrants made available to them. 
Being a researcher does not exclude such frightful and 
sinister practices. While one might console himself that at 
least in the world today scientists tend to foreswear such 
aberrations, yet no one can predict what might happen to­
morrow. For example,
The population development might possibly lead to a 
radical degradation of, and disregard for, human 
existence; the latter could become so devaluated that 
people might consider it superfluous to surround it 
with precautionary measures and the respect it now 
enjoys.̂
The history of the recent past is replete with the 
facts that totalitarian regimes have been wracked with gov­
ernment inspired violence. Purges have been the order of 
the day, developing from mistrust of one's own colleagues. 
Leaders have been so depraved and degraded as to plan and 
execute their own best, but rival, friends. The lust for 
power and wealth has completely obliterated the value of the 
person. Intrigue and murder have been the expected. These 
methods have been turned on the population as a whole and
 ̂Marcel, Searchings. p, 37*
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they have consequently lived in constant fear of torture and 
death. The despicable and degrading methods of the German 
Gestapo as well as the Communist MVD are cases in point.
The value of the person under these regimes is next to noth­
ing. Individuals are often relegated to the class of 
merchandise. Whole blocks of minority groups have been 
marked methodically for extermination. Tyranny and servitude 
follow in the wake of such activity. There is a reciprocal 
effect on both the master and slave. Both become less than 
human in the degrading process. Under such circumstances 
how can man maintain a sense of being, of being a person?
The answer is all too obvious, he cannot!
One cannot overemphasize the fact that the crisis 
which Western man has undergone and is undergoing today is a 
metaphysical one. It will be necessary for more than some 
readjustment of social or institutional conditions to mollify 
the disquiet which rises from the very depths of man's being. 
The problem is multiplied in totalitarian countries. There, 
all the techniques of modern man are joined by the evil 
designs of corrupt leaders to bring about the complete de­
humanization and thus subjugation of man.
Techniques of Degradation 
in a Warring World
In all probability, the depths to which human de­
gradation can reach were thoroughly explored during and since 
the last two World Wars. The extent to which man is capable
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of going in his carnal manipulation of the bodies and minds 
of fellow human beings is well nigh unbelievable. The 
planned attempts to bring man to the level of beasthood 
proved all too successful. The concentration camps of World 
War II stand as evidence of the degree of degradation and 
depersonalization that man can be driven by the carnal skill 
of evil leaders.
While the techniques of degradation can best be ob­
served in their intensity as used against the condemned 
minorities in World War II, yet their widespread effects can 
best be seen in the wanton bombings of countless thousands of 
innocent women and children during the hostilities. War is 
a kind of racial madness or insanity^ It is an irrational 
approach by leaders who desire to bring under their sway 
the masses of people and wealth of the earth. Of course 
there remains the exception of those persons who are at­
tacked by aggressors and are fighting a purely defensive bat­
tle. The matter of what consists a purely defensive struggle 
may be debatable. The massive power which dictators and 
other warring leaders are able to bring to bear against 
their opponents has been made possible through modern tech­
nology.
Technical progress and conduct of war today are merging. 
We have reached a state of affairs where the technical 
potential of a state is the determining factor in the 
event of war. Superior technology means victory, 
inferior technology means defeat; that is the briefest
2^6
possible formula to which a definite phase of tech­
nical progress can be reducedJ
This equation forces all modern states to support, speed-up, 
and push relentlessly their program for technical perfec­
tion. The modern state, for its own self-preservation, must 
subject everything else to technical automatism. The term 
modern state is primarily used in reference to the world 
_powers. Lesser nations must look to them for protection, 
which in turn rests on sophisticated equipment developed 
through scientific technology. Since the technical potential 
is decisive in war it is now considered a form of armament.
"Technically organized work becomes preparation for war; its
2connection with war becomes constantly more unmistakable." 
Even political propagandists make it their task to inces­
santly point to the war-making potential contained in their 
technological laboratories.
Marcel exhibits a deep concern lest the lessons of 
the gruesome past be soon forgotten. Lest man, insulated by 
the passing of time, forgets the perilous possibilities 
within himself to destroy his fellow beings:
Speaking in the most general fashion, I do think 
that after the terrible events which have been devastat­
ing our human world it is absolutely necessary to draw 
up some sort of human balance sheet. With this purpose 
in mind, we should put to the best use the sort of 
uneasy truce which is now all that is left to us; a
ljuenger. The Failure of Technologv. p. 181.
^Ibid.. p. 182.
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truce for that matter which perhaps cannot be main­
tained for very long."I
From this statement by Marcel one can quickly catch the 
sense of apprehension with which he views the present status 
of world affairs. He feels that the present period of un­
easy peace among the world powers is but a breathing spell, 
a forerunner, of further acts of violence of man against 
man. This is to say in a tragic sense that history itself 
is but "a wav of forgetting, or, to put it more flatly, of 
losing that real contact with the event for the lack of which 
historical narrative so often reduces itself to a simple ab-
pstracting naming of events." He continues by expressing 
astonishment at the extraordinary reluctance men show to 
learn from the lessons of the past.
Marcel insists that the philosopher has a special 
function in times like these,
I think that one of the duties of a philosopher, 
if he shows himself worthy of his vocation to-day, is 
to attack quite directly those dissimulating forces 
which are all working towards what might be called the 
neutralization of the past; and whose conjoint effect 
consists in arousing in contemporary man a feeling of 
what I should like to call insulation in time,3
Especially since the turn of the past century a 
growing war mentality has gripped the nations of the world.
It appears that the leaders, more particularly those of 
totalitarian governments, have come to the conclusion that
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 38.
^Ibid.. p. 38. 3lbid.. p. 39.
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the problems of the world can only be settled by armed con­
flict. Threats, ultimatums, international intrigue, and 
blackmail seems to be the order of the day. Perhaps the 
possession of new powerful weapons coupled with the im­
perialistic designs of growing nations can account for part 
of this approach.
Juenger graphically describes the situation thus:
Titanic elemental forces captured in marvelous engines 
are straining against pistons and cylinder walls as 
crankshafts are moving and deliver an even flow of 
power. All the elements are racing and raging through 
the jails of man-made apparatus . . . And all these 
noises are malignant, shrill, shrieking, tearing, ■ 
roaring, howling in character. And they grow more 
malignant as the technology approaches perfection 
. . .  as do the siren, those sirens whose mighty me­
chanical screams announce the approach of bombers.1
If this description of World War II horror is frightening,
what might it be in this age of gases, germs, drugs, guided
missies, and multiple hydrogen warheads?
Juenger further observes that there is an alliance
between perfected technology and government-organized war:
Technology, indeed, is willing, it is even eager to 
serve for destruction because it itself is brimful with 
destructive forces. Once we have grasped the fact that 
mechanization has its counterpart in the invasion of 
our civilization by elementary forces, the constantly 
closer connection between government by technology and 
government-organized war becomes quite clear.2
Marcel points to the innumerable crimes of which the 
wholly innocent were victims during the last war, of the
^Juenger, The Failure of Technology, pp. 123-12^.
^Ibid., p. 128.
2^9
children who died in concentration camps and in bombing 
raids, of the needless slaughter made possible by block­
busting bombs. "To me, it seems very difficult to find any 
sort of sort of argument that can even attempt to excuse 
this general crime against human l i f e . M a r c e l  concludes 
that the evil propensities within man plus the technical 
skill to implement and actualize his evil thoughts make for 
an apocalyptic world-outlook.
The growing notion that human life is cheap and ex­
pendable fits in with the traditional German view that might 
makes right. The Nazi war machine of World War II is an 
illustration in point. Something is drastically wrong with 
any value system when the death of an individual or the 
merciless torturing of the same goes by unnoticed. Marcel 
believes that the technological notion of the world leads 
people to arrogate to themselves the right to manipulate life 
since it doesn't have those sacral qualities one discovers 
through a theocentric perspective. Since life is expendable, 
one can extinguish it like a candle with little compunction 
of conscience. Even murder is gradually losing the stigma 
attached to it in the Ten Commandments. "Doubtless we can 
trace the trend to the terrible mass murders that were per-
ppetrated during the two World Wars and the pogroms." Think­
ing in this vein Marcel mentions that one is tempted to
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 79- 
2Marcel, Searchings. p. 49.
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speak in stock market jargon about a "devastating 'drop' in 
the price of life.""'
Marcel relates the incident of a famous French
palaeontologist while dilating on his confidence in world
progress was confronted with the fact of the millions of
wretches slowly dying in Soviet labor camps. His comment was
blasphemous: "What are a few million men in relation to the
immensity of human history"?^ Commenting further on this
statement Marcel adds,
Thinking in terms of millions and multiples of millions, 
he could no longer conceive, except in terms of 'cases', 
of abstractions, of the unspeakable and intolerable 
reality of the suffering of the single person--a suffer­
ing literally masked from him by the mirage of numbers.3
It appears that in the European countries which have
stood the ravages of two World Wars as well as numerous
revolutions with their fearful consumption of human lives, a
devaluation of life has come about in somewhat the same sense
that one might speak of a currency devaluation. Marcel
speaks from his experience:
I recall the comment of a well-known general, made in 
the presence of a relative of mine who was a General 
Staff Officer, on the day after a bloody offensive 
action during the first World War : 'Men are replace­
able. ' Scandalous, and even sacrilegious words, for in 
fact a human individual is precisely that which is not 
replaceable.̂
^Ibid., p. ^9.
2Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 264-. 
^Ibid., p. 264.
^Marcel, Human Dignity, pp. 138-139»
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He speaks of a pervading materialism which has all hut en­
veloped the present world culture. It is the same mental 
mood that has succeeded in introducing a merchandising dis­
tinction between wholesale and retail into the realm of human 
values, a domain from which it should have been forever ex­
cluded. The dehumanizing aspects of these degrading ten­
dencies and their attendant implications for the future of 
man present a bleak picture indeed.
The lowest rung on the descending ladder of human 
degradation is now a matter of record. In the concentration 
camps of World War II systematic efforts took place to de­
grade man and reduce him to a condition where his animal 
instincts were in control. In this process one could witness 
"the most dramatic and demonic evidence of the disintegration 
of the substance of modern life"^ to be found anywhere.
We need not think only of the systematic horrors per­
petrated by the Nazis and Communists on the souls and 
bodies of men with the aid of techniques of degradation 
developed to diabolical perfection, nor of the threat 
of a nuclear war which a torpid and thing-ified humanity 
fatalistically awaits, but of seemingly lesser yet 
omnipresent and insidious influences like the tides of 
propaganda by which all countries relentlessly subvert 
the minds of their subjects, or of the incredible 
sensationalistic trivializing and cheapening of life 
which is progressively produced by the mass media of 
every variety. When life is- reduced to a dirty joke for 
masses of men, a concrete philosophy must testify for 
the universal which each man carries beneath the scoria 
of his outer existence.2
p. 129.
1Kingston, French Existentialism, p. 12.
^Gallagher, The Philosonhv of Gabriel Marcel.
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In referring to the Nazis concentration camps, Marcel 
clearly states, "We are here in the presence of the most 
monstrous collective crime in history; only poisoned and 
poisonous imagination could have conceived it in the first 
place." Yet he is overwhelmed by the thought of the count­
less executive agents who were absolutely necessary as ac­
complices if the insane idea became a working reality.
Various and devious methods were used by the Germans 
to invade the privacy of the individual and to crush him as 
a person. The perverted use of surgery was a common prac­
tice on the victims of the camps.
To realize this, we need only think of the experiments 
on the brain and of the psychic alterations they seem 
able to provoke. In such cases we are witnessing the 
constant and widespread violation of privacy which is 
without question one of the most alarming features of 
the present world.2
The widespread use of truth serum constituted another
invasion of one's privacy. Through the manipulation of the
human organism and its chemistry these beastly torturers
proceeded to violate the sanctity of the person.
We need only recall, for instance, the scandalous 
'breaking and entering' which is involved in the use 
of what IS contradictorily called 'truth serum'--as if 
truth in the pure and noble sense of the word had any­
thing to do with the possible results of an injection 
of any kind.3
 ̂Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. hh.pMarcel, Human Dignity, p. 165*
^Ibid.. pp. 165-166.
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Here a concerted effort is made to destroy the dignity, 
self-respect, and sense of decency in each person. The goal 
is to transform each individual, little by little, into human 
waste products, hating and being hated.
'The Germans,' writes Madame Jacqueline Richet about 
Ravensbruck, 'sought by every conceivable means to 
degrade us. They exploited every kind of cowardice, 
they excited every kind of jealousy and stimulated and 
encouraged every kind of hate. One had to make a 
daily effort to sustain one's moral integrity. The 
veneer of civilization soon rubs away, and one sees 
that society ladies are not the last among us to start 
behaving like fishwives'!^
Madame Richet continues by observing that a good education, 
a good background does not always guarantee against a shock­
ing moral collapse under the pressure of hunger. Women 
willingly become the mistresses of beastly commandants, others 
laugh at the brutalities of 8.8. guards in order to avoid 
being struck themselves. 8pying and talebearing make life 
impossible.
'We had been condemned to perish in our own dirt, to 
drown ourselves in mud, in our own excrements; the 
point was to abase us, to humiliate our human dignity, 
to drag us down to the level of the beasts, to fill us 
with horror and contempt for ourselves and our fellow- 
suffers. That was the purpose, that was the idea of 
the camp! The Germans were perfectly aware of it; they 
knew that we prisoners had become incapable of looking 
at each other without disgust.'2
One can see, that for the torturers, it was not so much a
matter of subjecting their victims in material circumstances
1 Jacqueline Richet, Trois Bagnes, quoted in Gabriel 
Marcel-. Man Against lyfass Society  ̂ p. 42 =
^Lewinska, Vingt Mois a Auschwitz, quoted in Gabriel 
Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. ^3.
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so abject that they were bound to acquire the habits of
animals; more subtly, it was a matter of degrading these
persons morally by encouraging them to betray one another
and by fomenting resentment and mutual suspicion; in short,
"of poisoning the wells of human relationship so that a
prisoner who should have been . . .  a comrade and a brother,
became instead an enemy, a demon, an incubus.
'Human beings were inoculated quite consciously with 
the bacillus of depravity, so that they should be de­
moralized, slain morally and physically, as we destroy 
lice and noxious microbes; and, just like the. lice 
which throve on our defenceless bodies, so the dregs 
of the camp, prostitutes, women thieves, offenders 
against the common law, penetrated into our social
life: it was to these human dregs that the Germans had
entrusted the task of watching over us and it was of 
them that they had made an elite under the name of 
'camp functionaries.'2
It appears that one must lose all self-respect be­
fore he can treat others of the human race without funda­
mental respect. The persecutor sets out to destroy in 
another person the value he holds of himself.
How does a Streicher or a Himmler fundamentally esti­
mate the Jew whom he is persecuting? Apparently he 
looks on this Jew as the rubbish, the waste, the 
leavings of the human race. But is not this irrational 
contempt the inverted expression of a feeling which in 
reality is much closer to envy? Is not ambivalence of
feeling here more or less the rule?3
^Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 1+4.
^Lewinska, Vingt Mois à Auschwitz, quoted in Gabriel 
Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p p . 4l-44.
3Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 46.
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Drained of all self-respect, lowered to the level of 
a beast, human beings by the thousands experienced the 
ultimate in dehumanization in the concentration camps of 
World War II Germany. No doubt the greater share of the 
world's population didn't think modern man capable of treat­
ing his fellows with so little respect. Civilization surely 
had progressed beyond this state of carnal and enlightened 
savagery. Yet it did happen! The greatest tragedy did not 
consist of the physical suffering endured but the ensuing 
spiritual degeneration. Man became totally dehumanized-- 
worse, in some instances, than animals.
Nonetheless, there are many today blindly following 
the path of abstraction and technolatry which ultimately 
consigns man to nothing more than thinghood. The overtones 
of this approach are indeed frightening. Though the final 
results may not be apparent, the tragic end is inescapable. 
VJhether in a concentration camp or lost in a collectivized 
society, man tends toward dehumanization, thus losing his 
sense of being if not his soul.
The Logical Consequences of 
Dehumanization: Nihilism
While the extreme depths of dehumanization were ex­
perienced by countless thousands in the concentration camps, 
yet no mention has been made of the millions throughout the 
world adversely affected by recent wars. Displacement, dis­
illusionment, and disorientation have followed in their
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wake. Consequently, the dark cloud of nihilism has hovered 
over much the earth.
During the past century the term nihilism has gen­
erally indicated the denial of the worth of being or beings ; 
however, a double meaning has emerged more recently:
On the one hand, the term is widely used to denote the 
doctrine that moral norms or standards cannot be justi­
fied by rational argument. On the other hand, it is 
widely used to denote a mood of despair over the empti­
ness or triviality of human existence.1
This dual meaning appears to have arisen from the rapid growth
of both atheism and moral relativity in the past decades.
Even though the t g ^ ^ ^ v  to associate nihilism with 
atheism continues during the course of the
twentieth century^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^BLlist has somewhat 
changed. This change the
analysis nihfi^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hliences. Oftentimes 
today the member#NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNBIpion tend to think of 
the nihilist not alNINNININNININNINNNNiring atheist but as a
For them nihilism is caused not so much by atheism as 
by industrialization and social pressures, and its 
typical consequences are not selfishness or suicide but 
indifference, ironical detachment, or sheer b a f f l e m e n t . 2
The term nihilism, as used herein, denotes the feel­
ing of utter worthlessness that possesses a human being upon 
the loss of his true sense of being. It is accompanied by a
^Robert G-. Olson, "Nihilism," Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 1st ed., V, p1^-5l7«
^Ibid.. pp. 51^-517.
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wake. Consequently, the dark cloud of nihilism has hovered 
over much the earth.
During the past century the term nihilism has gen­
erally indicated the denial of the worth of being or beings; 
however, a double meaning has emerged more recently;
On the one hand, the term is widely used to denote the 
doctrine that moral norms or standards cannot be justi­
fied by rational argument. On the other hand, it is 
widely used to denote a mood of despair over the empti­
ness or triviality of human existence.1
This dual meaning appears to have arisen from the rapid growth
of both atheism and moral relativity in the past decades.
Even though the tendency to associate nihilism with
atheism continues to the present, yet during the course of the
twentieth century the image of the nihilist has somewhat
changed. This occurred with a corresponding change in the
analysis of nihilism's causes and consequences. Oftentimes
today the members of the younger generation tend to think of
the nihilist not as a cynical or despairing atheist but as a
robot-like conformist.
For them nihilism is caused not so much by atheism as 
by industrialization and social pressures, and its 
typical consequences are not selfishness or suicide but 
indifference, ironical detachment, or sheer b a f f l e m e n t . ^
The term nihilism, as used herein, denotes the feel­
ing of utter worthlessness that possesses a human being upon 
the loss of his true sense of being. It is accompanied by a
^Robert G. Olson, "Nihilism," Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 1st ed., V,
^Ibid.. pp. 51^-5 1 7.
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mood of pessimism and despair over the emptiness and useless­
ness of existence. Meaninglessness haunts his path, nothing­
ness pervades his future. In the backwash and aftermath of 
war one can always find such Individuals, sometimes In the 
form of the refugee, the displaced person.
Marcel suggests that an Interesting study can be 
made of this Individual, the refugee, who has forcibly been 
cut loose from all his moorings. He takes as his own point 
of departure the remarkable analysis which was made by the 
German philosopher Hans Zehrer entitled Man In This World. 
This author manifests an extraordinarily lucid awareness of 
the situation of contemporary man. He concentrates his at­
tention first of all on what he calls the barracks man.
Here a vivid picture Is painted of dehumanized man, the 
typical refugee.
This man Is about mid-forty. With graying hair and 
Ironic smile he has experienced somewhat of a "freezing" of 
the traits. This man has possessed a family, house with 
furnishings, a farm with animals and chickens. Not only were 
his parents living, but he had a wife, children and close 
friends living In the neighborhood. But now, as he Is ob­
served, he possesses nothing but the clothes on his back.
He works eight hours a day, repairs the same system of roads, 
returns to the same shelter at night and eats moderately good 
food. His life Is a routine, his needs are met and he always
^See fn. p. 172.
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speaks with a reserve. He talks occasionally of his former 
possessions, his family and his farm. For a few short min­
utes he lives again. He becomes a human being in the present, 
whereas he was one in the past; again he falls into his 
stolid silence. But before he does he manages to ask a 
question, always the same, and not expecting to obtain an 
answer: Who am I? What am I living for, and what is the
meaning of all this?
The State can furnish no answer to his question.
The best it can do is speak of employment, social security 
and the like. Society has no answer. It can only speak of 
emergency relief and aid to refugees. Nothing but abstrac­
tions! In the universe in which he circulates, this man no 
longer presents a living reality. He is a number on a filing 
card with a corresponding folder containing a few more facts. 
Yet he is more than just that. He is a real human being, 
with a memorable past. He owned a certain house on a par­
ticular piece of land. He had a family of his own who were 
also individuals. He speaks of his animals each one of 
which had a name. And it is to all this that the man refers 
when he asks his unanswered question: Who am I? What is
the meaning of all this? Others about him can only im­
perfectly understand his question, for who has lost country,
home, and all that one has loved? Ihe problem is multiplied 
when one is aware of the fact that the concern of this one
individual is the same for all who live in the same
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barracks-room. The question is like a cloud which floats
above the entire camp, and other similar camps. In fact it 
hangs over the entire country.
Nothing prepared the barracks man for the asking of 
this question. Once upon a time he knew who he was and why 
he existed. But the years slip by, he continues to be tor­
mented, he is disoriented, his mind is often a blank, he is 
worn down by this question without an answer.
That it arises before the obscure abyss of nothingness, 
before the absolute void, this is his destiny. A 
strange and incomprehensible power has stolen from him 
everything which constituted his home, everything which 
permitted him to take on form.1
But this man is not simply there on his own account for he
represents a multitude, a particular era in the course of
Western thought: "He is also the last link of an historical
development. He marks its ultimate possibility. For thirty
years this question has been in the making for a whole
2continent, and soon for the entire planet."
And so Marcel has graphically depicted the growing 
plight of all men by the plight of the displaced person in 
the aftermath of war. Cut loose from all his moorings the 
refugee drifts aimlessly on, not able to reestablish his 
self-identity. Uprooted from his former setting he no longer 
recognizes his self-image in an entirely alien land. His 
physical uprooting typifies the more serious and genuine
^Marcel, Problematic Man. p. 20.
^Ibid,,, p. 21 .
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inner -uprooting experienced by countless thousands in recent 
years. Both kinds of severance bring men face to face with 
an enervating nothingness and a bland meaninglessness. This 
is the logical consequence of the dehumanizing process. All 
appears hollow and paltry in the presence of this end.
Why have I thought it necessary to reproduce in its 
broad lines this analysis which, at a superficial 
glance, seems to concern but an extreme case, that of 
the unfortunate whom one designates by a rather ir­
ritating euphemism as displaced persons? It is because 
in reality, in a situation like that of our world 
today, nihilism is contagious, and it is precisely upon 
this contagion that we have to concentrate our atten­
tion. 1
If one really finds himself in the presence of the barracks 
man, faced in his imagination with the same concrete condi­
tions out of which arise these basic questions: Who am I?
What am I living for? he cannot escape feeling inwardly 
affected and in the end addressed by such questions himself.
First of all, one must realize that this extreme 
outcome might be his tomorrow. He is made to realize the 
precarious and contingent character of the conditions which 
constitute the framework of his own existence. He recog­
nizes that there is no guarantee of absolute continuance of 
his present, normal surroundings as he so often assumes.
The physical pilgrimage on which the refugee has entered 
prefigures the earthly sojourn of Marcel’s homo viator:
One can say, in short, that meaninglessness is 
spreading before our eyes. A strange inner mutation 
is thereby produced which takes on the aspect of a
^Ibid., p. 21.
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genuine uprooting. Entirely new questions are being 
asked, they insist upon being asked where one hitherto 
seemed to be in an order which contained its own 
justification; it is the very order to which the bar­
racks man belonged in the days when he was still a 
living being, when he was in the present.1
In returning to the question of the barracks man, 
one is reminded that no real answer is forthcoming from the 
Marxist nor from any similar atheistic movement. On the 
contrary it is in the name of Marxism "that countless beings 
have been placed in conditions which strip them of all con-
pCrete reality."
It seems that, on the whole, a certain bleeding 
heart of the human being, of human existence, has been 
laid bare in our time, under conditions which render 
profoundly suspicious, for a lucid mind, any attempt 
to cover it up again, to dissimulate it.3
Seeing one's own personal condition, through the eyes 
of the barracks man makes him realize that taking his own 
conditions of existence for granted appears to be a mere 
impudence. As he becomes detached from these conditions 
which he spontaneously treated as self-evident, the conse­
quence of this detachment is that suddenly, he too, no 
longer knows who he is.
What historical events led to the transfers of popu­
lation or the massive deportations which have resulted in 
the development of the barracks man?
But one can certainly remark that there occurred in 
the nineteenth century a conjunction of nationalism
llbid.. p. 22. ^Ibid.. p. 24.
3lbid.. p. 24.
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on the one hand, and of the industrial revolution on 
the other, whose effects have been extremely harmful 
to man.1
One could not stop here, for it would be necessary to in­
vestigate how nationalism and industrialism developed con­
jointly, and also what consequences they have had for the 
image which man has formed of himself. Later, with the 
accent on reason and individualism, an accompanying de­
vitalization of religion occurred. Liberalism, Marxism, 
and Socialism followed in the ensuing years ultimately 
eventuating in wars that played a role in further weakening 
the sense of personal dignity in man.
Marcel, however, feels that the essential is else­
where. "I will dare to say, for my part, that the process 
which results in the barracks man and in the anxious ques­
tioning around which all these reflections gravitate, is a 
genuine necrosis whose principle is metaphysical."^
In a general way, if we consider the historical 
and sociological evolution such as it has taken place 
for the past two centuries, it seems that man has lost 
his divine reference: he ceases to confront a God as
His creature and image. Might not the death of God, 
in the exact sense that Nietzsche has given to these 
words, be at the origin of the fact that man has become 
for himself a question without an answer?3
Marcel thus points-up the exact source of man's trouble, his
self-alienation from God. From his characteristic stance he
views man as a displaced person in reference to his original
^Ibid.. p. 27. ^Ibid.. p. 29-
^Ibid., p. 29.
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position before God. He is a spirit in a materialistically-
oriented world. He seeks his homeland, the spirit world.
His alienation from God is a result of his own rebellion.
He no longer needs God. He has repudiated him as his
Creator. As far as man is concerned, God is dead, and man
has helped to kill Him! Nietzsche notes the futility of it
all in The Will to Power;
The nihilist is the man who, regarding the world as- it 
is, judges that it should not be, and regarding the 
world as it should be, judges that it does not exist: 
from them on, empirical reality has no meaning.1
Cut off from hope, facing despair, experiencing 
alienation from God, himself, and others, modern man withers 
on the vine, for his source of life has been severed. It is 
but natural for him to face a great nothingness. Life 
devoid of purpose, design, and the personal care of the 
Creator holds but bleak prospect.
Nihilism should thus be seen as the end of a 
process of decomposition which takes place from the 
moment when, in one way or another, the original 
plenitude of past experience has fallen apart; and we 
should think here of withering and death, for it is 
therein that we find the most visible, the most sig­
nificant expression of this process.2
This is the end of the road for the dehumanized soul. With
all demand for being gone, participation in communion with
others a thing of the past, modern man has reached the level
of meaninglessness. He no longer recognizes himself since
^Nietzsche, m e  Will to Power, quoted in Gabriel 
Marcel, Problematic Man. p. 33«
pMarcel, Problematic Man. pp. 41-42.
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the self is constituted by others. There are no thou's re­
maining in his life, only it's. Becoming an island unto 
himself he deteriorates slowly, but ever so surely as a 
person. In a very real sense the remainder of his days is 
nothing but a hopeless marking of time. This is the logical 
consequence of dehumanization.
Man, trapped in the throes of an industrialized and 
materialistic society, does not present an encouraging pic­
ture. He struggles on, remembering the satisfactions of a 
better day. Most modern philosophers and psychologists 
agree with Marcel that there is a basic restlessness in man. 
He is a nostalgic being, longing for a fulfillment which 
constantly eludes him. Anxiousness pervades his being for 
he is ill at ease with himself, forever seeking to transcend 
his estrangement. But what can be made of this ceaseless 
searching, this hunger for transcendence, this nostalgia for 
being? At this point the way divides with different modern 
philosophers choosing different forks.
One way, that taken by Sartre, Camus and most of 
the influential contemporary thinkers, leads to an 
understanding of the restless longing of man as evidence 
for the absurdity of existence, Man has the desire for 
eternity in his heart. He longs for justice and ful­
filment. But he lives, condemned to die in a world 
filled with injustice and tragedy. In spite of the ab­
surdity of existence, man inevitably chooses to quiet 
his fears with dreams of hope. Hence, the only ap­
propriate epitaph for man is that supplied by Sartre,
'Man is a useless passion,'1
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, pp. 16-17*
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This first approach to man’s predicament is the answer given 
by most nontheistic existentialists. Little wonder the pre­
vailing mood among them is nihilistic. But there is an 
alternate route:
The other path, taken by religious thinkers of all 
ages, is the way taken by Marcel and the so-called 
'theistic existentialists.' This way leads to an 
understanding of the nostalgia for being as a token, 
a foretaste, an earnest, of man's participation in an 
eternal order in which tragedy is no longer the rule of 
life and in which death has no dominion. To belong in 
promise to this order is to remain a wayfarer in time, a 
homo viator: wondering as we wander, yet daring to
have faith that the mystery of being intends fulfilment 
and not frustration as the ultimate destiny of man.1
Each man in his day and his way must choose which path to
follow. His choice reflects not only his world view but
also determines the atmosphere surrounding his earthly
Journey. The former Sartrean way is plagued by despair and
absurdity, while the latter Marcellian path is laden with
hope and meaningfulness.
Concluding Statement 
From an apparently innocent beginning in the legit­
imate field of technology, through the gradual development of 
the spirit of abstraction and on to the implementation of the 
technological mentality, the modern technologist has often 
reduced man to a manipulable object. Man loses his freedom 
and dignity in the process of this abstraction. These tech­
niques of degradation stem from a kind of mental imperialism,
^Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 17.
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the will to power, in which the technician seeks to possess 
and control other human heings. Unnoticed in the ordinary 
world, these techniques manifested themselves in the 
totalitarian regimes of recent years, revealing all their 
dehumanizing horror in the concentration camps of World 
War II.
Though not as extreme, yet more far-reaching are the 
dehumanizing forces of modern industrialism. Under these 
pressures men tend to lose their ontological desire. A 
further complication is seen in the fact that a materialis­
tically-oriented science has loosed men from their moorings 
and many are adrift on the sea of atheism and doubt. Their 
horizons are bounded by alienation, despair, and nihilism. 
Troubled, fearful, and anxious they make their way toward an 
uncertain future. Sartrean-like they doggedly struggle on. 
Condemned to be free, they are aware of staggering responsi­
bilities which they prefer to shun. Purposelessness and 
nihilistic forebodings characterize their existence.
Not so with the men of Marcel's world. Though living 
in the same world they have discovered purpose and meaning. 
Through sinuous paths they find encouragement by the presence 
of others. True identity is discovered by participation in 
being. A spirit of camaraderie is engendered as faith, hope, 
and fidelity fill their hearts. A pervasive oneness is 
evidenced by a deep sharing in the mystery of being. Thus,
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homo viator presses on to journey's end, intractably drawn 
toward The Person in whom he finds fulfillment of his person.
VALUES AND INSIGHTS
In onr study of Marcel's concept of the dehumaniza­
tion of man a number of values have emerged and new insights
have been gained. This closing section contains a brief 
recapitulation of the more significant results of the study.
The Magnitude and Contemporary 
Relevance of the Problem
One of the more distressing features of this in­
vestigation is the fact that the problem of dehumanization
is of far greater magnitude than originally suspected. Ap­
parently, this process has pervaded most nations where in­
dustrialization has taken place, the population has exploded, 
or war has ravaged the land. The more advanced nations, 
technologically, have tended to export their abstractive 
know-how to the developing nations of the world. The tech­
nological mentality has increasingly become a necessity in 
the fight for survival among the highly competitive com­
munity of nations. For example, the evidences of technol- 
atry can be noted in the further industrialization of Japan 
since World War II, where these westernizing influences have 
threatened the loss of the distinctive, oriental culture.
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The extent to which dehumanization has invaded even 
the privacy of the American home is typified in the detailed 
and private information demanded by the U,S. Census Bureau in 
its census-taking activity of 1970» Some forms require 
nearly an hour to complete and pose questions concerning 
intimate matters. All of these facts are demanded as needed 
statistics by a bureaucratic agency for future governmental 
planning. Fine and imprisonment await the uncooperative.
The ever-widening effects of the technological 
mentality are evidenced on every hand. Their presence can be 
detected in many of the pressing problems of the day. Ac­
cording to a recent publication, man is literally encompassed 
by this web of technology:
The urge to manipulate others, whether to 'solve' a 
'problem' or to build an empire, begins in the nursery.
It becomes monstrous not only because of personal 
kinks in the parents' relationships but also because 
of the kind of world in which the parents live and the 
values they serve. It is affected by and affects 
every aspect of our existence, from the way we treat 
our school mates to the way we make love to the way we 
rear our children.1
Much of the protest and rebellion on college 
campuses can be traced to the impersonal and dehumanizing 
forces at work. In a recent, nation-wide survey made by the 
staff of a highly reputable news magazine, corroborating 
evidence of this fact was discovered:
Basic point made by many students was that uni­
versities have become too big. Young men and women
^George B. Leonard, "The Future of Power," Look, 
January 13, 1970, pp. 36-^0.
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protested they had become mimbers. They spoke of a 
sense of isolation . . .
’It is an impersonal school in an impersonal city. 
It's dehumanizingo No wonder students are rebelling—  
they want to live as human beings relating to their 
society, not as regimented numbers.'1
George Leonard recently wrote prophetically concern­
ing the danger of boredom which accompanies the techno­
logical society: "Mass boredom holds a revolutionary poten­
tial greater than that now possessed by SDS, the Black
2Panthers and all other activist groups combined." While it 
is not claimed that a technologically-based society is re­
sponsible in every case for all the troubles of the day, yet 
its powerful effects on man cannot be minimized. Consider 
the following reports:
Riots and mass violence are erupting in one country 
after another, all around the world.
In a single month of spring, more than a score of 
nations have been hit , , .
Yet almost everywhere, the strategy of protest-- 
against almost everything--is the same: violence.
Officials in many countries are seriously con­
cerned as to why--at a time of peace between most 
nations— people in so many places have fallen to fight­
ing among themselves.3
True, these disturbing reports appear to be world-wide,
coming from both the technical and non-technical nations.
A close examination of some of the outbreaks seems to
'"What’s Really Wrong With Colleges," U.8. News and 
World Report, June 16, 1969, pp, 36-38.
^George B. Leonard, "A Place for Snakes," Look, 
January 13, 1970, pp. 8O-85,
^"Why the Riots All Over the World," U.S. News and 
World Report. June 16, 1969, PP- 33-35*
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suggest there is a relation between a high incidence of 
mass violence in a given country and the extent oo which 
that country has been industrialized and technologically 
oriented. People tend to have a growing resentment against 
the dehumanizing forces which usually accompany industrial­
ization.
The Importance of Secondary Reflection 
in the Cognitive Process
Marcel's unique contribution to the field of 
epistemology is found in his method of secondary reflection. 
This is the essential approach, to him, in the study of man. 
While science follows the path of primary reflection (i.e. 
assessing objects in the external world through sense per­
ception), the nature of man can only be understood by one's 
participation in being. This requires an ontological hu­
mility which recognizes a depth in being which surpasses 
and includes the inquirer. It is the profound acknowledg­
ment of finitude.
Marcel suggests that at the beginning of philosophical 
inquiry lies a blinded intuition, one that is little aided by 
formal reasoning, if at all. It is the native cognitive 
power of the spirit. Though it is prior to reason it is not 
anti-rational, simply preconceptual. Marcel's sinuous move­
ment of thought is not a random deviation, for it contains 
the notion of a direction. While he feels that observation 
can acquaint one with the outer world of things, yet
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participation in being is necessary for one to come to an 
understanding of man. In this respect, the methods of 
science are inadequate for the study of man.
In the Bergsonian tradition, Marcel emphasizes the
intuitive niture of self-knowledge. It is accompanied by
its own inner assurance, for outer verification speaks only
of a world of sense perception. Marcel's approach, in a
novel and crucial way, can be called Augustinian.
The Augustinian experience is of a self whelmed in 
being and truth. Nothing could better express the 
central Marcellian insight than St. Augustine's 'To 
know the truth, we must be in the truth. ' We might 
even attempt to sum up his essentially un-abbreviable 
method with this shorthand expression: to philosophize
is to utter the being which is present unuttered. The 
cardinal point which Marcel does not cease to empha­
size is that this utterance is an effluence of our 
liberty: being can only be attested freely.
The indubitable presence of being, its free 
attestation--upon these two points hinges our under­
standing of almost everything in Marcel's thought.1
Perhaps knowledge comes only through the intuitive 
grasp experienced in participation of presence. Marcel 
intimates that intuition is possibly the language of the 
spirit, something like a sixth sense. It is not anti- 
rational, but rather suprarational. Through participation 
in being, presence, and communion the knowledge of self and 
others is attained. This is a creative and suggestive ap­
proach to the cognitive process.
1 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, p. 8.
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Marcel’s Contribution to Personality Theory 
Some contemporary theories of personality are predi­
cated on the basis of man's being nothing more than a 
highly complex animal; consequently, many modern psychol­
ogists make no effort to define man as a person. Their ef­
forts are directed to defining personality and to under­
standing its formation and function. Man, from this 
particular psychological viewpoint, is simply an organism 
functioning in a given environmental setting. His patterns 
of response to the stimuli received make up his behavior, 
the study of which is the study of personality. The person 
of man is hereby eliminated from any further consideration.
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, when 
psychology became accepted as a science, the question of a 
psychic agent (or soul) which regulates, guides, and con­
trols man's behavior has been repeatedly raised and dis­
cussed, only to be rejected as unscientific. Currently, it 
would be somewhat difficult to find a psychologist who would 
admit of an inner entity or soul which is the real self that
directs the activity of the individual in a purposive way.
In the midst of dissenting views Marcel has set 
forth his concept of being, his theory of the person as a
spirit created in the image of God, immortal, free, and of
divine origin. The entire burden of his philosophical work 
rests on the value and potential resident in man, as a 
spirit, incarnate in a body. One of Marcel's key concepts
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centers on the drive, thrust, hunger in man towards fullness 
of being, namely, the concept of ontological exigence. This 
exigence is experienced through participation in being with 
others. One of the confusing facets about Marcel's view of 
the self is due to his failure to make a clear distinction 
between the self as a person and the self as a personality. 
Marcel insists that the self (being), evidently as a 
personality in this case, is constituted by others. His 
accent on intersubjectivity in the development of the self 
has something in common with the interpersonal theory of 
personality as set forth by the noted psychologist,
Harry Stack Sullivan.^ Sullivan viewed personality as a 
hypothetical entity which could not be isolated from inter­
personal situations. Marcel's view of personality involved 
the mutual enrichment (if not constitution) of the I and 
thou through faith, fidelity, and love. He further intro­
duced the concept of disponibilité! which signifies openness 
and accessibility to others. As a major contribution to the 
field of personality theory, Marcel sets forth a philo­
sophical justification for the existence of the person that 
is both intellectually respectable and psychologically 
sound.
■1See Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories 
of Personality (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957)»
p. 134.
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The Interrelatedness of Phllosophv 
and Theology
This study awakened a new Interest in the inter­
relatedness of philosophy and theology. Marcel's early 
homelife was beset by conflicting ideas about religion.
Even though he seemed temperamentally inclined towards re­
ligion, he avoided discussions of it throughout young man­
hood; however, his metaphysical speculations during these 
years gave evidence of strong religious interests.
Marcel has never manifested a hostile attitude 
toward theological speculation. Even his earlier writings 
do not accent differences between philosophical and theo­
logical thought. Instead, there is growing evidence of a 
congeniality between the two disciplines as viewed by him.
His baptism into the Catholic faith in adulthood is somewhat 
indicative of the integration he had personally achieved in 
his thinking between the two fields. Philosophy and the­
ology became complementary to each other, not competitive. 
Marcel views them as partners, neither one being master or 
slave. In his perspective each has a role to play. Phil­
osophy performs its task by resolving the problems in the 
natural realm after a rational pattern. Theology follows 
the route of faith in discovering the truths of the super­
natural world. Interestingly enough, he allows full play 
of intuitive grasp in both fields. Since Marcel is committed 
to the pursuit of truth, he welcomes its discovery wherever 
and however it is found.
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The confluence of these two disciplines, philosophy 
and theology, affords mutual reinforcement in the develop­
ment of basic concepts. The concept of man is a case in 
point. The Biblical approach to man emphasizes his God-like 
being, spiritual in nature and of supreme value. Man's po­
tential for becoming a full and enriched being is con­
stantly accented in the Scriptures. Marcel's philosophic 
approach to man closely parallels that found in the Bible.
His major concern is for man to escape the dehumanizing ef­
fects of this world and to find fulfillment of being.
Marcel's man inhabits a teleologically structured universe 
which gives evidence of plan and purpose. Absurdity and 
nihilism find no place in his world, for it is permeated with 
divine purpose.
A number of Marcel's philosophical views have been 
tinctured by his theological presuppositions. On the other 
hand, he carefully tests these presuppositions to see that 
philosophical evidence is at hand to warrant their ac­
ceptance. For example, with a broad understanding of the 
Biblical account of the Fall, he weaves this doctrine into 
his world view, for he finds the world, in all reality, to 
be broken. Man is consequently viewed as a pilgrim and 
wanderer in search of a fulfillment to be found in its en­
tirety only in the world to come.
With the discerning eye of an Old Testament seer, 
Marcel notes, with a sense of foreboding, the apocalyptic
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situation developing in this atomic age. His more recent 
writings give evidence of a sense of urgency, for the day is 
pregnant with the seeds of both utopian promise or hellish 
destruction. Man holds the key. Capable of approaching the 
situation from both vantage points, philosophical and the­
ological, Marcel gains a fix that suggests the accuracy of a 
mariner charting his course on a troubled sea.
While Marcel began his philosophic quest many years 
ago, he was ultimately led by it to an examination of his 
theological views, and thence to his conversion. Philosophy 
was not cast aside at this point, but was accorded a place 
of greater importance as a supporting and purifying agent to 
his faith. He views the relation of these two great disci­
plines as simply different sides of the same coin. While 
this is not necessarily a new approach, yet it is par­
ticularly refreshing in a day when much is made of the in­
compatibility of faith and reason.
Emergence of Urgent Problems 
Calling For Studv
In making an investigation of such a crucial problem 
as the dehumanization of man, one is impressed by the part 
it plays in other important issues facing modern man. The 
danger of specializing in the study of one particular problem 
often lies in the tendency to consider the part as the whole. 
When this occurs, the examiner usually loses perspective, 
failing to see the relationships which exist among the
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several parts. In an effort to avoid needless constric­
tion, the writer poses in this section a number of serious 
problems in which technolatry and the resultant dehumaniza­
tion are vital factors. These interlocking areas of con­
cern have surfaced during the preparation of this 
dissertation and suggest the direction which future research 
might take. Most of these problems are in urgent need of 
solution if the further deterioration of man is to be 
checked.
1 . How can man deal efficiently with the rapidly growing 
masses without becoming abstractive in his relation­
ships with individuals? As the population increases, 
both government and business must maintain ever- 
increasing files on persons. How can this abstractive 
and necessary file work be done without the spirit of 
abstraction permeating all other areas of personal 
contact?
2. What are the limitations, opportunities, and responsi­
bilities imposed upon man by the vast network of inter­
dependence created by modern technology? Science and 
technology have increased the need for specialization 
to the point of men becoming crucially dependent on 
each other's skill and services. People are tightly 
linked together, especially in metropolitan areas. What 
are the implications of this new, complex relationship?
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3. How can man effectively manage the population explosion? 
Medical science has been so successful in lowering 
infant mortality, controlling disease, and extending 
life expectancy that the world's population has been 
increasing at a frightening rate in recent years. 
Dwindling food supplies and overcrowded conditions con­
front man with the simple choice: fewer births or more
deaths. Could there be a relationship between over­
crowded communities and a high incidence of neuroses, 
hunger, immorality, and crime?
k. How can an industrialized society live in its own pol­
luted environment? Poisonous wastes fill the air, water, 
and land. Will man die, the victim of his own pol­
lutants, or will ways be found to make him responsible 
for their proper elimination? Ihe despoliation of the 
environment has created a tremendous ecological problem, 
the solution of which is the announced national concern 
during this decade.
5. What effective means can be implemented to control the 
proliferation of modern weapons of warfare? The more 
recent discoveries of science, combined with advanced 
technologies, have made possible tools of destruction 
nearly beyond the imagination. As these weapons Increase 
in number the probabilities of their being used also 
mount. Is there a way to control this tendency towards 
mass suicide?
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6. In the midst of dehumanizing forces, how does one go 
about rediscovering the value of man? The value of the 
whole man must be found--not of the intellect only, but 
of the heart as well. There is a great American need 
for passion and caring. There are ways to learn a life 
of vibrant awareness of others. A person robbed of his 
ability to feel deeply can never really care about 
others. The objective, non-involved approach of the past 
has made many into unfeeling machines. The next few 
years will certainly reveal that caring deeply for others 
is now as necessary as food, air, and water.
7. How does one recapture meaning and purpose in life? Only 
as man is restored to his proper place, sensing the dig­
nity of being, will he lay hold of proper commitment to 
worthwhile goals. Nothing so corrupts the national life 
as the absence of compelling new visions of the good.
With nothing really exciting to become and be, people can 
soon lose the will to save themselves. The loss of 
ontological exigence eventuates in meaningless living.
The Benefits of Close Studv of Marcel 
Indubitably one of the greatest values derived from 
this study comes as a result of living in the presence of 
Marcel these many months. Through the reading and reflection 
necessitated thereby, I feel that I have come to know the 
man better— a man of brillance and goodness.
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Marcel exemplifies a balanced philosophie approach 
to life that is both wholesome and attractive. While he 
definitely accents the priority of intuition over reason in 
coming to an understanding of man, yet he proceeds to de­
velop a concrete philosophy based on both reason and experi­
ence. To him, a genuine, intuitive sense of direction is 
verified in the actual experiences of life. Theory and prac­
tice find happy union in his approach; subjectivity and 
objectivity achieve a proper balance.
Disponibilité is the term which Marcel has chosen to 
describe the characteristic of being that always accompanies 
presence. It involves the openhearted giving of oneself to 
an other. Availability, invitation to communion, ready 
access, and a warm extension of understanding typify the 
disponible person. This is the pattern of Marcel's being 
which glows so unmistakably throughout his writings.
Marcel's life and spirit undergird his philosophy. 
Though not always in agreement with him, one tends to have 
the profoundest respect for him--a greathearted man in love 
with life, his brothers, and his God. Lingering in his 
presence evokes enrichment of being.
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